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Abstract
This thesis is an empirical and theoretical study of the causes in the rapid 
economic growth of selected East Asian economies (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand) during the years 1971-2000. Firstly, we set out a nonparametric 
estimations of the Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) o f the aforementioned 
countries. It can be concluded that the estimated TFPGs o f these countries are higher 
than that of the US. This implies that the TFP gaps between the East Asian countries and 
the US have narrowed. An increase in productivity of human capital-augmented labour 
rather than an increase in that of physical capital is suggested to be a dominant factor in 
explaining the rising of TFP in the selected East Asian economies.
Secondly, to quantify the extent to which the TFP gaps have narrowed, we 
estimate the relative TFP levels o f the selected East Asian countries and the US. Both 
parametric and non-parametric estimations show that the US remains as the country with 
the highest TFP level. However, apart from South Korea, the rate o f change in the U S’s 
TFP level was lower than the catching-up East Asian countries especially Japan. Thus, 
the economic growth miracle of the selected East Asia economies might be explained by 
the productivity convergence between the countries and the advanced country (i.e. the 
US) rather than just input accumulation.
We construct a theoretical model to explore differences in TFP levels across 
countries using a framework based on interaction between labour unions, government 
policies, and TFP levels. Model simulation suggests that the presence o f monopoly rights 
reduce the productivity level by 2/3. Moreover, an increase in the competition from 
substitute products helps tackle the resistance from insiders yielding higher productivity 
of the incumbent firms. Nonetheless, with a strong labour union of an industry, the 
introduction of new firms (with the same output) competing in the market may have an 
adverse effect on the firms’ productivity level. Lastly, to promote an increase in the 
productivity level of a nation, a policy encouraging a wider choice of final products 
offered to consumers is recommended.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
In the light o f studies concerning economic growth, differences in income among 
nations has been a fruitful research topic. One central question which needed to be 
answered is why some countries are rich and getting richer and some are still poor. 
According to the prior literature, one can categorise explanations of income differences 
among the nations into two groups. The first group explains these differences in terms o f  
economic variables such as a country’s natural endowments (e.g. natural resources, 
population and its growth rate), capital accumulation, and technological progress. These 
factors play the key roles in most o f the economic growth literature, from the classical 
economic thought to the neoclassical growth model, and most recently the endogenous 
growth models. According to the classical economists, without any interventions, the 
invisible hand will allocate the available economic resources in the economy efficiently. 
In this view, economic growth seems to be a ‘natural’ phenomenon (Landes (1990)). 
Therefore, a nation will reach its optimum wealth without government intervention. 
However, economic expansion is confined to the limitation of natural resources under the 
fixed diminishing returns technology and a certain level o f population growth rate. As a 
result, neoclassical economists viewed, in the long run, the economy will reach its own 
steady state. The national income per capita will reach its optimum point, for any given 
fixed technology. Moreover, treating the production technology as a public consumption 
good among nations - the same technology is freely available for everyone and the use o f  
the technology in one country does not crowd out the returns of using the same 
technology in other countries, the technological level and thus income per capita of all 
nations will converge to the same level (under the assumption of perfect capital mobility 
between nations). Nevertheless, with the possibility of technological improvement, the 
long run growth rate of per capita income will solely be determined by the ability to 
achieve the higher level o f technology.
1.1 Background
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Abramovitz (1986) summarised the hypothesis o f technology convergence 
between nations, as that the productivity growth rates o f the technologically backward 
countries tend to be higher than those of advanced countries. However the hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that the technologically backward countries must have 
sufficiently developed social capabilities (e.g. education, politics, commercial, industrial, 
and financial institutions) in order to allow for full exploitability o f the best technology 
available. The speed o f convergence also depends on other factors such as: factors 
limiting the diffusion of knowledge (e.g. international trade and investment barriers, 
market competition, and industrial relations), the rate of structural change (i.e. the 
change from agricultural to industrial based economy), the accumulation o f capital, and 
the expansion of demand. Therefore, the different levels o f social capabilities among the 
nations can cause the productivity and thus income differences among them. Henceforth, 
the circumstances that lead to the difficulties o f adopting the best available technology 
will be called ‘barriers to technology’ (Parente & Prescott (2000) named this ‘barriers to 
riches’).
Clearly, economic theories alone cannot explain these sources o f income 
differences across the countries completely. A  second view is needed to further explain 
the causes of income differences between nations - the role of institutions. Relatively 
unfamiliar to the economists (though it is not new to sociologists (Rodgers (1994)), 
institutional factors arguably play a key role in explaining income inequality. The 
institutional economists recognise the differences between political systems, laws, 
industrial relations, market competition, norms, and other institutional factors as the 
intrinsic causes of the differences in the development experience of the country. The 
differences in these factors have lead to varying ways of life, ways of thinking, and thus 
an economic behaviour e.g. consumption, saving, investment, and production of the 
nation. An advanced economy can achieve its economic growth and its income target 
due to its support o f institutions. In contrast, a poor countiy remains poor because its 
own institutions act as obstacles to growth e.g. corruption and malevolent dictatorship.
Furthermore, Landes (1990) pointed out that bad politics and the unawareness of 
the new technology used by competitors can retard possible developments. For example, 
due to the poor communication systems of the late eighteenth century coupled with the
2
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unstable political situation in France at the time, the French industrialists were not aware 
o f new technologies used in English industries. However, with improved 
communications, the technological developments across the Channel became known to 
the French. The government of France later was expected to deliver the same standard o f  
services to their people. That is, impoverished political institutions and a lack o f  
knowledge of new technology caused the development gap between the two countries. 
Landes (1990) also suggested that much time is needed in creating a well functioning 
bureaucratic system similar to the present-day European countries. This may explain the 
income gap existing between the newly developing countries and the developed one. 
Likewise, he also suggested that the gaps between the rich and the poor countries have 
widened because knowledge and technology are too costly for the poor. In his view, 
these costs may be more than the opportunity cost o f not being rich. So, this destroys the 
motivation to be rich, and thus traps the poor in being poor forever. However, in the case 
of the developing countries with high economic growth rate (e.g. East Asian countries), 
this idea may not be applicable.
Considering market competition as a factor, the Schumpeter’ s followers believe 
that an innovator needs incentives to create new products, new services, new method of  
production techniques and management. Without proper incentives, there will be no new 
invention and no technical progress of the nation. Therefore, a monopoly rent earned 
from the market is a compulsory price to pay to the inventor. Hence, the monopoly rent 
protection policy such as intellectual property rights law is needed. However, the 
absolute monopoly power also leads to the lack of incentives to monopolising firms to 
invent since there is no other competitor. Therefore, to assure the continuing incentives 
to invent, the market must at least be contestable.
Moreover, a highly protected monopoly environment in the final product market 
may lead to labour slackness in both management and production levels. The 
management team can work without an incentive to compare their performance with 
their competitors. Similar arguments can be seen in Niclcell (1999). He suggested that 
there was evidence to support a negative relationship between the monopoly power in the 
product market and the productivity of the firms in this market. Furthermore, as stated in 
Parente & Prescott (2000), with a high degree of monopoly power in a final product
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market, an insider labour coalition can refuse to adopt a new technology as long as there 
is no threat from the new competitor. As a result, they suggested that the poor countries 
are still poor because, with the government’s compliance, there are too many monopoly 
rights in the economy.
In summary, from the productivity convergence hypothesis and supported 
literatures mentioned above, there are three main inherent elements that must be 
considered:
1) In the productivity convergence process, the productivity growth rates o f the 
technologically backward countries tend to be at a higher rate than that of the advanced 
countries.
2) If the first is true, then a convergence o f productivity levels between the 
developing and the advanced countries must be observed.
3) The productivity convergence hypothesis is based on the condition that the 
institutional factors within the developing countries allow the countries to adopt the best 
production technology available. Without sufficient support from institutional factors, 
productivity growth rates will be lowered and the convergence in productivity levels will 
be delayed or may never occur.
1.2) East Asian Economic Growth Controversies
Turning to the explanation of East Asian economic growth from the 1960s to the 
late 1990s, according to the idea about productivity convergence stated above, it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that the East Asian ‘economic growth miracle’ might be 
explained by the increasing in productivity levels o f countries in this region. Therefore, 
to test this hypothesis, many studies applied a technique called ‘Growth Accounting’ , 
discussed in the next chapter, to quantify a contribution of productivity growth in the 
East Asian economic development experience. Regarding the controversial works of 
Young (1993, 1995), he claimed that the cause of growth o f the countries in the region 
(Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea) was mainly input accumulation rather than 
productivity growth. He also showed slightly low or even negative total factor 
productivity growth (TFPG)1 for these four countries. Thus, in the view o f the
1 Detailed in Chapter 2
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neoclassical growth theorist, economic growth of these countries was predicted to be 
short-lived. When the East Asian economic crisis occurred in the late 1990s, the forecast 
seemed correct.
However, many studies that followed did not agree with such conclusion. Kim &  
Lu (1994) argued that the percentage contribution o f technology progress2 to GDP 
growth of the East Asian economy was moderately high (e.g. Korea (1960-90) 14%, 
Taiwan (1953-90) 15 % , Singapore (1964-90) 23%, and Hong Kong (1966-90) 35 % ). 
Moreover, Bosworth et al (1995) concluded that during 1960-1992, the TFP contribution 
(as a percent o f average total output growth per year) in East Asia was 11.9%. 
Nevertheless, comparing East Asian TFPG with the TFPG of industrialised countries, the 
figures o f East Asian economies were shown to be comparatively less significant. Sarel 
(1996) argued that according to the “relatively high” value o f capital share (0.45 
compared with 0.33, which is normally used) selected, the research of Young yielded a 
comparatively low TFPG. Additionally, he also doubted the “pessimistic” results o f  
Young by questioning the reliability o f capital estimation and estimation o f factors’ 
share. She also questioned the statistical error of these four economies, especially in 
labour participation figures.
Meanwhile, Hsieh (2000) also questioned the work of Young by using the 
standard primal and dual growth accounting double check process (proposed by Barro 
(1995)). By definition, the TFPG figures estimated from these two methods should be 
roughly equal. Therefore, he explained that the differences in TFPG figures of Singapore 
were caused by an over-estimated capital input and its inconsistent rental rate. Due to the 
unreliability o f the National Income Accounting system, he proposed that the dual 
growth accounting (which is based on the market price of the factor o f production) is a 
more reliable method. Consequently, he claimed that the TFPG estimation based on the 
National Income figures, such as Young (1995), is biased and underestimated.
2 It should be noted that, under Hicks > neutrality assumption, technical progress and total factor productivity growth are identical 
(details discussed in next chapter). Thus, these two terms -  ‘ technical progress’ and ‘Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG)’ - may 
be used interchangeably.
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Furthermore, Hulten (2000) argued that the TFPG studies, which were based on 
Hicks’ neutral technical progress (as seen in most published papers including Young 
(1993, 1995) and Hsieh (2000)), are questionable since the constant capital-labour ratio 
assumption is obviously not true in the case of East Asian economies. He argued that, by 
using Hicksian TFPG calculation, the role of TFPG which causes the higher output and 
also more capital stock, named ‘induced capital stock’, is neglected. Thus, instead o f  
treating capital stock as an exogenous variable, he proposed that part of the increase in 
capital stock (i.e. the induced capital stock) should be considered as an endogenous 
variable explained by TFPG. Therefore, the conventional Hicksian TFPG calculation 
tends to overstate the role of capital accumulation and understate the role of TFPG in 
economic growth process. The alternative definition of neutral technical progress, named 
‘Harrod’s Neutral’ may be considered. Further discussions on this topic are presented in 
the next chapter. By using Harrod’ s definition, he concluded that the role of TFP in 
economic growth in East Asian Countries (i.e. Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan: 
1966-1990/91) increased by 50% from the Hicksian’s TFP results (Hulten 2000). A  
similar argument can also be seen in Collins & Bosworth (1996).
Rodrick (1997) also argued that the recent works calculating TFPG such as 
Young (1995) and Collins & Bosworth (1996) might underestimate the real TFPG. He 
illustrated that by assuming the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
equals to unity (the Cobb-Douglas case) with a fixed capital share, the TFPG estimation 
rule out the importance of labour-saving technology. Even if the translog function was 
assumed as in the work of Young (1995), where the unitary elasticity o f substitution was 
not assumed, he suggested that assuming labour-saving technical change, this growth 
accounting will result in an overestimated contribution of capital in economic growth.
Apart from explaining East Asian economic growth from the technological 
growth, there are other paradigms for explaining of economic growth briefly discussed 
below. Landes (1990) reasoned that East Asian economic growth might be explained by 
the relatively homogeneous society with a high degree of historical and cultural 
uniqueness. With great unity and less ethnic conflict within the country, the development 
process would be made easier. The idea was agreed by Easterly & Levine (1997). They 
also concluded that ethnic diversity could explain at least 25 percent of the East Asia-
6
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Africa growth differences. They also claimed that high degree o f ethnic fragmentation as 
in Sub-Saharan Africa significantly explained most of the growth obstructing factors 
(e.g. low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, and distorted 
foreign exchange markets) found in the region. Rodrick (1997) also showed that the 
differences in the quality o f the country’s institutions (e.g. quality of the bureaucracy, 
rule o f law, risk of forced nationalisation o f the business) can explain the growth 
performance o f East Asian countries. The higher the quality of institutions, the better the 
growth performance. Indeed, the importance of institutional factors on technological 
improvement and economic growth was also pointed by Abramovitz (1986) as 
previously mentioned.
The next section presents the sections stated aims, scope, and organisation of this 
thesis respectively.
1.3 Aims and Scope of the Study
To test the hypothesis that East Asian economic growth can be explained by the 
productivity convergence process rather than input accumulation, all the three elements 
o f this hypothesis (i.e. the productivity growth rate of the country (TFPG) tends to be a 
higher rate than that of the advanced country; the convergence of productivity levels 
between the East Asian and the advanced country must be observed; and the speed o f  
convergence process depends on the supported institutions within the country itself) must 
be tested. Unlike prior literatures, which pay attention only on some of these aspects (and 
mostly only on the TFPG estimation), the ultimate aim of this thesis is to answer a 
comprehensive set o f questions as followed:
1) Was the TFPG contribution to the economic growth o f the selected East Asian 
countries (i.e. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) during the period of 1971-2000 
higher than that of the US?
2) Have the productivity gaps between the selected countries and the US been 
widening?
3) How can the institutional factors such as labour unions, government policies 
and related laws, and the degree of market competition explain the differences in income 
and productivity across the nations?
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4) What would be an effective set o f policies to enhance the productivity level o f  
the East Asian economy?
It should be noted that the growth accounting procedures adopted in this research 
(detailed in the next chapter) require a great detailed data for each country. Therefore, 
owning to the data availability, there are only four mentioned East Asian countries 
selected in this study.
1.4) Thesis Organisation
To achieve the four aims of the studies stated above, there are 7 chapters 
presented in this thesis. This introduction chapter is Chapter 1. The second chapter is the 
literature review including a brief consideration o f the development of the economic 
growth theory and the techniques to measure the TFPG and its relative level. Chapter 3 is 
the first empirical chapter presenting the TFPG estimations of the selected four East 
Asian countries. The second empirical chapter is Chapter 4. In this chapter, the relative 
TFP levels among the four countries are measured against the TFP level o f the US. 
Chapter 5 discusses the relationships between productivity of the nation and the related 
institutions. This includes a brief overview focusing on the development of the labour 
union, and the related institutions such as labour laws and related government policies o f  
the four East Asian countries. The theoretical models explaining the role of market 
competition and the choice of the labour coalition on the productivity of the firm are 
presented in Chapter 6. A  number of model simulations aiming to predict the coalition 
choice o f work practice, and thus the productivity of the firm in response to the change in 
the selected parameters, are examined. Ultimately, the policy implications for enhancing 
the productivity level of the firm (thus the country as a whole) are drawn from the 
simulation results. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes.
Chapter 2 
Review of Economic Growth Theory 
and Total Factor Productivity
This chapter is a literature review that aims to demonstrate the important role o f  
productivity growth in the economic growth literature. Moreover, as one of the ultimate 
aims o f this thesis is to estimate the Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) and the 
relative TFP levels among selected countries, then this chapter also aims to provide a 
comprehensive discussion about the estimation techniques used in the next two empirical 
chapters. The following sections are organised as follows. Section 2.1 presents a concise 
summary of economic growth theories followed by section 2.2 - a discussion o f  
definitions of TFPG and technical change. Then the next sections, section 2.3, 2.4, and 
2.5, present an introduction to growth accounting procedures including both parametric 
and parametric methods. Section 2.6 is a discussion of the limitations of the growth 
accounting procedures. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 demonstrate estimation methods for the 
relative TFP levels among countries and some discussion respectively. Section 2.9 
presents a review o f TFPG studies for East Asian economies.
2.1 Economic Growth Theory
In this section, the definition of economic growth will be examined followed by 
an introduction to the neoclassical economic growth and the endogenous growth 
theories.
• Economic Growth
Generally, the term Economic Growth is defined as the growth rate of output per 
capita. Moreover, treating output as demand-determined variable, short-run fluctuations 
in aggregate demand lead to changes in output level. Thus, the measured output o f each 
period, the measurable or actual output, may not equal to the full-capacity output level, 
the potential output. Therefore, to avoid the short-run demand fluctuation effect on 
output, it is useful to distinguish these two concepts of output measurement. The term 
economic growth should represent the growth rate of potential output rather than
Chapter 2 Review of Economic Growth Theory and Total Factor Productivity
measured output. Comprehensive discussions of these issues can be seen in Stafford
(1981), Uri (1984), Bemdt and Fuss (1986), Giomo and et al (1997), and Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997).
The main focus of economic growth studies may be summarised by the following 
two questions: the first is ' What is the cause of long-run economic growth?' and the 
second is 'How to sustain the growth?' In the next section, the neoclassical economic 
growth theory will be briefly presented, with these aspects in view.
• The Neoclassical Economic Growth Model
The neoclassical production function with two inputs (capital - K  and labour - L 1) 
without technical progress can be written as (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995):
Y  =  F (K, L) (2.1)
where it following assumptions are made:
i) For all K  >  0 and L >  0, FQ) exhibits the positive and diminishing marginal 
products with respect to each input.
ii) The constant returns to scale assumption is imposed on function F( ) .
iii) The marginal product o f each input approaches infinity as the amount of input 
approaches zero. This is also true in reverse where the marginal product approaches zero 
as the amount of input approaches infinity (this assumption known as the Inada 
conditions).
In this model, there are two main sources of economic growth. The first is the 
accumulation o f inputs (IC, L) and the second is the exogenous change which is not 
included in the model, i.e. the change in production technology or more commonly 
known as the change in Total Factor Productivity (of which details will be discussed 
later).
In the first case scenario, due to the diminishing marginal product o f both inputs, 
assuming a constant rate of depreciation of capital stock (S), rate of population growth 
(«), and saving rate (s), long-run per capita output growth rate cannot be achieved by
1 It should be noted that in this model number of labour is assumed to be a fixed proportion of the total 
population, i.e. the fixed labour participation rate is assumed.
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input accumulation. The crucial assumption behind this conclusion is the capital 
accumulation equation, which can be written as:
k = s- f(k)-(n + S)-k (2.2a)
where, k denotes capital stock per worker
dkk denotes the change o f k over time ( — )
dt
y =  f(k) denotes output per worker equation 
As long as the saving per worker of an economy, s- f(k), (thus investment per 
worker since the investment is saving determined) is higher than the effective 
depreciation, (n + 8 )k, a positive change in capital stock per worker will be observed. 
On the other hand if s • f(k)< (n + S)k, then a negative change in capital stock per 
worker is observed. Thus, there is a long-run equilibrium named the steady state where 
the growth rate of capital stock per worker and the output per worker growth are equal to 
zero (since y-f(k)). That is the output growth rate is equal to the rate of population 
growth. Moreover, the increase in saving rate (5) will increase the level o f capital and 
also output per worker in the steady state. However, the higher level o f saving rate is not 
a guaranteed condition for the higher level of output per worker. The excessive capital 
accumulation caused by the increase in the saving rate leads to dynamic inefficiency 
since the marginal product of capital lies below the effective depreciation rate, i.e. 
/ ''(k) < n + S (details can be seen in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: pp. 19-24). 
Therefore, in the long-run, output per worker cannot be improved by the rise in saving 
rate.
This conclusion leads to the consideration of the second source of economic 
growth: productivity growth. If Harrod neutral technical change is assumed then the 
production function with labour-augmenting technology can be written as (Romer 
(2001)):
Y = F(K,AL) (2.1a)
where AL denotes effective labour or technical augmented labour and A is referred to as 
technological level parameter. It can be shown that, from this specification, in the
11
Chapter 2 Review of Economic Growth Theory and Total Factor Productivity
balanced growth path, growth rate o f the output per effective labour (i.e.
y
+ A
giveny =Y /  AL) is equal to the sum of the technical growth rate ( — ) and population
A
growth rate ( — ). Thus, the long-run output per labour growth rate (i.e. , given
L • y
v Ay-YlL) equals to the technical growth rate (i.e. — = —•). Therefore, with this model
y A
specification, the long-run economic growth solely depends on the technological 
progress. However the model still does not include the source o f technical change within 
the model i.e. A is exogenously determined. Therefore, the exogenous native o f the 
technological growth in this model leads to the need to create a new model - the 
endogenous growth models.
• The Endogenous Growth Models
A  basic endogenous growth model consists o f a model without diminishing 
returns in the aggregate production function of an economy. However, generally, 
traditional inputs (i.e. capital or labour) are supposed to exhibit diminishing returns. 
Thus, instead o f using physical capital as the definition o f capital input, one version o f  
the model employs a broad capital concept, which includes human capital. With this 
definition the model is no longer exhibits the diminishing return in its inputs.
To illustrate, assuming net increase in capital (K) is equal to gross investment (I) 
minus capital depreciation (SK) and gross investment equals to saving which is a 
constant proportion of output (i.e. the saving rate-5), equation (2.2a) can also be written 
as (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)):
yk = k /  k = s • ( / (k) /  k) ~(n + S) (2.2b)
where, yk is the growth rate of k
lc = M X J U  = K/L-nkand n
dt
s  and 8  denote marginal propensity to save and the depreciation rate respectively.
12
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Assuming the aggregate production function (Y)
Y  =  A K (2.3a)
where, A  is assumed constant, more than 0, and reflects the level o f technology. 
Moreover, with this specification the marginal product o f capital is fixed at level A i.e.
The per capita form of (2.3a) is:
Equation (2.3a) named the A K  model, which is the simple endogenous growth 
model, assumes a constant and exogenous saving rate and the absence of diminishing 
returns to broaded capital. Given that s, A , n, and 8 are constants, therefore, the k growth 
rate is also constant. While equation (2.4) assumes the absence o f diminishing return, it 
implies that, as long as s-A>n + S, the economy will never face a decrease in growth 
rate per capita income or consumption even if level of the technology A is constant (i.e. 
there is no exogenous change in A needed in this model, to allow the economy to grow 
forever). Therefore, from this simple type o f endogenous growth model, an economy 
may be able to keep its long-run output per worker growth rate, which is equal to yk,
without an exogenous change in technical progress. In addition, given a fixed growth 
rate of labour and fixed depreciation rate, the increase in technical level (A) or TFPG as 
well as the rise in saving rate (s) cause the higher growth rate of output per worker in the 
balanced growth path.
In addition, there are more varieties of the endogenous growth models. For 
example, Paul M. Romer incorporated the model with research and development (R&D), 
increasing returns, and market imperfection. The source of TFPG is now presence in the 
model. The specification for aggregate output is Y = A(R)‘F(RJ,KJ,LJ) where Ryis
stock of results from expenditure on R&D by firm j and A(R) is a public stock of
(2.3b)
(2.4)
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knowledge which is assumed to be a function of knowledge spillovers (R) from private 
research effort (Romer (1986) quoted in Romer (1994)). In this model, as long as there is 
a sufficient incentive from monopoly rent paid to the firm, the private R&D activities 
exist. With the possibility of knowledge spillovers between the firms (i.e. ‘the 
incomplete property rights’ as seen in Romer (1994)), the public stock o f knowledge will 
increase from the private R&D activities. These activities yield new ideas to both the 
firm who invests their resources in the programme as well as other firms who do not pay 
for it (i.e. there is a positive externality from a private investment in R&D). These new 
ideas will cause an increase in productivity in firms’ level and thus long-run economic 
growth as a whole. It should be noted that Romer (1994) stated that the model originally 
specified as a homogenous degree one in all its inputs including R . However, as R can 
be seen as a nonrival good then indeed the firm faces an increasing returns production 
function. Then in this type of endogenous growth model, we have an increasing returns 
production function coupled with the presence of the source of technical progress in 
model, i.e. the knowledge spillovers between firms. That is, with this specification, to 
double the firm’s output needs only to double two inputs (capital and labour) with a fixed 
level o f R . Thus we have a situation that the growth rate of output is lower than the 
(weighted) growth rate of inputs as a whole which coincides with the definition of TFPG 
discussed in the next section.
Furthermore, Jones (1995) showed the other attempt to incorporate sources o f  
technical growth into the model by specifying a model with two production functions 
and two types of labours. The first production function is a normal labour-augmented 
technical growth model (i.e. Y = F(K,ALy) and LY denote labours who work to 
produce output). The other production function is a production function of ideas or 
knowledge (i.g.A = G{La) assuming that A is increasing in LA). This knowledge 
production function needs only a special type of labours (LA, givenL = LA +LY) as an 
input. Given a fixed proportion o f LA to the total labour force (L ) in the economy and a
fixed growth rate of total labour force (fixed — ), the model is now can explain the
L
growth of A, i.e. TFPG, by using the specification of the production function of 
A-G(La). We now have a model that can explain the source of technological change
14
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within itself. However, we still need to assume the growth rate o f labour force as an 
exogenous variable. Therefore, there are some developments which try to introduce the 
choice o f fertility and choice of labour migration as the endogenous variables in the 
model as detailed in Chapter 9, Barro & Lee (1995). Nevertheless, there are more 
varieties of the model to be explored. An intensive discussion about varieties o f  
endogenous growth model can be found in Barro & Lee (1995) and Aghion &  Howitt 
(1998).
In summary, both the neoclassical growth model and the endogenous growth 
model agree that technical growth is a vital variable to sustain the long-run economic 
growth. However, the neoclassical model treats technical growth as an exogenous 
variable while the endogenous growth model tries to incorporate the cause o f  
technological change into the model. So far there were many occasions when we came 
across the terms TFPG and technical change. To clarify these two words, next section 
presents a comprehensive discussion of the terms TFP, TFPG, and technical change.
2.2 Total Factor Productivity Growth and Technical Change
The word total factor productivity (TFP), introduced by George J. Stigler in 1947 
(Jorgenson 1995), has been used for more than fifty years in economic literature. 
Nowadays the word is widely used in both microeconomic and macroeconomic studies. 
The term may also be seen as Multiple (or Joint) Factor Productivity-MFP. TFPG 
generally explains that part o f output growth which is not explained by the growth in 
inputs. The term can also be interpreted as the productivity of overall inputs in producing 
output(s). In other words, if  there are only two categories of inputs, e.g. capital and 
labour, the term may be regarded as the weighted average o f capital and labour 
productivity.
Solow (1957) showed that the TFPG can be seen as the residual of the growth 
rate o f per capita income minus the weighted growth rate of per capita employed capital 
stock (which will be discussed later). Hence the TFPG may be regarded as the 'residual' 
sometime known as Solow's residual. In addition, the TFPG can also be regarded as the 
shift in the production function due to the change technology. On the other hand, the
15
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TFPG effect on economic growth is not always equal to the effect o f technical change 
even though these two terms are used interchangeably in many discussions.
Moreover, technical progress may be induced by activities which may or may not 
have costs to the producer. However, the TFPG captures only the costless technical 
change known as the 'Manna from heaven' (Hulten 2000: 9). For example, it is known 
that private R&D can lead to technical growth, but the expenditure of such activity has 
already been accounted for either in capital or labour inputs. Thus, if the private returns 
o f R&D are equal to the social returns of the project, then the calculated residual equals 
zero. Hence, the presence o f the residual is caused by the difference between private and 
social returns of a R&D project. Therefore, the residual may be regarded as the 
reflection of externality o f private R&D (Hulten 2000: 25, and also Romer (1994)).
Furthermore, assuming
• A  one sector economy or an economy which can be represented using one 
aggregate production function
• A  fixed labour force
.  An investment rate equal to the sufficient level to replace the depleted capital 
stock
• The technological level changes from the lower level -Ao to the higher level-Ai
Then the result o f technical growth on output per worker (Y /L) can be shown by 
the following figure.
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From the figure above, Hicksian efficiencies - Ai/Ao or TFP effect, equals the 
ratio of be/ce assuming a fixed K/L ratio. Therefore in this case we want to evaluate TFP 
effect from point c to b given a fixed K/L ratio at Ki/L0. Meanwhile, i f  we want to 
compare point a to b, then the range cd can be considered as the extra employed capital 
stock induced by the increase in factor efficiency. Thus the total importance of technical 
change contributed to total economic growth equals the ratio of be/de (Hulten 1975). 
Furthermore, it can be seen that be/de > be/ce. Therefore, in this case, the calculated 
contribution of TFPG in economic development is not the same number as the 
contribution of technical change (a simple model explaining this can be seen in 
Appendix 2.1). In other words, i f  the K /L ratio is increasing during the period of study 
(e.g. from point a to b), then the Hicksian TFP index understates the true contribution o f  
technical change to economic growth (i.e. the contribution o f technical change are TFP 
effect plus induced accumulation effect).
In addition, it should be noted that, assuming the constant capital-labour ratio 
(K/L), the induced accumulation effect equals zero. That is, TFPG is equal to technical 
growth if and only if a constant K/L is assumed, which is a crucial result o f Hicks’ 
neutral technical change assumption. Since the neutral technical change in this sense is 
the change which improves the marginal product of capital and labour in the same 
proportion, the relative marginal product (in other words, in competitive market, the 
relative price) o f these two inputs is still unchanged, (details can be seen in Thirlwall 
(1994)). For instance, evaluating TFP effect at point /  compared with point a, it can be 
seen that the induced accumulation effect equals zero. Thus, in this case, Hicksian TFPG 
equals technical growth. On the other hand, if the change in technical level from Ao to Aj 
induces producers to invest more than the replacement level (the level which leads to a 
constant value of K/L) then K/L is no longer constant. Thus, if the increase in per capita 
capital stock can be observed, then the Hicks’ TFPG understates the effect of technical 
progress in the economic growth process.
In summary, Hicks’ TFPG is the exact measurement for the total importance of 
technical progress in economic growth if and only if a constant capital-labour ratio is 
assumed. Therefore, in the case where an economy experiences a higher capital-labour 
ratio in its economic growth process, using this TFP calculation under Hicks’ neutrality
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assumption leads to an underestimation of the role of technical change in the 
development period of that particular economy.
Therefore, Hulten (1975) and Hulten and Srinivasan (1999) presented the 
alternative in estimating the total importance of technology in the economic growth 
process by using the Harrodian parameter of technical change instead of Hicksian's 
TFPG. Under the Harrodian technical change, a constant capital-output ratio is assumed. 
Thus, the presence of the costless technical change, a part o f the growth rate of capital 
stock (i.e. induced capital stock), is interpreted as a shift in the production function 
(Hulten and Srinivasan 1999).
Figure: 2.2 Harrod Neutral Technical Change
From figure 2.2, given a fixed K /Y , Harrod neutral technical change allows us to 
evaluate the increasing in output per worker from point a to b. In this case, the total 
importance of TFPG that drives the increasing in output per worker is be/de. Moreover, 
as seen in Hulten (1975), with a constant returns to scale assumption, the relationship 
between the Harrodian and Hicksian technical change can be written as (details can be 
seen in Appendix 2.1):
TFP TFPTFPU
1-5,
TFPH denotes Harrodian technical change
/■V
TFP denotes Hicksian technical change or TFPG
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sK denotes the income share of capital 
sL denotes the income share of labour
In summary, TFPG can be seen as an upward shift in production function. To 
measure the total importance of technical change on the growth of output per worker 
there are two concepts o f neutral technical change to be considered. The Hicks’ neutral 
technical change assumes an equally increasing in productivity o f all inputs, thus a ratio
MPK
of marginal products o f inputs is unchanged (i.e. a constant — is assumed). If there
are only two inputs, capital (K) and labour (L), then in the balance growth path the 
constant K/L ratio is observed. Therefore, the assumption o f constant K /L ratio is 
imposed in measuring Hicksian TFPG. Meanwhile, the Harrod’s neutral technical 
change assumes a constant relative input shares in output (i.e. assuming a constant
Share of Capital. . . . ,
—  —   ) and a labour-augmenting technical progress (i.e.
Share of Labour
Y -F[K,A'L]). In the balance growth path, it can be shown that the constant K /Y  is 
observed while K/L and Y /L  grow at the rate of growth of A , i.e. TFPG, (see Romer 
(2001), chapterl). Then to measure TFPG in this sense, a constant K /Y  must be imposed. 
By doing this we allow K/L to change in the balance growth path. Therefore, to measure 
TFPG of the economy which the increasing in K/L still can be observed, the Harrod 
neutral concept is a preferred choice. The detail o f TFPG measurements will be 
discussed next.
K  -MPK
Y
LMPL
Y
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2.3 Introduction to Growth Accounting
Solow (1957) defined the technology progress as the upward shift o f the 
aggregate production function. In other words, if  the production function is homogenous 
degree one and the Hicksian's neutral technology is assumed, then technological progress 
is the change in output with respect to time, for given constant inputs (i.e. a constant 
K/L)
It should be noted that, as seen in the last section, in the light of Hicksian's 
technology the implicit assumption is the constant capital-labour ratio and hence the 
equality of TFPG and technical growth. Therefore, the technical progress or TFPG in this 
sense is the same. It is defined as the difference between aggregate output growth rate 
and aggregate input growth rate weighted by its income share, which is known as 
Solow rs Residual. The process of decomposing the source o f economic growth is known 
as Growth Accounting. As stated before the causes o f economic progress can be 
categorised in two groups, input driven or technology driven. In practice, to estimate the 
contribution of inputs in the economic growth process, the income share of inputs must 
be estimated. The estimation methods may be categorised into two groups, the non- 
parametric and parametric method. The former, discussed next, is based on applying 
index number theory to national income accounts, while the latter is based on 
econometric estimation.
2.4 The Non-parametric Approach to Growth Accounting
In this section, the non-parametric growth accounting methods are presented. As 
named this method does not need to use an econometric estimation for the unknown 
parameter in the production function. However, we need to introduce input and output 
quantity indices to estimate TFPG. The following sections present the simple quantity 
indices followed by Divisia index. Then, TOmqvist’s index and the relationship between 
the index and the transcendental logarithmic production function and Divisia index will 
be illustrated. Lastly, the primal and the dual growth accounting and the relationship 
between the two will be discussed.
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2.4.1 Simple Quantity Index Methods (Diewert 1992)
The production process is said to be more productive when less input is needed to 
yield the same output. Thus, with this definition the productivity of the process can be 
seen as the ratio between output and input quantity indices. For simplicity, the following 
assumptions are imposed:
Assumptions
i) Firm produces one homogenous output (y) by one homogenous input (x)
ii) Output in period s and t (ys andy respectively) can be observed, as well as
input in both periods (xf and *'), the average price o f output in both periods (ps
and pl) and the average price of input in both periods (ws and W)
iii) Thus, the total revenue o f the firm in period t equals
R* = p ‘y ‘ 
and the total cost is:
C  =  w V
iv) Assuming a perfect competition, then a zero-profit condition is:
R‘ ~ C
Under these assumptions then the measurement o f productivity can be grouped as 
follows:
The first method, direct quantity index method, in calculating productivity 
change from period s to t can be regarded as the ratio between output growth rate and 
that of input:
ccs't m[yt/ y s]/[xt/ x s] (2 .5 )
The second method, the 'technical coefficient method', can be written as:
p s,t & a ‘/as (2.6)
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where a{ denotes the output-input coefficient (ratio) o f the firm in period t, which 
equals: a* = y* /  x‘ . Therefore it can be seen that a5 ' 1 =  /3s,i.
The third method, know as the deflated revenues divided by deflated costs 
method, can be calculated as below:
f* ■  [(R* IRs)/(p‘ / ps)]/[(C ICS)I(W lws)] (2.7)
Utilising assumption (iii), we then can see that ys,t =  [y* / y5y\[x* I xs] = as,t = J3s,t.
The fourth in this section, is the Caves and Christensen (1982, cited in Diewert 
1992) method. This method involves the calculation of the ratio between the output 
index and the implicit input index, which can be written as:
8 s ' 1 =  [ / / / ] / [ ( C V C ' ) / ( w ' / v / ) ]  (2.8)
It should be noted that the denominator is called the implicit input index because it 
equals to x‘ I xs (see assumption (iii)). Thus 8 s,t =  ys,t = as,t = j8 s,t.
The filth method is the deflated revenues divided by an input quantity index as 
seen below:
ss't&[(Rt/Rs)/(p‘/ps)]/[xt/xs] (2.9)
It should be noted that (R* /  Rs)/(pt / ps) might be seen as an output quantity index 
( j /  /  ys). Again we can see that ss,t =  Ss,t =  ys,t =  as,i = fls,t.
The last is called the Jorgenson and Griliches price index method, in which a zero 
profit model is assumed (i.e. total revenue =  total cost, (R‘ =  C  ), for any period /). Then 
from (2.7) the formula can be seen as:
</>*’* =[w‘/ws]/[p‘/ps] (2.10)
It can be seen that all six methods mentioned above are equal (details in Diewert
(1992)). That is:
=  J3S'‘ =  y5>‘ =  8 s*' =  = f'* (2.11)
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As stated in the assumptions, in this section, only one input technology is 
considered. In the next section, the more generalised technology assumption will be 
presented.
2.4.2  T h e  D iv is ia  In d e x
The Divisia index allows for a continuous change in price and quantity, by using the 
relation between the definition o f the price and quantity indices and total expenditure. 
Divisia generated the price and quantity indices by assuming that the total expenditure 
function (v(0) is continuous and differentiable. Thus, it can be shown that the growth 
rate of aggregate price and quantity are equal to (Diewert 1988) (details can be seen in 
Appendix 2.2):
p'Q) f f g,(Qj>KO ^  q'(f) ... y PiiQq'iiO
pit) <=i p(t) ■ q(t) q(t) ,=i p{t) • q(t)
p(t) denotes period t price vector
pi(t) denotes price level o f goods i
p'i(t) denotes time derivative o f price level o f goods i
— —  denotes growth rate of aggregate price level 
Pit)
  denotes growth rate of aggregate quantity level
q(f)
q(t) denotes period t quantity vector
qft) denotes quantity level o f goods i
q'ft) denotes time derivative of quantity level o f goods i
p(t) • q(t) denotes an inner product (i.e. x-y = )
i
where the differentiable expenditure function v(t) is:
N
v(0 =  X M 0 t f / ( 0  = p(t) • q(t)
i=i
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Consider the growth rate o f quantity
q(f)
<?'(0 f  
q(t) h
M p(t) q(t) 
Pt(‘)qt(>)
vg.(0
Since
p(t)-q(t) 
PiiO’QiiO
1=1
Pi(t)q,(t) 9 f(0 )
_p(t)-q(t)_U , « J
are the shares of expenditure function, v(f)> then if given s,- is
the /th expenditure share then
Pi(t)-qi(t)
p(t)-q(t) _
m
q(t) /-l ( ? ,( f )
(2.13)
The last equation shows that the growth rate o f aggregate quantity is the function 
of the summation o f the product of expenditure share of good zth and its quantity growth 
rate. By assuming a zero-profit model, the equation corresponds to the concept of the 
equality between output and factor incomes, where pft) is the factor's price and qft) is 
the amount of factor i.
Empirically, the researcher can estimate parameters st in this continuous function 
by using econometric estimation, or otherwise, using the index number concept to 
estimate the parameter. Diewert (1976) showed that if the second-order approximation o f  
a transcendental logarithmic production function is assumed, by using the quadratic 
estimation lemma, the index can be estimated by using Tomqvist's index as seen below. 
The derivation details can be seen in the next section. The discrete-time form of (2.13) is:
In
v G C r -i ) ,
L-i -  SG +Swhile Si — —-
N
=  ! + , ' l n
q,(f) (2.14)
i=i yq,(.‘~l)y
l,l~l that is s t denotes the average cost share of each good.
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If the left hand side of equation (2.14) is the change in aggregate output o f an 
economy and the right hand side, qi and st is the change in input and its income share in 
the aggregate output respectively, then the discrepancy between the two sides of the 
equation can be regarded as the residual or TFP component.
2.4.3 The Transcendental Logarithmic Production Function and Tornqvist’s Index
The Transcendental logarithmic (Translog) production function was developed 
by Christensen et al (1973). The function is the flexible functional form, allowing for 
variable elasticities o f substitution between inputs and also no prior restriction on returns 
to scale. The function can be regarded as a second-order approximation of a Taylor’s 
series expansion o f a logarithmic function below. Thus, even if the real aggregate 
production function is not the Translog, the function is still applicable (Hulten 2000).
In y- / ( ln x l,lnx2,lnx3,...,lnx,J) (2.15)
Thus, it can be shown that the general form of the Translog function can be written
as:
n n n
lny =  Inj'o + L ailn*; +\Y?LPii lnxj (2 -16)
1 = 1  1 = 1  j=1
where yQ, aitand fa denote constants, (dp = fa for all i, j, a n d =1 for the
i
constant returns to scale assumption.
In addition, we can consider the second-order Translog function as a general 
quadratic function (Diewert 1976). Let z be an N-column vector, then the quadratic 
function off (z) may be written as
f(z) = a0  + a Tz +  i  zT Az, ; or in scalar notation
N  N  N
f(z) = a0  + a(z( + 2  X ! aifziz j (2-17>
» = 1  1 = 1  y = l
where, T superscript of a vector denotes its transpose, A  denotes diagonal matrix (thus A  
= A t), and a( and aj are constants and ay =  ap for all i and j.
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Then, by using the Quadratic Estimation Lemma (Diewert 1976), the change in 
f[z), caused by change in z° to z1, can be estimated by,
/ ( z , ) - / ( Z°)  =  i [ v / ( Z, ) +  V /( Z0) f  (z1- Z°) (2.18)
If given V /( z r) is a gradient vector off evaluated at zr (i.e. V /( z r)is a first-order 
differentiating vector of / (z) by zt at zr). It should be noted that equation (2.18) is true 
if and only i f /i s  a quadratic function.
Comparing equation (2.16) and (2.17), therefore, the Translog function can also 
be regarded as a Quadratic Function, in which fiz) =  In y and z,- =  In jq . Consequently, 
from the quadratic estimation lemma, the change in the Translog function can be 
estimated by the lemma as in equation (2.18)
In light o f Total Factor Productivity studies, equation (2.16) denotes the 
aggregate production function o f factor xb By assuming a Translog production function, 
maximising behaviour, then employing the Hotelling's lemma with the assumption o f a 
zero profit model, and constant returns to scale, equation (2.18) can be transformed to:
ln (y 1 /  /  )  =  Yl! 1 +  s ?  /  x ?  ] (2 .1 9 )
1=1
whereof denotes the z'th share o f cost (or share o f aggregate output, if the zero profit
model is assumed) in period T. Moreover, equation (2.19) is identical to equation (2.18) 
and can also be derived from the Tomqvist's quantity index as follows:
;=i
Therefore, to recap the proof above, the Tomqvist's quantity index is an exact 
index as a discrete approximation of the continuous Divisia's quantity index. In other 
words, assuming a second-order Translog production function, by using a quadratic 
estimation lemma the continuous Divisia index can be estimated by the Tomqvist's 
index. That is for the real practice, we do not need to estimate the income share of the 
input (which is st in the last section) by using econometric estimation. We alternatively
can use the Tomqvist's index as an exact estimator for the Divisia index, assuming 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale.
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2.4 The Primal and Dual Growth Accounting
In estimating TFPG, by using a non-parametric approach, there are two methods, 
the primal and dual growth accounting. Both methods are based on the equality between 
the value o f output and income o f employed inputs. In other words, these two growth 
accounting methods are theoretically identical. The derivation details can be seen as 
follows:
• The Primal Growth Accounting
Let the aggregate production function be:
Y = F( A,K,L) (2.21)
and the Hicks’ neutral (i.e. F(A,K,L) = A-F(K,L) and thus FA - F(K, L) =
F A~~r~ - 1 )  assumption hold. By differentiating the function by time and dividing by Y  
yields:
Given — = TFPG, then 
A
Y/Y -sK •(.k/K) + sL >(L/L) + TFPG (2.22a)
TFPG = Y/Y-sk -(k/K)-sL '(L/L) (2.22b)
where the marginal products of capital (FK) and that of labour (FL) equal the factor prices 
(i.e. rental rate of capital (r) and wage (w), respectively), assuming perfect competition. 
It so called marginal product pricing which is a crucial assumption of growth 
accounting. It should be noted that if the perfect competition assumption does not hold, 
the TFPG estimation is inaccurate (details can be seen in section 2.6 and Appendix 2.3).
A
TFPG denotes estimated rate of technical progress (or TFPG or the
Solow residual)
F KsK denotes share of capital payment in total production (sK = ~~~ -rK/Y)
F LsL denotes share of labour payment in total production (sL = —J—  = wL/Y)
27
Chapter 2 Review of Economic Growth Theory and Total Factor Productivity
The equation (2.22b) is the primal growth accounting procedure. Assuming 
constant returns to scale, it can be shown that the equation can be rewritten as:
where y denotes output per unit of labour and k denotes capital per unit o f labour.
It may be noted that Solow (1957) used the equation (2.22c) in discrete form to 
find the TFPG of the US economy (1909-1949), where k is the estimated employed 
capital per man hour which equals the product of capital stock and percentage o f  
employed labour. Furthermore, equation (2.22a) can also be regarded as the Divisia 
index which can be estimated in discrete time by using the Tomqvist's index as 
mentioned before. In this case the right hand side of the equation represents the inputs o f  
the aggregate production function plus the 'residual'. It should be noted that, in Solow’s 
(1957) paper, the Tomqvist's index was not employed (calculation details can be seen in 
Solow (1957:315)). Moreover, in estimating the TFPG, by using Tomqvist's index, 
equation (2.22b) can be seen as:
® The Dual Growth Accounting
Under the assumption of zero profit and perfect competition in output market, 
Barro (1998) showed the equality of primal growth accounting and the weighted factor 
price growth rate or the dual growth accounting. In other words, TFPG can be seen as 
the weighted average growth of input productivity represented by the increase in the 
price of inputs (if the perfect competition assumption in factor market holds). The 
derivation can be seen as follows:
From the equality o f total output and factor incomes:
A  * ♦
TFPG -y! y~sK' (kf k) (2.22c)
TFPG = Y/Y-sk -(K/K)-sl -CL/L) 
where s. ^ ^[sfTj + sfT-I) ] .
(2.22d)
Y=rK+wL (2.23)
where r denotes the rental price of capital and w denotes wage.
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It should be noted that dividing (2.23) by Y  implies the constant returns to scale 
assumption (i.e. = sK +sL =1).
Differentiation of (2.23) by time and dividing by Y  yields: 
h Y  = sK -(r/r + K/K) + sL-(w/w+L/L)
TFPG = Y/Y-sk-(k/K)~sL •(.L/L) = s k  •f/r+sL-w/w (2.24)
Equation (2.24) shows the equality o f primal and dual growth accounting. Then, 
the dual growth accounting equation can be seen as:
TFPG = sKr/r + sLw/w (2.25)
where f / r denotes growth rate of r and w/w  denotes growth rate of w.
Therefore, as stated above, theoretically these two methods o f growth accounting 
must yield the same level o f TFPG assuming zero profit and perfect competition in 
output market. However, as discussed later, it can be shown that due to the measurement 
error, in empirical practice, discrepancies between the two methods may be found.
2.5 The Parametric Approach to Growth Accounting
Due to the limitations in using National Income Accounts for the non-parametric 
approach, direct estimation of the production function and TFP is an alternative. The aim 
of using an econometric model is to calculate the income share of inputs in the particular 
country's production function. Then, by using the econometric results, TFP can be 
calculated as a model intercept and its error term. Hence, the method is based on the 
primal growth accounting concept but with the econometric estimation of income share 
instead of using the index number approach. The single output model will be discussed 
first then followed by multiple inputs and outputs model and a cost function approach, 
respectively.
2.5.1 Single O u tp u t -  M u ltip le  In p u ts  M o d e l
In this model only a single output, named aggregate output, is used. However, the 
model allows multiple inputs, e.g. capital and labour. In fact, the model and its modified
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versions can be seen in many papers such as Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Young 
(1993), Fajnzylber and Lederman (1999), and Senhadji (1999). For example, the Cobb- 
Douglas production function is widely used for empirical research in economic growth 
and TFP studies. The general form of this function can be written as:
Y = A j j 7  (2.26)
1=1
where A  >  0 denotes the level o f technology, xx denotes input i, 0 <  otj <  1 denotes
n
constant, and =  1 for constant returns to scale assumption.
i=i
The technical change can be regarded as the change in variable A. Assume a one
output (Y) and two inputs (K and L) model. Thus, under the constant returns to scale
assumption, the model can be seen as
Y = AKaL(l-a) (2.27)
or
y =  Aka (2.28)
The lower case letters indicate a per capita variable. Alternatively, without the 
constant returns to scale assumption, the model can be written as:
Y =  AKalf (2.29)
Assuming a perfect competition factor market (i.e. capital and labour market) and 
Hick's neutral technology, taking the natural logarithmic of (2.29) and differentiating 
with respect to time gives:
F A K nL— — — h oc— t- fd— (2.30)
Y A K H L V ’
where a  is output elasticity of K  (i.e. the percentage share of output paid for employed 
capital) and p is output elasticity of L (i.e. the percentage share of output paid for 
employed labour) which are sK and sL respectively.
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Thus, equation (2.30) exhibits three sources of economic growth, input
K L A
accumulation ( —  and — ) and the change in technology level ( — ). It should be noted 
K L A
that without the returns to scale assumption, a scale effect is implicitly included in the
TFP component. Moreover, the econometric form of this equation is:
Y A K nL—  = — + a— + B— ve
Y A K L
where e~N(o,cr2)
Therefore,
 a  B— = —  + e (2.31)
Y K r L A K J
A
That is if — is treated as the intercept o f the equation, the estimated TFP level is 
A
the estimated intercept plus the regression residual (e), which is the estimated change in 
intercept of the production function, as seen in Fajnzylber and Lederman (1999). It 
should be noted that by using econometric estimation of the above function, it is assumed 
that the share o f capital (a) and that of the labour ( P ) are fixed over the period of study, 
unlike in (2.22a). Although the Cobb-Douglas production function has been widely used 
in many empirical studies, the assumption o f unitary elasticity o f substitution between 
inputs is questionable. Thus, the more flexible form of production function such as 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or variable elasticity of substitution (VES) may 
be used.
For the CES function, given the production function is:
-i
r = A(aK-/> + ( l - a ) / r V  (2.32)
Given 0 < «  < 1, /? > - 1 ,  the function above exhibits homogenous degree one and thus 
constant returns to scale. From second order Taylor's series expansion o f function (2.32) 
around the point P - 0 , it can be shown that (Rmenta 1967):
ln(|) = In A +  aln(j) -  » [ l n ( | ) f  (2.33)
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By adding the error term in the function above in CES function (2.33) can be estimated 
by using simple linear OLS. That is:
ln(y-) = In A +a ]n(~) -\-fda{\- a)[\nft)f + st (2.34)
(where s ~  N(o,cr2) )
A
Estimating equation (2.34) yields In A and st . From the summation o f the two estimated
A  *
terms (lnrf + st) we can conduct a series of TFP indices allowing us to calculate TFPG.
Otherwise we can use a relationship between output-labour ratio and wage (Arrow et al 
(1961)) as follows:
Y
M y )  -  Y +  & ln W  (2.3 5)JLi
where cr denotes the elasticity of substitution between K  and L which is — -— .
1 + j3
Estimating (2.35) yields the estimated a and thus the implicit fd. Then, with the know 
share of capital, we can estimate the TFP level (details will be discussed later in section 
2.7) and thus the TFPG. Alternatively, by using the non-linear LS, we can also estimate 
all the parameters of the equation (2.32) directly.
However, estimating TFPG from CES function has some problems. Firstly, in 
case of following Kmenta (1967) the implicit fd recovered from the estimated coefficient 
K  2
of ln(— ) from (2.33) may not obey the assumption that fd>-1. This problem mayJu
occur as well in the case of direct estimation from equation (2.32). Moreover even the 
K K
value of ln(— ) and ln(— )2 are not linearly related, the model may still suffer from these
JU J-i
highly related exogenous variables. Finally, it is possible that the non-linear LS 
estimation of the equation (2.32) may not converge for a solution at all.
Additionally, for the VES production function, Lu and Fletcher (1968) presented 
VES by starting with the general relationship between value added per labour (Y/L) and 
wage (W) and capital-labour ratio (K/L) and assumed competitiveness in both the final 
product and the factors market, giving the equations as follows:
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In— = lna + 61nw +cln  
L
K_
L
(2.35)
The general VES function is:
Y =  A[aK~p + (1 -d)t](KIL (2.36)
where, a, b and, c are constants.
A denotes technical level 
a  denotes relative factor shares in output 
p denotes substitution parameter 
ri =  (1-6) /  (1-6-c)
So to estimate (2.36), by using non-linear LS, we need to know the estimated value o f b 
and c first. Then from the estimated b and c obtaining from (2.35), we can estimate 
(2.36) for a and p . Again, in this case not only we have to estimate the non-linear LS 
but also we have to use the two stages LS technique in order to estimate all required 
parameters in the function. Thus, this complication may be one of the reasons that this 
functional form has not been widely used.
The strength o f the econometric estimation is that the price of inputs (i.e. wage 
and rate of return of capital) do not need to be estimated. Thus, in comparison with the 
index number approach, less raw data series need to be collected. The only data that is 
needed is therefore the growth rate of output and employed capital and labour for the 
study period. However, the econometric estimation method is based on the strong 
assumption of the explicit aggregate production function. Moreover, the model 
misspecification, measurement error, and aggregation bias may be captured by the 
regression residual (Hulten 2000). Thus, in this sense, the residual from an econometric 
estimation may represent the errors as stated rather than TFPG. Furthermore, the 
estimated parameter (i.e. income share o f employed capital and labour) is assumed to be 
constant for the whole study period, which is a very strong assumption. In addition, as 
capital accumulation is partially income-detennined, the problem o f a simultaneous 
relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variable in the parameter estimation 
process is questionable.
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In the next section, more generalised production function will be discussed.
2.5.2 M u ltip le  In p u ts  and O utputs  M o d e l
In aggregate studies, all outputs of the economy are treated as one output yielded 
from one production function. Thus, the identity between technical change in an 
aggregate production function and that o f disaggregate one (i.e. production function o f  
each industry) is assumed. However, technological change may favour some industries. 
As quoted in Fox & Diewert (1997:1) ' Technical progress may cause not only outward 
movement in the production possibility frontier, but also twists favouring one output over 
another. Similarly, technical progress may have asymmetric effects on the use of inputs'.
Therefore, the solution of this problem may be solved by using one of the two 
following methods. The first one is calculating TFPG at industry or sub-industry level 
using an aggregate concept. Alternatively, one may consider the more general form o f a 
production function, the multiple-inputs and multiple-outputs production function, which 
will be considered in this section.
Let the production function of one particular output (yi) at period / be a function 
of the other outputs produced (y2, y3, y  y«) and inputs available (xj, x2, X3,...,x,j in that 
period:
Ti = /  (y2 >y3>'"’y M (2 .37)
The explicit quadratic form of the above function is (Diewert 1992):
M N M M  N N M N
yi=h+Y b>y<+ Z  °jxi+ ft12> Z  Z  hy>yj+ tt /  M Y  Z  + Z  Z  dty^ i (2 -38>
i=2 jm 1 m 2  j= 2 i=l j=l i=2 j=l
If the outputs and inputs in the above function are represented in natural 
logarithmic form, then the function can be seen as the Translog production function 
presented by Chiristensen et al (1973). It should be noted that in Chiristensen et al 
(1973) only a single output was concerned. By using the econometric technique to 
estimate all unknown parameters in the equation, bit ci} by, cy, and dy, the model will be 
subject to the low degree o f freedom problem leading to unreliable estimation. 
Moreover, the estimated parameters may imply 'an oddly shaped isoquant’. Thus, prior
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restrictions such as constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution must 
to be imposed. Furthermore, similar to the previous section, the output and inputs used in 
the model may exhibit a simultaneous relationship. Therefore, the estimation may be 
subject to simultaneity bias (Hulten 2000). In other words if the inputs is also a function 
o f output, i.e. inputs are no longer exogenously determined, then the change in inputs 
will lead to the change in output which in turn lead to the change in inputs and output 
again. Then the OLS estimated parameters are not consistent and not efficient as well 
(Gujarati (1995)).
Consequently, Diewert (1992) proposed a solution to the low degree of freedom 
problem by using a relationship between productivity, total cost function, and the 
conditioned factor demand function to find a system of factor demand equations. By the 
joint estimation of the cost function and the corresponding system o f conditioned factor 
demand equations, the change in productivity can be measured.
2.5.3 Cost Function Approach
Assuming the firm minimises costs, under the production constraint stated in 
equation (2.37), the cost function for period t can be seen as (Diewert 1992):
c'=  X > X  (2.39)
«=1
c' = c‘ (y[,...,y'u,w\,...,w‘K) = —  ■c(yu...,yM,wi,...wN) (2.40)
a
for t =  0 ,l,...T
where w‘n denotes cost of input x*n, a' > 0  denotes a cost efficiency factor in period t and 
normalised to 1 at period 0, and c(-) denotes an atemporal cost function which does not 
depend on time.
Equation (2.40) can be seen in logarithmic form as 
lnC‘ =  -In a1 +lnc(-)
Note that for an econometric estimation, disturbances can be added to the above 
function:
lnC( = -In a1 +lnc(-) + et (2.41)
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Assuming a translog cost function as the explicit functional form for c(-). 
Then,
m-l n=1 2  j j-i
1 U N  i  M N
H T T  f„ In wl In wI + — • Y 1 y ( g-mn In j /  In w[ . (2.42)
By assuming a homogenous function of degree one for input prices, then the 
parameter o f the above equation will be subject to the following restrictions:
If the cost function (2.42) is differentiated by the factor price (wn for n =
1), with the information from equation (2.41), then, by using Shephard's lemma, the 
system of conditional factor demand equations yielded is:
It should be noted that an error term has been added to equation (2.43) for 
econometric estimation. The /Vth equation is dropped as it would yield no new 
information since the estimation is subject to the restrictions associated with the 
assumption of homogenous degree one. Therefore, by substituting (2.42) into (2.41) the 
joint estimation of all unknown parameters in (2.41) and (2.43) can be made. Hence, the 
cost efficiency factor (a1) in (2.41) can also be estimated. The ratio of cost efficiency
af
factor from period t to period s (i.e.—  given s < t) can be regarded as the total factor
as
productivity change.
The method stated above was presented in Diewert (1992). Note that if the actual 
behaviour of the firm is not consistent with the cost-minimisation, then the estimation is
N N
n=1 7=1
m = .
n=1
= cn +  £  fn, In w‘j + £  g„ In y‘m + e'n
M
(2.43)
C‘ dw'„ C‘ /«=!
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invalid. Also, the process of decomposing the cost function into two parts (as seen in 
equation (2.40)) is questionable. Further concern is based on the distribution of the error 
terms for equation (2.41) and (2.43), i.e. the error terms may not obey classical 
assumptions for the OLS (details for the assumptions about the distribution of error term 
can be seen in Greene (1993) and Gujarati (1995)), which may create econometric 
problems. Additionally, the process above may be more suitable for the microeconomic 
or industry level rather than the macroeconomic study. Therefore, for this study, the 
method will not be used.
2.6 The Limitations of Growth Accounting
As stated in the previous sections, a number of limitations of growth accounting 
methods have been outlined. The arguments can be summarised as follows:
• Marginal Product Pricing
The marginal product pricing assumption (i.e. price of inputs equal its marginal 
product) is the most questionable point both in the non-parametric and parametric 
approaches. The assumption is based on the condition of perfect competition in both 
output and inputs markets which may be empirically questionable. The presence and 
fluctuation of rent in the factor market may lead to the wrong interpretation of the change 
in TFP. For instance, as seen in the dual growth accounting sense, the change in the 
factor price is interpreted as the change in TFP. However, it may be nothing more than 
the change in the bargaining power in labour markets and the degree of competition in all 
factor markets. Unfortunately, as long as the income share of input needs to be estimated, 
the marginal product pricing assumption seems to be inevitable.
• Econometric Estimation of Factor Income Share
In the parametric approach, once the parameters are estimated, the explicit 
assumption is that the factor income share is constant during the period of study, which 
may not be true. The problem can be seen as two sides of a coin. On the one side, the 
econometric estimation with short data series may be subject to the problem o f low 
degrees of freedom. On the other side, the problem may be avoided by using longer data 
series. However, then the strong assumption of constant factor income shares for the
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longer time period must be imposed since, from OLS estimation results, there is only 
one value of each estimated parameter for the whole considered period.
• Utilisation Rate and Rate of Return of Capital
As far as the distinction between the total labour force and employed labour is 
concerned it is necessary to clarify the difference between gross capital stock and 
employed capital stock. The failure to identify these facts in estimating TFPG may lead 
to misleading results. For instance, in an economic slump, it can be shown that the lower 
utilisation rate of an input will be disguised as a lower TFPG. On the other hand, in an 
economic boom, an increase in the capital utilisation rate will be interpreted as a rise in 
TFPG. In other words, estimating TFPG without carefully considering the input 
utilisation rate leads to a pro-cyclical pattern o f TFPG. But this does not mean that the 
procyclical behaviour of TFPG may not still be observed with careful estimation. A  
comprehensive discussion of this behaviour can be seen in Aghion and Saint-Paul
(1993), Basu and Femald (1995,1998).
Solow (1957) used the unemployment rate as the proxy o f unemployed capital, 
which implicitly implies that capital input is treated as a variable input, which can be 
changed in the short-run. Then, the utilisation rate of available capital stock is one minus 
unemployment rate. In other words:
Solow's Employed Capital Stock — (1-Unemployment rate) x Gross Capital Stock
(2.44)
In contrast, Bemdt and Fuss (1986), quoted in Hulten (2000), used the 
Marshallian concept that the income paid to capital is the residual of total income left 
after paying for other inputs. Thus, the decrease in income paid to capital indicates the 
lower rate o f utilisation of the available capital stock, as the capital stock is considered as 
the quasi-fixed input. Therefore, by using this ex post rate of return of capital in growth 
accounting, the utilisation rate o f the available gross capital stock is already taken into 
account.
Hence from equation (2.23) the ex post rate of return on capital can be seen as
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Y -wL .
r =  — —  . (2.45)
In addition, the different interest rates used as the proxy o f rate of return o f  
capital, lead to different results o f TFPG estimations as well as the discrepancy between 
the primal and dual growth accounting - details will be discussed next. By using the ex 
post rate o f return as in equation (2.45) these problems can be avoided. Moreover,
equation (2.23) also implies the constant returns to scale assumption, and therefore it
follows that:
7  wL Y 1 /i \r  -------------------   ( l-*s? ) . (2.46)
K Y K (K/Y)
From equation (2.46), the rate of return of capital can be written as a function o f  
the capital-output ratio and the income share for labour (sL). The higher the capital- 
output ratio the lower the marginal product of capital and hence the lower the rate o f  
return of capita! Meanwhile, a higher income share for labour implies a lower income 
share and rate of return of capita! Two concepts of the rate of return and utilisation rate 
o f capital have so far been presented. The first one, Solow (1957), allows the utilisation 
rate of gross capital stock to change. Thus, the rate of return of capital is fixed if and 
only if the supply of capital stock is elastic enough to compensate for the fluctuations 
from the demand side. Therefore, even the utilisation rate of capital is changeable, it is 
not a necessary condition to guarantee a fixed rate of return of capital. Consequently, in 
this view, both the utilisation rate and the rate o f return of capital is variable.
Alternatively, the second concept is based on the assumption o f quasi-fixed 
capital, which means that the capital input is fixed in the short-run. The demand 
fluctuation of the final product leads to a variation in the derived demand for capital 
input. As in the short-run the supply of capital input is fixed, the change in demand 
directly affects the price of capital, which is the ex post rate of return in equation (2.45)2. 
This implies that the utilisation rate of capital is also fixed as well.
2 For example, given that in the short-run there is a fixed amount of capital stock installed (and 
utilised) in an economy. An increasing in a final demand will directly increase the demand for inputs. For 
simplicity, assuming a fixed labour, wage, and stock of capital, then the rise in the derived demand for 
inputs will directly increase the price of the capital stock. Numerically, assuming competitive market,
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• Unbiased Technical Progress
In both the non-parametric and parametric approaches to growth accounting, 
Hicks’ neutral technical change is assumed in the model, which means that all inputs are 
equally improved. However, if  the labour and capital input technology augmentation 
rates are not equal, then the technology parameter A  is needed to split the two 
augmentation parameters, one parameter for each input (Hulten 2000). That is the 
production function must have a form: Y =  A(t)F[AK •K,AL •Lj given AK and Ah denote 
technology that augmented in capital and labour respectively. So far, with Hicks neutral, 
we assumed AK =  AL = 1. If the technical change is non-neutral, then AK A AL .
• Simultaneous Relationship of Outputs and Inputs
As stated in the previous section (page 19), considering the capital input, 
Hicksian technical growth is based on the assumption of a constant capital-labour ratio, 
in other words it is assumed that the change in employed capital stock is an exogenous 
variable. However, it is possible that some part of the increase in employed capital stock 
can be induced by the change in output, which can be partly considered as the change in 
technical level. Therefore, employed capital stock can be considered as an endogenous 
variable. By employing Harrodian technical growth, a solution to this problem will be 
solved.
Furthermore, considering labour input, the assumption that employed labour is an 
exogenous variable is also questionable. As seen in Lipsey and Carlaw (2001:6), 
'Feeding 6  billion people with the agricultural technologies of 1900 would have been 
literally impossible'. That is, employed labour itself may be partly dependent on output 
and thus, consequently, on technical change.
Therefore, the measurement of TFP based on the assumption that both employed 
capital and labour are exogenous variables is still a controversial area.
equation (2.23), i.e. Y — wL +  rK , holds. Given a fixed wL =10, fixed level ofK =100, and r =5%, then 
output (Y) must equal 15 (i.e. 10 + 0.05*100). A  100% increasing in output level (Y) (from 15 to 30) will 
lead to an increasing in r from 5% to 20%.
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•  D iscrepancies in  P r im a l and D u a l G ro w th  Accounting
As stated previously, in practice, a discrepancy between primal and dual growth 
accounting is possible. Since the study is subject to the assumption o f a market clearing 
condition both in output and factor markets (i.e. the labour market and the capital 
market) then if the market does not clear, the use o f information obtained from the 
market (r and w) will mislead.
Considering the capital market, even if a perfect capital market is assumed, since 
the real rental rate o f capital cannot be directly observed, then the estimation is needed. 
Thus, such an estimation leads to points to consider e.g. the availability of the market 
interest rate, which may be or may not be the best representative rate in estimating the 
real rental rate o f capital. In addition, the use of such interest rates and/or capital gains 
from financial markets also has to be questioned. For example, which rate of interest 
from different assets (e.g. government bond, commercial bank interest rate, price-earning 
ratio from capital market, etc) will be selected. A  discussion can be found in Diewert &  
Nakamura (1998).
Clearly, different selected interest rates may yield different results. Most 
importantly, the dual growth accounting methods was derived from the identity (2.23) 
(i.e. Y = rK+wL) (Barro 1998), but by using an arbitrarily selected reference interest rate, 
the identity may not hold. This problem may be more serious in a developing economy 
where markets are imperfect.
Considering the labour market, according to the presence of labour unions and 
the minimum wage legislation, the assumption of perfect competition in labour market 
may not hold. Especially in the case of efficient wage bargaining, where the unions have 
a strong negotiation power, the estimated real wage paid may be higher than the real 
marginal product of labour. Therefore, it is possible to find the discrepancy between the 
left and right hand side of identity (2.23). Moreover, since there are some unpaid workers 
(e.g. household workers) in the economy, then the estimated wage paid to labour is still 
subject to this limitation.
Therefore, the estimated real rental rate of capital and the estimated wage paid to 
employees may contain errors due to both market imperfection and measurement
41
Chapter 2 Review of Economic Growth Theory and Total Factor Productivity
problems. These problems may lead to inaccurate TFPG estimation and may explain the . 
discrepancies between the primal and dual method as show in the model below:
Let rat denotes the estimated real rental rate of capital, r denote the real rental 
rate of capital with the relationship, rat = firr where jur Y 0 . Similar to the real rental 
rate of capital, the real wage rate and its estimate has a relationship: 
w*r = PwW where Mw * 0 
where denotes the estimated real wage rate and w denotes the real wage rate.
Note that the estimated labour's and capital's share in output used in growth 
accounting then equals:
wL rKsLal =  Mw • —  =  MJ l and sKm =pr—  = prsK respectively.
If /ur and /A  not equal to one, by using rest and west in the growth accounting
procedure, the identity (2.23) will not hold. That is, Y is not necessarily equal to
lirrK +  juwwL.
To balance the identity, let us assume that
jUyY =  jUrrK +  juwwL . (2.47)
Differentiating (2.47) by time, and dividing by Y  and rearranging the equation
yields:
Y 'rK f rK K wL w wL L
— = JUr ■ * — -j" ——— ----- +  ju ------ • ——- —j— ——~ • ..Y r_Y r Y K _Y w Y L
That is:
PyY -  pr sKk - juwslL = prsKf +  juwsLw (2.48)
- X  
given X  =  — .
The equation above is the equality of primal and dual growth accounting where 
either market imperfection or mismeasurement of r and w exists. However, it is assumed 
that there is perfect competition and no error in measurement of r and w. Thus, the TFPG 
estimation by using primal growth accounting can be seen as:
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TFPprimal-est ~ Y SKat&  SLeil B • (2.49)
Since sK = prsK and sL^  ~ juwsL, then equation (2.49) is the left hand side o f
equation (2.48) treating juY =  1. It can be shown that since jur and juw not equal to 1 (i.e.
rat * rand wat ^ w), then it is likely that jliy (but not necessary). Therefore, i f
/ / rand juw are not equal to 1, in this case, it is possible that the result from the primal
and dual methods will differ. The size of this discrepancy can be shown as (see 
Appendix 2.3):
TFPpnmat.es, ~  =  (1 “  +  9  +  0  ~  A > i  J  +  *0  • (2 -50)
Hence, if the perfect competition assumption holds and accurate variable 
measurements are applied (i.e. jur and juw equal to 1 or in other words rat =  r and
west = w )> then the difference between TFPG estimation from primal and dual method
will equal zero. That is, the identity between primal and dual growth accounting subject 
to the conditions above.
Moreover, the discrepancies between these two methods may be caused by 
market markup behaviour, as discussed in Young (1998). As the presence of the markup 
behaviour indicates a certain degree of market imperfection, then the more general 
equation i.e. equation (2.50) can be applied. Moreover, Hsieh (2000) suggested that the 
difference between primal and dual growth accounting is more likely caused by the 
inconsistencies between national account and factor price data. Then, in case this case, 
parameters (p,*) in equation (2.47) represent these inconsistencies.
•  In te rn a tio n a l Com parisons
In order to compare levels o f technological development of among economies, it 
is insufficient to estimate TFPG alone. Since TFPG tells us only the absolute growth rate 
of the TFP level o f each country, then, to identify the relative technological level among 
the considered countries, TFP level estimation is necessary. The next section presents 
procedures to estimate relative TFP levels between countries.
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2.7 The Relative TFP Level among Countries
The TFP level study can be categorised into two groups, the non-parametric and 
parametric approaches discussed below.
2.7.1 Non-parametric Approach
In this section, in answering the question about relative level o f productivity 
between countries, the relative index for technical growth named the 'translog 
multilateral index of productivity' originally proposed by Cave, Christensen, and Diewert
(1982) will be presented. The index is also known as ‘CCD Index’ (Fox (2003)). The 
index is considered as a ‘ superlative index’ as defined by Diewert (1976), since the index 
can be derived directly from a flexible production function -  in this case a second order 
translog production function (with constant returns to scale assumption). Moreover, the 
CCD index is a multilateral index, thus exhibits a ‘circularity (or transitivity)’ property.
Therefore, by using this index, we can compare two economies directly or through their 
relationships with the third country (see Cave et al (1982):84). In addition, as shown 
later, the index is also ‘base-country invariant’ . Thus, for an international comparison, 
the relative relationship between indices of the considered countries does not change 
according to the change in the selected base country. Consequently, the CCD index is a 
preferred index for an international comparison and will be used in our empirical study 
in Chapter 4. Following section shows the derivation of the index.
Assuming the production function of an economic entity s is a constant returns to
scale translog production function with A 5 vector of inputs and Ys vector of outputs as 
seen below:
F(ln 7  ton X s, s) = cej + £  a /  In I 'j + £  p‘n In X ‘n + © E S a s ln In Yj
i n 2  i j
1 N M  I  N
+  - Z Z A „ „  lnX„s ln X * +  ZZY,.„ toy,* \nXs„ = 1 (2.51)
2 n m i n
where atj =  ayi, j3iy ~ pyi and the restrictions for constant returns to scale are:
- I X = I ^ , ; = 1  for5 =  1, ...S, Z « y =  o fo r /=  1 , . . . / ,
i n i
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X Pnm = 0  for m - 1, . . i f ,  = 0  for n - and =  0 for i =  1,.../.
« j n
Then the implicit production function o f country k and I can be written as: 
F [ln y $ ln X $ /c ]  =  l and
F[In Y1,In X 1,1] -\ , respectively.
In comparing the output o f these two countries, if country k is selected as the base 
country then by assuming a constant factor Sk, which denotes the ratio of output o f k to / 
that yields:
F[\n(Yk/8 k),\nXl,l] = l
That is:
F[ln(7 * ISk),\nX‘,l]-F[lnY‘,lnX',1] =  0. (2.52)
It can be shown that by using a quadratic estimation lemma (Diewert 1976) under the 
constant returns to scale assumption (i.e. F{[ln(7/c / 8 k) ,InX 1,/]  =  Ft[In YkM X 1,1] and 
/
YjFf - - 1 )  the equation (2.52) can be seen as:
i=1
£ { $ i[ln(7‘ / ^ ) , l n X i,/]  + i F i[lny/ ,ln ±r ')/ ] } - [ l n ( ^ / ^ ) - l n } : . ' ] = 0
i L Z
where F{ (•) denotes partial derivative o f F(-) with respect to the logarithm of output i and 
the solution for In 8 k from the equation above is:
In Sk =  - E [ ! A ( l n 7 ‘ ,ln X / )/) + $ ((ln 7 , , l n X '>/)]ln(7(t / 7 / ) .  (2.53)
i Z Z
Meanwhile, when considering country / as the base country, and assuming a
constant factor of relative output between country k to /  is 8 t, this then yields
F(ln8 {YlM X k ,k) = 1. Similar to the case where k is the base country, it can be shown 
that:
ln<5(= - 2 $  Ft (In 7 ' ,  In X *  ,/t) +  -!- F,. (In 7 \  In X \  A)] ln(7;* /> ) ') . (2.54)
i 2 2
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For constructing the base-country invariant output index, if the geometric mean 
of 8 kan& S{ is then:
(25 5 )
Therefore In 8 kl =  In dlk. In other words, the index is base-country invariant. Replacing 
(2.53) and (2.54) in (2.55) and rearranging the terms yields:
to<y« = - Z [ | i 1(lnlrM n X i , i )  +  i i p( ln y ',ln X ')/)]ln(y//¥') (2.56)
With revenue maximising behaviour, Ft (•) can be seen as the negative value o f output
PY
share of product i in total output. That is F{ (•) =  —  1 1 ■ =  -Rt. Therefore it can be seen
W ,
i
that:
In S„ Q l O *  +Rj)in(Yj/Yt'). (2.57)
2 i
Equation above is known as the 'translog bilateral output index'.
For multilateral comparison, if  there is a hypothetical representative country, h 
(e.g. the country that represents the region average value of inputs and outputs) with the
output vector In Yt , input vector ln X f and the revenue share R{, then the translog 
bilateral output indexes between country k and /  and h are:
1 '  *In Skh =  - I O *  + X,)-QaYj -  toy,) and
2 i
1 '  /
ln^//; = ~ E (R\ +Rj)-(InY/ -  InY() respectively.
2 /
Comparing the above two indexes yields the 'translog multilateral output index', In Sjd : 
In S'kl = In Skh -  In Sih (2.58)
The index exhibits a circularity property as it can be shown that:
ln < ^ =  In S'km -  In Sjm . (2.59)
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Similar to the output index, to construct the input index for comparing inputs o f  
two arbitrary countries -  i.e. k and /, assuming that the input ratio between k and I is a 
constant, pk, yields F^ln Yk, In pkX l, k) - land also the other constant, that yields
F(\nYl ,\n(Xk /  /? ,) ,/)  = 1. Assuming cost minimisation and replicating the method for 
output index stated above yields the 'translog bilateral input index':
In PmJ h w f  + r „ ') to (X t  IX'„) (2.60)
2  n
where W* is the cost share of input n in total cost of input for country i. Comparing 
country k and I with a hypothetical country h yields:
and
2  n
In Pu, =  <Wl +K)QnX‘„ respectively.
2  n
Therefore the 'translog multilateral input index’ is:
ln /?« = ln /?M -ln /?„ , . (2.61)
The translog multilateral input index is transitive (exhibits circularity property) since it 
can be shown that:
In p'k, = In p'km -  In p 'm.- (2.62)
Since the measurement o f a productivity level o f a country is to compare the
outputs yielded to the inputs used in the particular process then, similarly, the index for
bilateral productivity comparison named the 'translog bilateral productivity index' 
( In XkJ) is the difference between the translog bilateral output and input indexes. That is:
\nXkl=\aSk, -\npkl . (2.63)
For multilateral comparison, the translog bilateral productivity index between country k 
and / and the hypothetical representative country h are:
In Xkh =  In Skh - In pkh , and
In Xlh - In Slh - In plh respectively
where,
In4 *  + i ? Y ( ln r *  - E T ) - } ! ( r *  +W„)(\nXkt - t a ^ )  and
2  i 2  n
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Ini,* +R,)-QnY‘ + r„)(lnX ( -ln X „ ).
2  i 2  n
Comparing ln/l/c/l and ln/t/A yields the 'translog multilateral productivity index f,\nX}cl. 
That is:
In K,i= -ln^„ (2.64)
Since I n l n ^ ,  -  In pkh and In A/;, = ln<?//2 -  In plh, then it can be shown that:
InA*ki= InS*kr Inp*kl . (2.65)
In other words the translog multilateral productivity index is also the difference between 
the translog multilateral output and input index. The index is transitive since it can be 
shown that:
'n M  - In 2-L - In 4 n ■ (2.66)
In addition, the figure below shows the relationship between the translog bilateral and 
multilateral index.
Figure 2.3: The Translog Bilateral and Multilateral Index
Furthermore, for the case of a one output (Y) and two inputs (K, L) model, the 
translog multilateral productivity index can be seen as:
lnA;= [In f* —In7'] - I(s *  + 7j) [InAT* - t a £ ] - | ( ^  [In - to l]
+ | ( 4  + *7) [InX' -ta £ ]+  | ( 4  + [Ini' -141] (2.67)
where sK and sL are capital's and labour's share respectively.
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Alternatively, to estimate the TFP level, the Level Accounting may be employed 
as seen in Hall & Jones (1998). The method is based on the explicit aggregate production 
function with a technical parameter. Then by using the level value of output and inputs, 
assuming the same output elasticity of input for all considered countries, the TFP level 
can be estimated as the residual as usual. The crucial assumption imposed in this method 
is the homogeneity of output elasticity to input across the considered countries which 
introduces a new question of how to estimate the elasticity. One possible method is using 
a parametric approach, discussed next, to estimate the elasticity of output. These 
estimated results can be used to carry out the level accounting.
2.7.2 Parametric Approach and Panel Data Estimation
In the light of the parametric approach of comparative TFP level among
countries, the panel data estimation may be used. A summary of the model is presented
below:
Assuming the differences across countries can be captured in differences in the 
constant term, i.e. the fixed effects model, the model can be written as (Greene (1993)):
y = Da + Xp + s , (2.68)
where, y is an nT x 1 vector of dependent variable
D is an nT xn matrix of intercept dummy variable
a is ann x 1 vector of individual specific disturbances
X is an nT xk  matrix of independent variables
P is a k x 1 vector of parameters 
s is an nT x 1 vector of remaining disturbances
In the case that n is small enough, the equation above can be estimated by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with regressors X  and dummy variable D. It should be 
noted that the restriction of homogeneity of the slope coefficients is imposed in the 
model.
Applying the model to a comparative TFP level study, the technical level for 
different countries can be captured by the first term of equation (2.68) i.e. Da , while y 
is the vector of aggregate output and X  is the metric of inputs for all n countries in the
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considered period. Moreover, if the elements in y and X  are represented in natural 
logarithmic form, then the model corresponds to the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production 
function. In addition, as stated above, the homogeneity slope assumption is assumed.
In the case of a CES production function the general form of a one output-two 
input model is:
ztL
Y = A(aK~ls + ( l - a ) I “^ )'9 . (2.69)
Given 0<a <\, fd>-\, and ju —I the function above is of homogenous degree one and 
thus exhibits constant returns to scale. From a second order Taylor series expansion of 
function (2.64) around the point fd = 0, as previously mentioned, it can be shown that 
(Kmenta 1967):
In Y = In A + juaIn K  + ju( 1 -  a) InL -  #  fdpaQ. -  ar)[ln(—)]2 (2.70)
2 L
By adding the error term in the function above and imposing the prior value of a , i.e. a , 
all parameters in CES function (2.69) can be estimated by using simple linear OLS. That 
is:
In Y„ =lnAi +Ma]nKu +ju(l-a)itiLu-L/3Md(l-cc)[H— )]2+(2.71)
2 Lit
Alternatively, imposing constant returns to scale the restricted model can be written as:
ln (± ) = In A, + « lnA^-) -  ±  fSa(\ -  a )[h j!L )f  + slt. (2.72)
it it X Git
Then using the standard Solow's residual method, the TFP level for each country for the 
period t = 1...T can be estimated as the sum of the individual specific term ( In A{) and 
the regression residuals ( sit).
Otherwise from Arrow et al (1961), assuming constant return to scale, perfect 
competition, and profit maximisation, it can be shown that without assuming the explicit 
production function, the elasticity of output per head with respect to the real wage rate is 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. That is the relationship of the 
logarithm of output per head and logarithm of real wage rate is:
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ln(—) = y + <rln(w) (2.73)
where cr denotes the elasticity of substitution between K and L and y denotes a constant. 
If  the underlining production function is the CES function as seen above then it can be
Then, by using panel data estimation of functions above, the implied common slope (or
a predetermined value of the estimated capital share (a), the TFP level can be estimated 
by using the standard Solow's residual as previously mentioned.
2.8 Discussions and Limitations of Relative TFP Level Studies
• Purchasing Power Parities and International Comparison
As far as international comparisons are concerned, the data used in the study 
must be presented in the same currency units. Thus, the exchange rates between 
currencies are needed. Therefore, to represent the real purchasing power for each 
currency unit, the exchange rates based on the 'Purchasing Power Parities' (PPP) may be 
used rather than the market exchange rate. Penn World Table Version 6.0 constructed by 
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten will be used. Thus, all data used in 
conducting an international comparison in Chapter 4 (e.g. GDP at factor cost, value of 
capital stock, and wage) are presented in $US by using the PPP exchange rates.
• The Marginal Product Pricing
Identical to the study of one particular country, the Translog multilateral 
productivity index is based on marginal product pricing i.e. factor’s prices equal its 
marginal products. Therefore, the estimated price of inputs, based on the perfect 
competition assumption, is still questionable.
shown that by differentiating the output with respect to labour input (i.e. finding a 
marginal product of labour) that the relationship is:
(2.74)
or
lnw = ln(l- J ) )  + a  + p )ln (j) . (2.75)
A
the substitution parameter) of all considered countries (ft ) can be estimated. Assuming
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• The Homogeneity o f Slope Assumption
In the fixed effects model not only is the explicit form of the aggregate 
production function assumed, but also a very strong assumption about the homogeneity 
of the slope of aggregate production functions among the considered countries is 
imposed. Thus, the higher technical level means the higher output, all other things being 
equal. That means, with the same level of inputs and the same output elasticity of inputs, 
the only reason behind the differences in output between countries is the technical level. 
This conclusion corresponds with the standard growth theory.
However, to check the validity of this assumption, the poolability test (i.e. the test 
for the validity of homogeneity of slope assumption) is necessary. If  the test is rejected 
then the estimated level of TFP is invalid. Therefore, to prevent such a problem, it is 
useful to consider a small number of similar countries in the model rather than a large 
number.
2.9 TFPG Studies for East Asian Countries
This section presents a summary of the results and methodologies used in the 
recent TFPG studies for East Asian economies. We may start with the controversial work 
of Young (1993, 1995). Young (1993) estimated TFPG for 6 East Asian countries 
(details in the following table) during 1970-85 by using a parametric estimation of the 
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function. He concluded that the 
estimated TFPG of the East Asian countries ranged from 0.1 to 2.5% per year and the 
cause of economic growth of the countries during the period was mainly the input (both 
labour and capital) accumulation. This led to some criticisms about his findings. The 
arguments were largely on the use of Cobb-Douglas production function and the size of 
the estimated capital share. Therefore, Young (1995) tried to defend his view by using a 
non-parametric growth accounting based on the Tomqvist index (i.e. the primal growth 
accounting). By using this method, the estimated TFPG is based on a more flexible 
production function i.e. the translog production function as discussed in section 2.4.3. 
The results from the study still confirmed the findings from Young (1993).
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Regarding the other non-parametric growth accounting, Collins & Bosworth 
(1996) imposed a value of the share of capital equal to 0.35. To estimate TFPG, they 
assumed the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function, using 
education attainment adjusted labour instead of normal labour input. The findings were 
in line with Young (1995). Moreover, they also suggested that the institutional factors 
may explain the moderate estimated TFPG of the countries.
Turning to the parametric estimation of TFPG, Nadiri & Son (1999) estimated the 
constant returns to scale translog cost function with 5 inputs (i.e. labour, capital, import, 
human capital, foreign capital, and technical progress). The calculation was based on 3 
Stages Least Squares in estimating parameters in the cost function and system of cost 
share equations. Again the results were in line with Young (1993, 1995) and Collins & 
Bosworth (1996). It should be noted that, since the average TFPG figures were not 
shown in the original paper, in the following table, they are calculated from the average 
output growth (stated in the original paper) multiplying by the percentage contribution of 
TFPG shown.
Nonetheless, all the mentioned studies were based on the primal growth 
accounting (both parametric and non-parametric estimation). Hsiech (2000) argued that 
the accuracy of data from National Income (Nl) Accounts of the countries was 
questionable. He also mentioned that a low estimated TFPG from the prior studies may 
be caused by the possibility of overstated capital accumulation in the Nl Accounts 
especially for the case of Singapore. Therefore, he proposed that the dual growth 
accounting method is a more reliable method and may be used to recheck the estimated 
TFPG figures from the prior primal growth accounting studies. To conduct the dual 
method, he used market interest rates based on many asset types e.g. eaming-price ratio, 
average lending rate, deposit rate, and discount rate to estimate the rate of return of 
capital. With different asset types selected, the study yielded different estimated TFPG 
figures. For simplicity, all the results shown in the table below are based on lending 
interest rates only i.e. curb market loan for South Korea, average lending rate for 
Singapore, prime lending rate for Hong Kong, and curb loan rate for Taiwan. The full 
details can be seen in the original paper.
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The following table shows the result of the latest TFPG studies for East Asian 
countries:
Table 2.1: Estimated TFPG and Contribution from Prior Studies
Source Country Period Average TFPG 
(% per year)
Contribution to 
GDP Growth
Y oung (1993) Korea 1970-85 1.4% na
Malaysia 1970-85 1.0% na
Hong K ong 1970-85 2.5% na
Singapore 1970-85 0.1% na
Thailand 1970-85 1.9% na
Taiwan 1970-85 1.5% na
U SA 1970-85 0.4% na
Y oung (1995) Korea 1966-90 1.70% 17%
H ong K ong 1966-91 3.5% 32%
Singapore 1966-90 0.2% 2%
Taiwan 1966-90 2.6% 28%
Collins&Bosworth (1996) Indonesia 1960-94 0.8% 24%
Korea 1960-94 1.5% 26%
Malaysia 1960-94 0.9% 24%
Philippines 1960-94 -0.4% -31%
Singapore 1960-94 1.5% 28%
Thailand 1960-94 1.8% 36%
Taiwan 1960-94 2.0% 34%
U SA 1960-94 0.3% 27%
Nadiri&Son (1999) Japan 1969-90 1.6% 31%
Korea 1969-90 1.8% 18%
Malaysia 1969-90 0.6% 8%
Singapore 1969-90 0.5% ! 5%
Thailand 1969-90 0.8% 11%
Taiwan 1969-90 2.1% 22%
Hsiech (2000) Korea 1966-90 1.9% na
H ong Kong 1966-91 2.3% na
Singapore 1968-90 2.2% na
Taiwan 1966-90 2.6% na
Source (and methodologies used): As mentioned in the text
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In the next two chapters, the empirical study on TFP growth and level 
respectively for East Asian countries will be presented. The main modifications are:
1) For the primal growth accounting, to deal with the increase in labour quality, 
we use human capital-augmented labour (calculation details can be seen in 
the next chapter) instead of the pure labour.
2) To estimate the share of labour correctly, we utilise the International Labour 
Organization data to calculate the total labour force including both formal 
and informal employed workers.
3) Unlike Hsiech (2000), we impose the equality of the estimated TFPG from 
the primal and the dual methods. By doing this the implicit (or ex post) rate 
of return of capital as seen in equation (2.45) can be estimated. Ultimately, 
by using the dual method, we can decompose the causes of TFPG: the 
increase in labour productivity and that of the physical capital.
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A p p e n d i x  2.1 
A  N o t e  o n  T h e  Relationship b e t w e e n  
H i c k s  a n d  H a r r o d  Neutral Technical C h a n g e
Let the production function be
Y ~F(A,K,L) . (A2.1)
AAssuming that rf is a Hicks neutral technology input (i.e. — is a Hicks neutral
rf
technological progress).
F(A, K, L) = AF(K, L) . (A2.2)
Indeed, for the Hicks neutral, the technological progress is measured by assuming a 
constant K/L ratio. However, in this exercise, we assume a constant capital-output ratio 
at the balanced growth path as in a Harrod neutral concept:
^ m = 0 . (A2.3)
dt
Rewriting equation (A2.1) as:
Then,
Y = F (A ,~ Y ,L ). (A2.4)
dF dF dFdY = ——dA +   d(K/Y)Y + — dL
dA d(K/Y)Y 3L
OF dF SFdY = ~ d A  + Zf--d(K/Y)Y +— dL. 
dA dK dL
Differentiating by time (t) yields:
dY/= dF/dA dF_ d(K/Y)Y dffdL 
dt dA dt dK dt dL dt
Y = FaA + Fk  \ ~ y  + y ^ — ! + Fl L
Y dt
Since under Harrod-neutral technical change -  o? rearranging the terms yields:
dt
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Y - M C . y  = FaA + FlL.
Dividing by Y  yields:
Y fl FkK FaA A Fl L L
Y Y Y A Y L'
F A
Since equation (A2.2) implies that - ^  ■ = 1, then the above equation can be seen as:
Y Fk K A Fl L L
Y Y A Y L
or
Y
Y
A FlL L —  + — L----
A Y L
F K F L
If constant returns to scale is assumed then 1 — ——  = L . That is: 1 -5 ^  - s T
Y Y
where sK and5£ denote capital and labour share respectively.
Thus,
Y _ L _ y _  
Y L ~  y 1 -5 K _
A
A
(A2.5)
where y  is output per capita.
That is, along this balanced growth path (i.e. with constant K/Y), the growth rate
y Aof output per capita ( — ) depends only on the growth rate of technology (— ), giving a
y A
fix capital share. Since the capital share (sK) is more than zero and less than one, then 
the total effect of technical growth on output per head under Harrod’s neutral is higher
1 1than the figure from Hick's neutral by a factor o f  = —  \
1 - * *  SL
1 It should be noted that Hick's neutral technical change is based on the assumption of a constant 
capital-labour ratio (i.e. along the balanced growth path the growth rate of capital-labour ratio (— ) is
k
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By rearranging the terms in equation (A2.5), it can be seen that the true 
contribution of technical change to long-run economic growth under the Harrod neutral 
assumption is:
yK
1-5 K J
A
A
(A2.6)
Equation (5) means that treating capital’s share as a constant factor, the true importance 
of technical change to long-run per capita output growth can be divided in two parts: the
A
first is called a TFP effect or a Hicks’ TFP growth (— ) and the second is an induced
A
accumulation effect
1 -5 K J
A
A
As far as the latter effect is concerned, the technical
growth leads to an increase in marginal product of capital and thus induces more capital 
accumulation. Higher accumulated capital stock leads to potentially more output per 
head. Therefore, as seen in the standard primal growth accounting, treating capital 
accumulation as a pure-exogenous variable in calculating Hicks’ TFP growth leads to an 
underestimation of the total importance of technical change in economic growth process
by the amount of
f \
SK
1
A
A
zero). Therefore total differentiation of equation (1) then dividing by itself and rearranging the term yields
the standard Hick's TFP calculation with constant returns to scale:
A
A
58
Chapter 2 Review of Economic Growth Theory and Total Factor Productivity
A p p e n d i x :  2.2 
Divisia Price a n d  Quantity Indices
Assuming the differentiable total expenditure function, v(/), is an inner product 
of price and quantity vector, p(t) and q(t) respectively. That is:
v(t) = p(t)-q(t)
Differentiating the function yields:
dt dt dt
Given q\t) = and p\t) = ? dividing the above equation by v(/) yields:
dt dt
dv(t)
dt Pif)q\t) + q{t)p\t)
v(0 v(0
Then,
dv(t)
dt q\t) . p \0+ •
v(0 #(0 p (0
That is growth rate of total expenditure is the summation of gi*owth rate of quantity and 
price indices. Differentiating the left-hand side again yields:
p(t)q'{t) + q(t)pXt) ^q'(t) | p'(t) 
v(f) q(t) p(t)
or
P(tW(t) t q{t)p\t) = q'(t) ; p\t) 
v(t) v(t) q(t) p{t) ’
Assuming fixed price (i.e. p\t) =  0) yields the growth rate of aggregate quantity level:
q'(t) = p(t)q'(t) ^ ftPiftq'iit) 
q(t) v(t) /=i p(t) • q(t) '
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Assuming fixed quantity (i.e. q'(t) = 0) yields the growth rate of aggregate price level:
p\t)  ^g(t)p\t) = *^ qi(t)p\(f) 
p(t) v(t) i=i p(t) -q(t)
By using these two growth rates and normalising the starting point to one, then 
the Divisia's price and quantity indices can be constructed.
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A p p e n d ix : 2 .3
Discrepancies b e t w e e n  P r i m a l  a n d  D u a l  G r o w t h  A c c o u n t i n g
Given the estimated TFP growth in primal concept is:
TFP primal _ e s t  —Y~ SKes,E ~ SLal E (A2.7)
w r wL tK
where Mw= ~ ,  Mr =~,^  =MW —  = and = Ar —  =w r i i
respectively and the real TFP growth in primal concept can be written as:
A - Y  -  sKk  -  s lL  . (A2.8)
That is
Y -  A +  sKk  + s lL  . (A2.9)
Substitute (A2.9) in (A2.7) and rearranging the terms yield the relationship between the 
estimated and real TFP growth as follows:
TFpPM_es, = A + (1- Hr)sKk  + (1 -  m J slL  . (A2.10)
Thus, if (ur and juw equal to 1 the estimated TFP growth will equal to the real TFP 
growth.
Considering the dual method, the real TFP growth in dual concept can be seen as:
A = sKr + sLw. (A2.ll)
In estimating the TFP by using dual method, the process can be written as:
TPPjual_es, =^Kj + sLaW = ArsKf-Y n^ SL-w. (A2.12)
(A2.12)-(A2.11) and rearranging the terms yield:
= (A2.13)
Similar to the primal, if pr and juw equal 1 the estimated TFP growth will equal to the
real TFP growth. Consider the different result between primal and dual growth 
accounting, it can be shown that (A2.10) -  (A2.13) yields:
PPprimal_est~ TPPdml_es, = tt ~ + ?) + tt “ MW)^ (L + w) . (A2.14)
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C h a p t e r  3 
A n  Empirical S t u d y  of T F P G  in East Asia
This chapter presents the empirical study of TFPG and its contribution to four 
East Asian countries - Japan, South Korea (henceforth Korea), Taiwan, and Thailand. 
For comparative purposes, the case of the United States will also be included. As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the nonparametric estimation for TFPG is based on 
the ‘superlative’ index i.e. the Tomqvist's index which can be derived directly from the 
flexible production function -  the second order (constant returns to scale) translog 
function. Then without relying on the OLS residuals yielded from the parametric 
estimation, this nonparametric method can estimated TFPG directly from the National 
Income Accounts. Then the non-parametric estimation of TFPG is a generally preferred 
method to the parametric estimation. Consequently, the nonparametric method is 
selected to estimate TFPG in this chapter. The following section is a summary of the 
methodologies used, followed by a data description and concludes with results, 
discussion of TFPG and its contribution.
3.1 Methodologies Used
In this chapter both the primal and dual growth accounting methodologies will be 
used as the estimation method for TFPG. In addition, to take into account of the 
importance of human capital within the production function (as suggested in Manlciw et 
al (1992) and Lucus (1993)), the implicit production function used in this section can be 
seen as:
Y -  A'F(K,H) (3.1)
where H denotes the amount of human capital-augmented labour; details of how H is 
measured can be seen in the variable measurement section 3.2.
• Primal Growth Accounting
Considering the Translog aggregate production function:
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In 7, =a0+aK In Kt + aH In H + att
+ -/? «  (In AT, )2 + PKH (In/C, )(inHt) + (\nK,
(3.2)
Given the restriction of constant returns to scale, this implies: 
aK + aH = 1 and
P k k  +  P K H  ~  P h h  +  P k h  ~  P K t  +  P m  =  ^  *
Then as seen from the derivation in Chapter 2 (i.e. equation 2.22a and 2.22b), 
assuming Hicks’ neutral technical change, the primal growth accounting equation, using 
Tomqvist's index, is:
In sx In + sH In + TFPtt_l
or
TFPft-i = In' Y J - ^ • l n f K j
VA-l 7
i„ln ' H l '  
V ^ - 1  J
(3.3)
where,
TFPt t_j denotes the estimated total factor productivity growth for period t
S K
sK (t) + sK ( t - 1) = sH(t) + sH(t-T)
a  H rs
w,H, denotes the human capital-augmented labour share in period t
sK (t) = 1 -  sH (t) denotes the capital share in period t 
wt denotes the unit real wage of H in period t.
Moreover, it is assumed that there are j  types of physical capital (/cy). If  the
aggregate capital stock function is assumed to be a translog function, then the growth 
rate of the aggregate capital stock can also be estimated by:
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n # - ) = ZE-t-i j
r sk +sk ^
Kj,t K],t-
f t pK-i
where the cost share of each capital stock j  is:
rk-j j
Kj Y-wH
(3.4)
(3.5)
Details relating to the measurement of r- can be seen in the variable measurement section 
3.2.
• Dual Growth Accounting
For dual growth accounting, as seen in the previous chapter (i.e. equation (2.25)), 
the TFPG equation, under the constant returns to scale assumption, can be written as
where
- r wTFPiM = sk -  + sh —  
r w
r r— = ln(—1- )  denotes the growth rate of r 
r G-i
(3.6)
w wf— = ln(——) denotes the growth rate of w
w w.t-1
When the equality of output and factor income is assumed as stated below, then 
the assumption of constant returns to scale must hold.
Yt -  rtKt + wtHt (Dividing this equation by Yt yields sK(t) + sH(t) = 1)
Similarly, as well as when estimating the growth rate of aggregate capital stock, the same
rapplies when estimating the growth rate of overall rate of return of capital, — which is:
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In order to decompose the causes of growth of output ( — ) into three components:
an increase in physical capital ( sK — ), an increase in human capital-augmented labour
K
H A(sH — ), and TFPG ( —), the primal growth accounting as in equation (3.3) will be used. 
H A
Meanwhile, as the aim of introducing the dual growth accounting in this chapter,
assuming the equality of output and factor income, the dual method can identify the two
. . .  _ fsources of TFPG -  an increasing in productivity of physical capital (sK—) and that of
r
_  wthe human capital-augmented labour (sH — ), as in equation (3.6). This relationship can
w
be shown in the following figures:
Figure 3.1: The Primal and the Dual Growth Accounting
Note: Details for derivation can be seen in Chapter 2
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It should be noted that the equality of equation (3.3) and (3.6) holds if and only if 
the equality of output and factor income is assumed. Thus, from Yt =rtKt + wtHt , the ex 
post rate of return of the aggregate physical capital must equal:
Therefore, utilising these relationships (equation (3.3), (3.6), and (3.8)), to conduct the 
primal and the dual growth accounting there are only 4 variables needed, i.e. Yt, wt, Ht,
and Kt while rxp can be calculated from (3.8). Details for the variable measurement can
be seen next.
3.2 Variable Measurement
In this section the measurement of variables used in the growth accounting 
methodologies are presented. The details of the data and sources for each country can be 
seen in an Appendix 3.1. It should be noted that an aim of this chapter is to estimate the 
absolute TFPG of each individual country. Therefore, the variables used in this chapter 
can be presented in the country’s own currency. However, for an international 
comparison purpose presented in the next chapter, all the variables will be presented in 
$US by using both official and PPP exchange rates.
• Output (Ti)
Output used in this chapter is real output at factor cost at constant 1990 prices. In 
addition, since the output is treated as value added created by physical capital (K) and 
human capital-augmented labour (H) input, then the inputs in this model can be 
categorised into two groups, i.e. K and H as discussed next.
• Initial Physical Capital Stock
To estimate physical capital stock in a particular period, t , it is necessary to 
estimate its initial value. If  it is assumed that net physical capital stock (IQ in this period 
t has been accumulated as net investments starting from an infinite past up to the prior 
period t-1, then the net physical capital stock in period t equals:
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x , = Y { i , - r ( X - s y - j . (3.9)
where,
It denotes the gross investment in physical capital stock in period t 
5 denotes a constant annual depreciation rate that fully reflects the percentage of 
physical capital stock retiring every year. Note that this depreciation rate should not be 
confused as the ‘accounting’ depreciation rate which does not reflect (and usually 
underestimates) the physical capital stock installed and still productive in the firm.
Let the gross investment growth rate approximately be a constant rate, g.
Therefore, it can be shown (details in Appendix 3.2) that
Kt as stated in (3.11) was used by Young (1995) as an initial capital stock.
• Estimated Physical Capital Stock (K t)
After estimating the initial value of physical capital stock, the current value of the 
physical capital stock of an economy can be seen as:
Depreciation rates for each capital type j , used in this calculation, were taken 
from Hsieh (2000) i.e. 1.3% for dwellings, 2.9% for non-residential buildings, 2.1% for 
other constructions, 18.2% for transport equipments, and 18.3% for machineries and 
equipments. The series of estimated physical capital stock for each country can be seen 
in Appendix 3.5.
• The ex post Rate o f Return of Physical Capital
As previously mentioned, and as in Hulten (2000), assuming constant returns to 
scale, the ex post rate of return of capital ( rxp) from equation (3.8) is:
(3.10)
Kt =K t_x(\ -S ) + It_1. (3.12)
rxp
Y-wH
K
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~Y-wH~ K
Y
It can be shown that the ex post rate of return is consistent with the constant returns to 
scale assumption as follows:
r-K
From sK = - — - which denotes capital’s share, replacing r with rxpyields: 
r -Kxp
wH wH
Thus, sK = 1 — —  = 1 where sH = ——  denotes the share of human capital-
augmented labour. It can be seen from the above equation that by using the ex post rate, 
the constant returns to scale restriction (i.e. sH + sK = 1) is implicitly imposed.
Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 2, this ex post rate of return is consistent with 
the idea that physical capital stock is considered as quasi-fixed input. That is, it is
assumed that the amount of employed physical capital stock is fixed in the short-run.
Therefore, the estimation of the utilisation rate of physical capital stock is not necessary 
since it is assumed to be fixed and equal to one. Consequently, the change in the ex post 
rate of return of capital stock reflects the change in demand for capital stock due to 
economic fluctuation.
Furthermore, following Young (1995), assuming that the nominal interest rate i 
is equal for all types of capital ky, under perfect competition and constant returns to
scale assumptions, the total cost of physical capital must be equal to the output valued at 
factor cost (7 )  minus the amount paid to employed human capital-augmented labour 
(wH ). Therefore the implicit nominal interest rate (ical) is a solution of the following 
argument:
hoi =argm in|(7-w i7)~j;r/cy.J • (3.13)
Given
k
rj = —  ' 0  -  Pj +SQ  (3.14)p j j
as seen in Hsieh (2000) where:
r} denotes the real rental rate of ky
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p denotes the GDP deflator
i denotes the market nominal interest rate (in this case assuming i = ical)
p kj denotes the rate of asset price (i.e. price of physical capital goods j) inflation
Sj denotes the depreciation rate of /cy
In other words, the rate ical can be estimated by trying to equate the following 
identity by varying the value of i and thus p.:
Y = wH + Y riki (3.15)
j
Additionally, if the aggregate physical capital (K) is K = k} , then rearranging
j
equation (3.15) and dividing by K yields:
Y r l .
= (3.1.6)
K K v *
The term on the left hand side is the ex post rate of return of aggregate physical capital
Y-wH  
K
1 — WI1 . .
r xP   ---------~ — as seen m equation (3.8) while the right hand side is the weighted average
O f  Vj .
P /Given value of — , p ., and S{, and obtaining i . from equation (3.13) then 
P
substituting back in equation (3.14) yields the real rental rate of physical capital type j , 
i.e. Vj. Then from equation (3.5) we can calculate sk and ultimately we can estimate the
aggregate growth rate of physical capital ( ln(— L-) ) as seen in (3.4).
K t-1
• Human Capital-Augmented Labour (H), and Its Share in Total Output (sH )
From the International Labour Organization (ILO) database total employed 
labour (included self-employed labour,Ls) (L) and the self-employed labour proportion
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(I,—— ) are provided. To estimate the stock of human capital-augmented labour, 
L
following Hall and Jones (1999), let Hbe:
H = e*(E)L (3.17)
where <f)(E) reflects labour efficiency with E years of schooling compared with no 
schooling. That is, if it is assumed that ^(0) = 0 then L = e^ {0)L . Therefore, it can be 
e^E)L Hseen that ln( — )=  ln(—)=  <j>(E) . The first derivative of the function (<j>\E)) is the
en ’L L
rate of return to education which is assumed to be a (decreasing returns) piecewise linear 
function of the number of years spent at school7 of the employed labour (i.e. rate of
return to education exhibits decreasing returns) and is shown as follows (Hall and Jones
(1999)):
0.134, 0 < is < 4
0.101, 4 < £ < 8  (3.18)
0.068, E  > 8
Furthermore, as seen in Gollin (2002), in order to estimate labour’s share for 
developing countries one should consider the importance of self-employed labour. This 
is necessary since in the system of national accounts, compensation to employees is 
calculated from the sum of employee income only. Therefore, to avoid the 
underestimation of labour’s share, the cost of self-employed labour must be added to the 
compensation of employees. This can be done by using self-employed figures from ILO 
with the assumption that all workers in an economy can move freely between the formal 
and informal (self-employed) sector. Thus, in the long-run, workers from both sectors 
gain the same level of real wage paid (as assumed for example Young (1995)). Then 
total real compensation to all employees can be seen as:
Yh = Yhf + YHS (3.19)
1 Schooling data ( E ) is taken from  Barro and Lee (2000).
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where YH denotes total real compensation to human capital-augmented labour (which is 
wH in 3.14)
Yhf denotes real compensation to formally-employed human capital-augmented 
labour observed in the system of national accounts as compensation to employees.
Yhs denotes real compensation to self-employed human capital-augmented
labour estimated from Ym = w • Hs where w denotes a common real wage paid for a
Y
unit of human capital-augmented labour (i.e. w = —— ) and Hs - l s -H denotes
self-employed human capital-augmented labour. Therefore, the share of human capital- 
augmented labour in total output (7 ) can be seen as:
^ (320)
Utilising this self-employed labour adjustment, it can be shown that the share of human 
capital- augmented labour for all countries is around 2/3. This is consistent with the 
existing literature, which suggests that the share of physical capital is around 1/3. It can 
be seen from table 3.1 that, after self-employed adjustment, the estimated sH for the East 
Asian countries are significantly increased especially in the case of Taiwan and Thailand 
which the shares increase by around 18% and 32% respectively. That is without this 
adjustment, the estimated shares of human capital-augmented labour for the countries are 
considerably underestimated and thus the share of physical capital will be overestimated 
as suggested by literature (e.g. Sarel (1996) and Gollin (2002)).
Table 3.1: Average Share o f Human Capital-Augmented Labour
(Self-employment Adjusted)
Average Share of H (1971-2000) Japan Korea Taiwan Thailand USA Average
With Self-em ployed Adjustment 65.53% 67.60% 73.21% 61.26% 68.42% 67.20%
Without Self-em ployed Adjustment 55.53% 46.11% 55.32% 28.96% 62.58% 49.70%
Note: The calculation based on equation (3.20) by using the ILO data.
Details of the estimated self-employed labour proportion (ls) and estimated share of 
human capital- augmented labour (sH ) can be seen in Appendix 3.3 and 3.4 respectively.
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3.3 Growth Accounting for East Asian Economies
In this section, four East Asian economies are selected and compared with the US 
economy. The results for the estimated Hicksian TFPG and contribution to GDP growth 
(shown in parentheses) are presented in table 3.2 and figure 3.2 below:
Table 3.2 Estimated Annual Average TFPG and Contribution
Hicksian TFPG and Contribution
1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 1971-2000
Japan 2.71%
(58.24% )
2.11%
(52 .60% )
-0.24%
(-21.66% )
1.45%
(44.27% )
Korea -1 .70%
(-25 .87% )
2.72%
(31.70% )
1.55%
(29.22% )
0.78%
(11.28% )
Taiwan 1.83%
(20.56% )
4.24%
(51 .79% )
2.61%
(40.16% )
2.67%
(34.08% )
Thailand 2.50%
(37.66% )
2.19%
(29.29% )
0.61%
(14.19% )
2.00%
(32.17% )
USA -0 .46%
(-13 .69% )
1.15%
(35.53% )
1.51%
(42.06% )
0.65%
(20.49% )
Source: Calculation
Note: Assuming H ick ’ s neutral thus constant —  ratio, TFPGs shown are estimated by  using equation
H
(3.3). Numbers in the brackets show the contribution to GDP growth from  the growth in TFP. The negative 
numbers (in the brackets) are thus the negative effects from  the negative TFPG on the GDP growth.
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Figure 3.2: Estimated TFPG and Contribution to Output Growth (1971-2000)
■ 1971-19*0
■ 19*1-1990 
□ 1991-2000
■ 1971-19*0
■ 19*1-1990 
O 1991-2000
Estimated TFPG (1971-2000) % of Output growth
Estimated TFP Contribution to Output Growth (1971-2000)
Taiwan Korea USA Thailand Japan USA Taiwan Korea Thailand Japan
Estimated Average TFP Contribution % of Output to Output Growth per Year (1971 -2000)Qowth
Japan Taiwan Thailand USA Korea
Source: Calculation from equation (3 .3 ) i.e. Hicks TFPG .
From the results above, it is clear that on average (1971-2000) the estimated 
TFPG rates o f the East Asian countries are higher than that o f the US. However, it can be 
seen that the rates for the East Asian countries are generally decreasing over the period, 
especially in the 1990s. On the other hand, in the same period, the TFPG of the US 
continuously increases, particularly in the 1990s.
Moreover, despite economic slowdown in the 1990’ s, Japan is the country that 
has the highest TFP contribution to GDP growth (44.27%) while Korea has the lowest 
(11.28%). This low TFP contribution rate may be caused by a high rate of physical 
capital accumulation in Korea (detailed discussion can be seen in the dual growth 
accounting section). It can be seen that, during the time period 1970-2000, the physical 
capital stock of Korea grew 16.26 times compared with only 2.05 and 2.31 times for 
Japan and the US respectively (details can be seen in Appendix 3.5). Meanwhile Korea’s
\
real output in 2000 was only 8.05 times the 1970 figure, compared to 2.70 and 2.60 times 
for Japan and the US respectively. Therefore the ratio between growth of the physical 
capital stock and output is on a 2:1 basis for Korea and a 1:1 basis for Japan and the US, 
implying that the latter two countries are more efficient in using the available resources.
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Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, a vital assumption of Hicksian TFPG is a 
constant capital-labour ratio (in the steady state). This may be true in the case of the US 
but not for the East Asian countries being considered, where it is noted that the physical 
capital accumulation is large. The following figure shows indices of capital-labour (in 
this case labour is human capital-augmented labour) ratios:
Figure 3.3: Indices of Capital-Labour Ratios (1971-2000)
It can be seen from the figure above that the assumption of a constant capital- 
labour ratio does not seem to fit the data for the East Asian economies, however it fits 
the US case. Thus, by this fact, Hulten (1975) named part of this increase in capital- 
labour ratio the ‘induced capital stock’ as stated in the previous chapter. This type of 
capital stock is treated as a result of technological progress. Therefore, the TFPG 
estimation under Hick’s neutral assumption is obviously underestimating the role of the 
TFP by neglecting the impact of technical progress in capital accumulation. As 
previously discussed, to avoid this underestimation, an alternative assumption of neutral 
technical change -  employing a constant capital-output ratio may be used instead (Hulten 
(1975)), i.e. Harrodian technical change. From Chapter 2 we proved that, with constant 
returns to scale, the relationship between the Harrodian and Hicksian technical change 
can be written as:
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where TFPH denotes Harrodian TFPG and TFP denotes Hicksian TFPG.
By using this formula and the information that the estimated human capital-augmented 
labour for all considered countries is around 2/3, the Harrodian TFPG will be higher 
than the Hicksian’s by roughly 1.5 times. Details can be seen below:
Table 3.3: Estimated Annual Average TFPG (Harrodian) and Contribution
Harrodian TFPG and Contribution *
1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 1971-2000
Japan 4.37%
(93.81% )
3.20%
(79 .54% )
-0.36%
(-32.86% )
2.33%
(71.33% )
Korea -2 .62%
(-39 .79% )
3.93%
(45.71% )
2.15%
(40.50% )
1.18%
(17.01% )
Taiwan 2.52%
(28.37% )
5.56%
(67.87% )
3.54%
(54.56% )
3.77%
(48.14% )
Thailand 4.15%
(62 .53% )
3.52%
(47.13% )
0.99%
(22.92% )
3.33%
(53 .43% )
USA -0 .65%
(-19 .57% )
1.68%
(51.84% )
2.22%
(61.71% )
0.95%
(29.68% )
Source: Calculation
Note: Assuming Harrodian’ s neutrality, TFPGs shown are estimated by  using equation (3.20).
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Figure 3.4: Estimated Harrodian TFPG and Contribution to Output Growth (1971-2000)
Source: Calculation
■ 1971-19*0
■ 19*1-1990 
□ 1991-2000
■ 1971-19*0
■ 1981-1990 
□ 1991-2000
Estimated Harrodian TFP Contribution % of Output to Output Growth (1971-2000)growth
Taiwan Korea USA Thailand Japan USA Taiwan Korea Thailand Japan
Estimated Average Harrodian TFP Contribution % of Output h> Output Growth per Year (1971-2000)Crowth
TFPOYcar
6%
Estimated Harrodian TFPG (1971-2000)
Estimated Average Harrodian TFPG per Year
It can be seen that, by using the Harrod neutral technical change concept, both 
estimated TFPGs and its contributions in output growth for East Asian countries increase 
significantly. For instance, during 1971-2000, the estimated Harrodian TFPG of Taiwan 
is 3.77% compared with 2.67% in case of Hicksian TFPG. For Thailand the estimated 
Harrodian TFPG during the period is 3.33% compared with 2.00% in case of Hicksian 
TFPG. Considering the TFPG contribution to output growth, in this case it can be clearly 
seen that (apart from Korea) the TFPG contribution of East Asian countries are 
considerably higher than that of the US (i.e. 71% for Japan, 48% for Taiwan, 53% for 
Thailand, and around 30% for the US). For the case of Korea, the TFPG for the whole 
considered period (1971-2000) is comparatively small due to the negative TFPG during 
the 1970s.
So far, for the primal growth accounting exercise, we aim to answer the question 
of what causes output growth: input accumulation or technology? The next question is 
what causes the TFPG. Next section, considering factor prices and the dual growth 
accounting, aims to decompose the sources of TFPG -  an increasing in productivity of 
Human capital-augmented labour or that of the physical capital stock.
76
Chapter 3 Empirical Study of TFPG in East Asia
3.4 Evidences From Factor Prices and the Dual Growth Accounting
In this section we utilise the dual growth accounting concept to decompose to 
sources of TFPG. If the assumption of marginal product pricing holds, then, under the 
competitive factors market, an increase in the price of inputs means an increase in its 
marginal products. Therefore, by using this concept we can identify the sources of TFPG 
as: the increase in productivity of human capital-augmented labour (H ) or that of 
physical capital stock ( K ).
Firstly we calculate the real wage paid to H for each country. Then, for 
comparison purposes, we construct the normalised index (1971 = 100) for each country 
shown in figure 3.5 below:
Figure 3.5: Indices of real wage rate to H (1971-2000)
Source: Calculation
From the figure above, it is clear that the real wage paid to//for East Asian 
countries has increased during the last three decades. For the case of Taiwan, the real 
wage paid increases around 3.5 times compared with around 3 times for Thailand, 2.5 
times for Korea, and 2 times for Japan. On the other hand, the rate has been almost 
unchanged for the case of the US. Assuming a decreasing marginal product for H, the 
causes of an increasing in marginal product of H is either a decreasing in the number of 
H or and an increasing the productivity of H. For the case that an increasing of number
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of H is observed coupled with an increase in the real wage for H, the increase in 
productivity of H must be high enough to compensate the negative effect on productivity 
from the increase in number of H. Considering the fact that the amounts of H for all the 
considered countries have increased over the period (as seen in figure 3.3), then we 
arrive at the conclusion that the productivity of H for East Asian countries must 
significantly increase during the considered period.
Figure 3.6: Indices of Number of Human Capital-Augmented Labour (1971-2000)
From figure 3.5 and 3.6 above, it can be seen that although the number of H of 
East Asian countries have been increasing more than that of the US, the real wage 
indices for the former are still higher than the latter. That means the increase in 
productivity of human capital-augmented labour for the East Asian countries were 
considerably higher than that of the US during the period of study.
Turning to physical capital stock side, with constant returns to scale, the indices 
of ex post real rental rate of capital (r ) are shown in the figure below:
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Figure 3.7: Indices of ex post rate of return to K
Unlike the real wage of H, it can be seen that the ex post rate of return of physical 
capital for the US has increased continuously, while the figures for the East Asian 
countries show downward trends especially in the 1990s. As mentioned before, in the 
specific case of Korea there was a large increase in its physical capital stock during the 
last three decades. This leads to a significant decrease in the real rate of return of 
physical capital during the period. If all markets clear, it can be concluded that the 
marginal product of physical capital of the selected East Asia countries has decreased 
over the last decade. The evidence may reflect either over investment or a lower 
utilisation rate (or both) for physical capital stock. Again, as seen in many previous 
studies, a conclusion of over accumulation of physical capital in East Asia is found. The 
indices of the estimated amount of physical capital stock of the countries can be seen 
below:
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Figure 3.8: Indices of the Amount of Physical Capital Stock (1971-2000)
It can be seen that for the case of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand the indices have 
increased around 15, 13, and 5 times respectively. In contrast, for the case of Japan and 
the US, the indices have increased only around 2 times. This is evidence supporting the 
idea that the decrease in the real rate of return of physical capital stock of the East Asian 
countries is caused by over capital accumulation.
Therefore, it is clear that TFPG in East Asia depends on increasing labour 
productivity reflected by the extraordinary increase in real wage paid. In other words, 
improving labour quality in East Asia is comparatively high and may explain the cause 
of the TFPG and thus economic growth miracle in the last three decades. Therefore, by 
using the dual growth accounting shown below, we can show that the positive TFPG of 
the East Asian countries are caused by the positive wage components.
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Table 3.4: The Dual Growth Accounting 1971-2000
Rent Wage TFP Annual
Component Component Growth TFPG
Japan -2.04% 43.96% 41.92% 1.45%
Korea -39.32% 62.20% 22.89% 0.79%
Taiwan -8.96% 88.84% 79.89% 2.75%
Thailand -5.77% 63.87% 58.10% 2.00%
USA 6.01% 13.09% 19.11% 0.66%
Source: Calculation
The dual growth accounting calculation is based on equation (3.6), i.e.
~ _ f — W  _ yTFPt — sK  Y sH • —. The rent component is sK * — while the wage component is
r w r
_  wsH • —. Detailed results for the dual growth accounting is given in Appendix 3.6 and 
w
can be used to compare the primal growth accounting results shown previously. Note 
that given value of output equals summation of factor incomes (i.e. zero profit condition, 
Yt = rtKt + wtHt) and thus the constant returns to scale assumption holds, then the
estimated TFPG from the primal and dual growth accounting are literally identical. 
However, even the estimated TFPG from the two methods are exactly identical, the dual 
growth accounting has to be introduced in this chapter aiming to decompose the 
estimated TFPG drawn from the primal method.
From the table above, as mentioned, the net positive estimated TFPGs of the East 
Asian countries are caused by the positive wage components while clearly the rent 
component of all East Asian countries show a negative sign. Therefore, from the primal 
growth accounting we can conclude that the estimated TFPG of the selected East Asian 
countries are higher than that of the US. Meanwhile, the dual method suggests that TFPG 
and thus economic growth of the selected East Asian countries are caused by the increase 
in labour productivity rather than that of the physical capital.
Comparing our results with the prior studies (as detailed in Chapter 2), for the 
non-parametric growth accounting studies as seen in Young (1995), Collins & Bosworth 
(1996), and Hsiech (2000), it can be seen that the relative estimated TFPG of all the 
studies mentioned (including ours) is alike. All studies agree that the highest estimated
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TFPG is that of Taiwan, followed by that of Thailand and Korea respectively. Moreover, 
all the prior studies mentioned assumed the Hicks’ neutral technical change which 
assumes that in the balanced growth path the capital-labour ratio must be fixed. 
However, we show the fact that the ratios for the East Asian countries have been 
increasing as seen in figure 3.3. Thus the results from these studies are fundamentally 
underestimating the role of TFPG in inducing capital accumulation in the economy. Our 
study shows that, by using the Harrod’s neutral technical change concept, the estimated 
TFPG of all considered countries increases significantly.
Furthermore, for the dual growth accounting, we use the ex post rate of return of 
physical capital instead of using the observed market interest rate or the eaming-price 
ratio in the capital market as seen in Hsiech (2000). By doing this we can avoid 
arguments about capital market efficiency and ensure the equality of the primal and the 
dual growth accounting. Our study shows that the ex post rate of return of physical 
capital of the selected East Asian countries have been decreasing. This indicates the 
decrease in the marginal products of the physical capital caused by the over capital 
accumulation (as shown in figure 3.8). However the result from Hsiech (2000) showed 
an opposite case. He found a positive growth rate of the rate of return of capital for the 
countries during the period of study. It should be noted that the rate of return of capital in 
his study is derived from the eaming-price ratio in capital market and other market 
interest rates. His results are then subjected to questions as to whether the financial 
markets of the countries are efficient or not and whether the number of firms listed in the 
capital market is sufficient to represent the whole economy. Moreover, there are many 
interest rates from different asset types (e.g. government bonds, commercial bank loans, 
eaming-price ratio) in the market that can be selected. Therefore, such a discretionary 
decision to select one of the rates as a representative of the rate of return of capital for a 
whole country is questionable. A similar argument can be seen in Diewert & Nakamura 
(1998).
Additionally, Hsiech (2000) use the dual growth accounting as a tool to recheck 
the estimated TFPG from the primal growth accounting. Conversely, we impose the 
equality of the two methods (as it should be identical, theoretically) and utilise the dual 
method to decompose the two sources of TFPG -  an increasing in productivity of
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physical capital and that of the human capital-augmented labour. By doing this we reach 
a conclusion (as mentioned above) that TFPG and thus economic growth of the selected 
East Asian countries are caused by the increase in labour productivity rather than that of 
the physical capital.
3.5 Conclusions
During the last three decades, 1971-2000, the estimated TFPGs of the four East 
Asian countries considered were higher than that of the US. In the case of Japan, Taiwan, 
and Thailand the estimated TFPG showed a significant contribution in GDP growth i.e. 
over 30% of GDP growth of these countries could be explained by TFPG. However, 
unlike the US, the estimated TFPG rate of the East Asian countries declined substantially 
during the 1990s. In the case of Japan, a negative sign was found. In Korea, the over 
accumulation of physical capital was evidenced, with an increase in the capital-labour 
ratio and a dramatic decline in the rate of return of physical capital. Furthermore, since 
the assumption of Hicks’ neutral constant capital-labour ratio seems questionable for the 
case of East Asian economies, the alternative - Harrod’s neutral was used. The results 
under Harrodian’s technical growth assumption showed a substantial increase in 
estimated TFPG for all considered countries by roughly 1.5 times, much less for the case 
of the US.
Additionally, considering the factor prices, it can be concluded that the physical 
capital productivity of East Asian economies have continuously decreased and were 
reflected in the downward trends of the ex post rate of return of physical capital. This 
was caused by an over accumulation of physical capital of the countries. However, 
labour productivity showed a trend in the opposite direction since an increasing real 
wage was found, confirmed by the results from the dual growth accounting. Therefore, 
the East Asian growth miracle might be explained by the increase in labour productivity.
Lastly, since the average TFPG rates of East Asian countries in the last three 
decades was higher than that of the US, then the gap in the TFP level between the US 
and East Asian countries is expected to fall during this period. Therefore, to confirm this 
expectation and thus recheck the findings in this chapter, a study of relative TFP level 
will be conducted in the following chapter.
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A p p e n d i x  3.1 
Details for sources of data used
• Japan
Data Source
GDP at factor cost, Compensation to 
employees
National Accounts of OECD Countries 
Detailed Tables: 1970-1982, 1989-2000 
OECD
Gross capital formation Economic and Social Research Institute
(Government of Japan)
http ://www.esri.cao. go. i p/en
Employment and Self-employed 
Labour
International Labour Organization 
http://www.ilo.org
Schooling Data Barro and Lee (2000)
PPP and official exchange rate World Development Indicators (WDI)
• Korea
Data Source
GDP at factor cost, Gross capital 
formation, and Compensation to 
employees
Korean National Statistical Office 
http ://www.nso. go .kr
Employment and Self-employed 
Labour
International Labour Organization 
http://www.ilo.org
Schooling Data Barro and Lee (2000)
PPP and official exchange rate World Development Indicators (WDI)
84
Chapter 3 Empirical Study of TFP Growth in East Asia
• Taiwan
Data Source
GDP at factor cost, 
Compensation to 
employees, Gross Capital 
formation
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China: 1982, 
1994, and 2001
Employment and Self- 
employed Labour
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China: 2000 and 
2001
Schooling Data Barro and Lee (2000)
Official Exchange Rate Penn World Data Mark 6.0
• Thailand
Data Source
GDP at factor cost, Gross capital 
formation, and Compensation to 
employees
National Economic and Development Board 
(Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand)
Employment and Self-employed 
Labour
International Labour Organization 
http ://www.ilo. 01*2
Schooling Data Barro and Lee (2000)
PPP and official exchange rate World Development Indicators (WDI)
• The US
Data Source
GDP at factor cost and Compensation 
to employees
Bureau of Economic Analysis (USA) 
http://www. bea. 2ov
Gross capital formation Economic Report of the President (Feb 2002)
Employment and Self-employed 
Labour
International Labour Organization 
http://www.il0.0r2
Schooling Data Barro and Lee (2000)
PPP and official exchange rate World Development Indicators (WDI)
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A p p e n d i x  3.2 
Initial Capital Stock
If  it is assumed that net capital stock (Kt) in the period t has been accumulated as 
investments starting form an infinite past up to the prior period t-1, then the net capital 
stock in period t equals:
K,-j) (/,„• -(1-<5)M ). (A3.1)
1=1
where,
It denotes the gross investment in capital stock.
8 denotes the constant depreciation rate per year
Let the gross investment growth rate be approximately a constant rate, g.
That is It = • (1 + g f or L
a + g y
Therefore,
£,=/,-! +I,_2(1-S)+ /,_3 (1 - <5)2 +... + /,
Substitute (2) in (3) to obtain:
K,=I,
It also can be seen as 
L
f 1 1 ( ! -<*) ) + 1, + ( 1 )
U+gJ l(l+ g )2J ld  + g)2J (1 + g)m J
(A3.2)
(A3.3)
(A3.4)
K. = 1 - 8
f\- 8  ^
\l + Sy
+ 1 - 5
l + S.
+ + ... + 7l-<57 (A3.5)
Given, 0 < S <1 and 0 < g < 1 then
V1+ S/
JC 1 — JCthen* + x2 + x3 +... =  with x =  then
V1 + &7
<1. Follows from if 0 < x < l  
\~S
1 — JC 1 + g 1 -x  g+5
Therefore,
(A3.6)
86
Chapter 3 Empirical Study of TFP Growth in East Asia
A p p e n d i x  3.3 
Self-employed L a b o u r  Proportion
In the International Classification by Status in Employment 1993 (ICSE-1993) 
used by the ILO database, there are six categories of employed labour:
Category (1) Employees,
Category (2) Employers,
Category (3) Own-account workers,
Category (4) Members of producers’cooperatives,
Category (5) Contributing family workers, and 
Category (6) Workers not classifiable by status
By definition1 only the first category-employees is considered as the formal employed 
labour. However, in practice, to calculate self-employed labour figures only category (2) 
and (3) are included as self-employed labour. This calculation is consistent with the 
figures for the self-employed labour proportion shown in the Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market (KILM) 1999, ILO Geneva. The data are also presented in the ILO table 
called Table 2D. Data availability are different for different countries as detailed below:
1 See http://www.ilo.org
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A p p e n d i x  3.3 
Self-employed L a b o u r  Proportion (cont.)
Country KILM 1999 ILO Table 2D Notes
Japan 1980,
1990-1997
1987-2000 The missing data for the 1980’s are 
estimated by interpolation, assuming a 
linear change from the year 1980 to 
1987. The data for 1970’s was 
estimated by assuming the same rate 
of change from 1980 to 1990.
Korea 1980,
1990-1997
1986-2000 See note for Japan
Taiwan NA NA All Taiwan data (1970-2000) come 
from the Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of China: 2000 and 2001.
Thailand 1990-1996 1987-2000 If  only category (2) and (3) are 
included as self-employed labour then 
the calculated labour share for 
Thailand is sufficiently low i.e. only 
30-50% of GDP. Since the proportion 
of worker in category (5) in Thailand 
is considerably larger than the rest of 
the countries then in this calculation it 
is assumed that half of the family 
workers are considered as unpaid self- 
employed worker. Also see note for 
Japan
The US 1980,
1990-1997
1987-2000 See note for Japan
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A p p e n d i x  3.3 
Es t imated Self-employed L a b o u r  Proportion (eont.)
Year Japan Korea Taiwan Thailand USA
1970 18.92% 39.98% 28.76% N A 8.90%
1971 18.75% 39.38% 28.76% 59.20% 8.88%
1972 18.58% 38.78% 28.17% 58.77% 8.86%
1973 18.40% 38.18% 27.81% 58.35% 8.84%
1974 18.23% 37.59% 27.63% 57.93% 8.82%
1975 18.06% 36.99% 26.79% 57.51% 8.80%
1976 17.89% 36.39% 26.42% 57.08% 8.78%
1977 17.72% 35.79% 25.35% 56.66% 8.76%
1978 17.54% 35.20% 25.21% 56.24% 8.74%
1979 17.37% 34.60% 25.09% 55.81% 8.72%
1980 17.20% 34.00% 24.91% 55.39% 8.70%
1981 16.95% 33.57% 25.30% 54.97% 8.68%
1982 16.71% 33.13% 25.38% 54.54% 8.66%
1983 16.46% 32.70% 25.11% 54.12% 8.64%
1984 16.22% 32.26% 24.79% 53.70% 8.62%
1985 15.97% 31.83% 25.08% 53.27% 8.60%
1986 15.73% 31.40% 24.49% 52.85% 8.58%
1987 15.48% 30.54% 23.42% 52.43% 8.56%
1988 15.14% 30.19% 23.42% 51.50% 8.63%
1989 14.62% 28.76% 23.40% 51.59% 8.53%
1990 14.05% 28.02% 23.45% 51.27% 8.50%
1991 13.49% 28.03% 23.74% 50.37% 8.73%
1992 13.10% 28.48% 23.27% 49.58% 8.41%
1993 12.62% 28.20% 22.80% 48.51% 8.55%
1994 12.32% 27.84% 22.52% 48.24% 8.65%
1995 12.14% 27.87% 22.30% 48.73% 8.39%
1996 11.81% 27.91% 22.31% 47.83% 8.28%
1997~ 11.77% 28.34% 22.03% 47.17% 8.11%
1998 11.68% 28.89% 21.73% 48.62% 7.84%
1999 11.67% 28.80% 21.68% 48.18% 7.56%
2000 11.36% 28.48% 21.45% 46.93% 7.33%
Source: as stated above
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A p p e n d i x  3.4 
Estimated S h a r e  of H u m a n  C a p i t a l - A u g m e n t e d  L a b o u r
Year Japan Korea Taiwan Thailand USA Average
1971 57.75% 61.55% 71.56% 54.66% 70.20% 63.14%
1972 58.35% 59.36% 69.60% 55.06% 70.09% 62.49%
1973 60.14% 59.22% 67.45% 51.30% 70.06% 61.63%
1974 ! 63.22% 56.29% 71.25% 50.64% 70.96% 62.47%
1975 66.39% 57.03% 73.30% 54.14% 69.24% 64.02%
1976 67.14% 58.69% 71.78% 55.27% 69.16% 64.41%
1977 67.57% 61.13% 71.25% 55.50% 68.98% 64.88%
1978 66.06% 64.14% 71.59% 56.33% 68.77% 65.38%
1979 66.52% 66.45% 72.89% 60.17% 68.83% 66.97%
1980 66.42% 68.50% 73.41% 65.80% 69.63% 68.75%
1981 67.06% 66.74% 75.64% 65.33% 68.98% 68.75%
1982 67.38% 67.11% 76.66% 68.23% 69.81% 69.84%
1983 67.75% 69.10% 75.25% 70.06% 68.19% 70.07%
1984 67.17% 68.11% 75.38% 68.85% 67.70% 69.44%
1985 65.93% 67.35% 75.63% 67.15% 67.97% 68.81%
1986 65.74% 65.77% 72.83% 65.49% 68.09% 67.58%
1987 65.90% 66.61% 71.17% 63.04% 68.44% 67.03%
1988 65.32% 68.58% 73.28% 59.92% 68.62% 67.14%
1989 65.31% 71.03% 75.10% 58.37% 67.66% 67.49%
1990 65.20% 71.94% 76.99% 58.97% 68.06% 68.23%
1991 65.49% 73.25% 77.17% 58.06% 68.51% 68.50%
1992 66.06% 73.70% 77.02% 58.90% 68.25% 68.78%
1993 66.24% 72.97% 75.70% 61.69% 68.02% 68.92%
1994 66.60% 72.80% 75.28% 61.29% 67.60% 68.71%
1995 66.96% 74.53% 74.81% 64.34% 67.19% 69.56%
1996 66.15% 77.20% 72.90% 64.04% 66.41% 69.34%
1997 66.44% 75.56% 71.87% 64.74% 65.82% 68.88%
1998 66.97% 71.85% 69.99% 67.54% 66.64% 68.60%
1999 66.33% 70.28% 69.61% 67.30% 66.82% 68.07%
2000 66.39% 71.09% 70.01% 65.77% 67.83% 68.22%
Average 65.53% 67.60% 73.21% 61.26% 68.42% 67.20%
SD 2.48% 5.74% 2.59% 5.49% 1.20% 2.45%
Source: Calculation
wH Y +7Note: The calculation based on equation (3A9),SH = —y- ~  HF HS , that is the share of human
capital-augmented labour is the proportion of the output at factor cost paid to both formal and self- 
employed labour.
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A p p e n d i x  3.5
E s t i mated A g g r e g a t e  Physical Capital Stock
Year Japan 
(Bill. Yen)
Korea 
(Bill. W on)
Taiwan 
(M il. N TS)
Thailand 
(M il. Baht)
U SA 
(Bill. $US)
1970 1,123,068 53,216 1,089,140 1,999,217 7,259
1971 1,144,610 57,461 1,176,746 2,078,417 7,447
1972 1,165,416 6"l,730 1,289,839 2,153,325 7,663
1973 1,188,824 65,887 1,422,695 2,225,392 7,926
1974 1,218,173 71,573 1,566,264 2,312,408 8,217
1975 1,242,943 78,178 1,726,529 2,391,120 8,450
1976 1,265,733 85,190 1,936,052 2,460,809 8,611
1977 1,288,860 93,943 2,143,398 2,553,412 8,813
1978 1,311,033 105,637 2,358,631 2,697,582 9,081
1979 1,335,226 12"l,926 2,613,646 2,862,656 9,399
1980 1,362,933 139,216 2,906,854 3,027,726 9,731
1981 1,390,563 153,029 3,248,736 3,151,702 9,997
1982 1,418,329 165,412 3,588,640 3,29l",521 10,260
1983 1,445,734 179,327 3,908,986 3,422,954 10,458
1984 1,471,927 196,355 4,199,458 3,599,818 10,696
1985 1,501,622 215,208 4,495,877 3,790,653" 11,030
1986 1,536,021 234,410 4,750,723 3,957,544 11,383
1987 1,573,259 255,860 5,050,041 4,116,738 11,722
1988 1,616,519 281,623 5,441,581 4,344,568 12,041
1989 1,669,273 311,080 5,909,993 4,661,310 12,371
1990 1,730,250 345,673 6,466,020 5,081,509 12,702
1991 | 1,798,545 395,968 7,053,721 5,661,146 12,995
1992 1,868,817 446,745 7,690,686 6,321,392 13,210
1993 1,931,009 494,508 8,482,611 6,994,019 13,462
1994 1,983,597 544,394 9,370,599 7,712,616 13,765
"1995 2,032,440 600,038 10,312,770 8,508,959" 14,128
1996 2,082,028 662,591 11,314,822 9,393,652 14,522
1997 2,143,174 728,456 12,288",433 10,311,495 14,978
1998 2,205,838 788,575 13,381,138 10,838,977 15,505
1999 2,255,559 825,620 14,544,621 10,785,750 16,127
2000 2,298,931 865,083 15,661,783 10,750,578 16,804
S ource: Calculation
N ote: The calculation follow s equation (3.10) and (3.11) where the initial physical capital stock ( K 0 ) is
— -—  and the physical capital stock at period t is K t =  1K t_x (1 -  S) +  /  M . In this case/C 0 is for the 
g  + S
year 1970. Regarding capital accumulation in disaggregate levels; for Japan there are residential and non- 
residential; for South Korea there ar e construction and mechanical &  equipment; for Taiwan there are 
residential, non-residential, other construction, transportation, and mechanical &  equipment; for Thailand 
there are construction and equipment; and for the US there are structure, equipment &  software, and 
residential.
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A p p e n d i x  3.6 
T h e  Detailed Results f r o m  the D u a l  G r o w t h  A c c o u n t i n g
1971-1980 Wage
Component
Rent
Component
TFP
Growth
Annual 
TFP Growth
Japan 24.70% -0.38% 24.32% 2.70%
Korea 7.98% -22.92% -14.94% -1.66%
Taiwan 21.18% -5.16% 16.03% 1.78%
Thailand 26.62% -4.18% 22.44% 2.49%
USA -6.19% 2.01% -4.18% -0.46%
1991-2000 Wage
Component
Rent
Component
TFP
Growth
Annual 
TFP Growth
Japan 4.54% -6.67% -2.13% -0.24%
Korea 19.83% -5.85% 13.98% 1.55%
Taiwan 23.67% -0.15% 23.51% 2.61%
Thailand 23.08% -17.58% 5.50% 0.61%
USA 10.65% 2.99% 13.64% 1.52%
1981-1990 Wage Rent TFP Annual
Component Component Growth TFP Growth
Japan 12.77% 6.23% 19.00% 2.11%
Korea 32.36% -8.30% 24.05% 2.67%
Taiwan 38.24% -0.07% 38.17% 4.24%
Thailand 4.89% 14.82% 19.71% 2.19%
USA 7.81% 2.57% 10.38% 1.15%
1971-2000 Wage
Component
Rent
Component
TFP
Growth
Annual 
TFP Growth
Japan 43.96% -2.04% 41.92% 1.45%
Korea 62.20% -39.32% 22.89% 0.79%
Taiwan 88.84% -8.96% 79.89% 2.75%
Thailand 63.87% -5.77% 58.10% 2.00%
USA 13.09% 6.01% 19.11% 0.66%
Source: Calculation
Note: The calculation is based on equation (3.6), i.e. TFPt t_x - s K • ~ + sH • —. The rent
r w
_ r _ vvcomponent is sK • — while the wage component is sH • —. The results above show the 
r w
equality between the primal and dual growth accounting (under constant returns to scale
assumption) at the first decimal.
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C h a p t e r  4
In the previous chapter we showed that the TFPG of East Asian countries in the 
last three decades were positive and higher than that of the US. However, the findings 
still cannot quantify how wide the gaps of the TFP levels among the considered countries 
are, and whether the gaps have widened or not. Knowing this information would allow 
us to identify the stage of the relative TFP levels (and their trends) of the considered 
countries. Moreover, this chapter aims to show whether the productivity convergence 
hypothesis is true or not for the case of the selected East Asian countries - Japan, South 
Korea (hereafter Korea), Taiwan, and Thailand and the US. Therefore, this chapter 
presents an empirical study of the relative productivity levels among the selected four 
countries and compares it to the productivity level of the US. The first section is a 
summary of the methodology used, followed by a section identifying data and sources. 
The main findings are then presented, followed by some discussions and a conclusion.
4.1 Methodology Used
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two main approaches to 
estimating the relative productivity levels among the nations. The first, presented next, is 
a non-parametric approach and the second is a parametric approach.
4.1.1) Non-parametric Approach
In answering the question about the relative level of productivity between 
countries, the translog multilateral productivity index originally proposed by Cave, 
Christensen, and Diewert (1982) is used. As mentioned in Chapter 2, let the aggregate 
production function be the translog production function with one output (7 ) and two 
inputs (physical capital, K and human capital-augmented labour, H), then it can be 
shown that the translog multilateral productivity index between country k and I is:
Chapter 4 The Relative levels of TFP among Countries
lra ;= [ln  Yk -\n Y ']-[  | ( 4  + s*) [\nKk- ln t f ] - | ( 4  + -ln X ] ]
-[ ] (4.1)
where
In Xkl denotes translog multilateral productivity index between country k and I 
Yl denotes output of country i
slH denotes share of human capital-augmented labour of country i 
s'K denotes share of physical capital of country i 
and a bar over the variables (X ) denotes value of a hypothetical country h
The hypothetical country h is an average value of five countries: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and the US. Countries /during the period t are all these five countries during 
the time 1970-2000, while country /, the base country, is the US, year 2000. That is, we 
estimate the TFP levels for all countries during the period 1971 to 2000 relative to the 
TFP level of the US for the year 2000. In other words, calculating these indices is to 
compare the output and inputs used of the four East Asian countries against that of the 
US by using the hypothetical country h as a reference point as shown in the figure below:
Figure 4.1: Translog Multilateral Productivity Index
Note: country k are the four East Asians countries, the country /  is the US, and the hypothetical countries h 
is the average value o f  all five countries.
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Moreover, it should be noted that as it is assumed that the underlying production 
functions are the second order translog functions, by using the Quadratic Estimation 
Lemma (Diewert 1976), then the Tomqvist's index is the exact index as a discrete 
approximation of the continuous Divisia’s index. We, therefore, can see the Tomqvist's 
indices as the terms representing the average inputs’ shares between the countries and the
I   j __
hypothetical country h in the equation (4.1) e.g. ~(sk +sk ) and f t sH + sh) •
The non-parametric approach has many attractive features. The most important 
one is the method does not require a restriction of homogeneity of input’s share among 
the considered nations. Moreover, this method allows a year-by-year variation of the 
input’s shares of an individual country. That is, by conducting the non-parametric 
estimation of the relative TFP levels, the assumption that each individual country has its 
own input’s share is allowed and the share can alter during the period of study as well. 
On the other hand, by using the parametric approach, even if the panel data model 
includes slope dummy variables for each country, the estimated slope for each country 
(i.e. the estimated input’s share or the estimated elasticity of substitution, for example) is 
still a fixed value for the period of the study.
However, the parametric estimation also has some advantages. The TFPG can be 
estimated both with and without the constant returns to scale assumption. Also, when 
conducting the parametric estimation, the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution 
can he tested. Moreover, we can also relax the assumption of neutrality of technical 
change by adding some terms to capture the non-neutral technical change. For example, 
assuming the Cobb-Douglas production function, a model with Hicks’ neutral technical 
change can be seen as: In 7, = a0+al InLt +a2 InKt +ut, while the summation of the
estimated a0 and ut is the estimated TFP level for time T. With the possibility of non­
neutral technical change, new terms representing the interactive between time and inputs 
may be added. Then the production may be seen as:
In Yt =a0+ ax InLt + a2 In Kt + a3 InKtT + a4 InLtT + vt .
where a3 and a4 reflect the technology augmenting in capital and labour respectively. 
A detailed discussion regarding this topic can be seen in Hulton (2000). Nevertheless, for
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the consistent and comparable results, in our exercises, we will still assume neutral 
technical change through out our study. A parametric approach is presented next.
4.1.2) Parametric Approach
In estimating the productivity level parameter, A, of a production function it is 
necessary to identify an explicit form of this function. Indeed the preferred production 
function is the translog production function. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a 
model based on the translog function is subject to the low degree of freedom problem 
which leads to an unreliable estimation. To prevent the complications involving the 
estimation of such flexible function, we may need to impose some restrictions (e.g. 
constant returns to scale, constant elasticity of substitution) on the function (Hulten
(2000)). By doing this, we will end up with the restricted form of the translog function 
which loses its flexibility and the estimation will still suffer from the low degree of 
freedom problem.
Therefore, in this exercise, we select a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production function. Thus, we do not need to assume a unitary elasticity of substitution 
between inputs as in the Cobb-Douglas production function case. Then, for the CES 
case, there are two parameters need to be estimated -  the elasticity of substitution 
parameter and the input’s share parameter. For the input’s share parameter, the results 
from Chapter 3 show us that on average the share of physical capital of all the considered 
country is around 1/3 which in-line with the prior literature as Mankiw et al (1992). 
Thus, it is wise to utilise the known information without using the regression estimation. 
Consequently, the only parameter needed to estimate is the elasticity of substitution 
parameter, shown in the following procedure:
The CES function can be written as:
-m
Y = A(ocK~p + (1 -  a)L~p) p (4.2)
Given 0 < ct: < 1, /? > -!, and/i-  1 the function above is a homogenous of 
degree one thus exhibiting constant returns to scale (i.e. equation 4.2 is a homogenous 
degree// function). Therefore, the logarithmic form of a constant returns to scale CES 
function can be written as:
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Differentiating (4.3), the marginal products of labour and capital are respectively:
\L;
MPL =
dL Ap
MPK = dY cc (Y^(l+P)
dK Ap \Kj
(4.4)
(4.5)
and the elasticity of substitution between two inputs is: 
d(K/L)
<r = , i  ffp  . = 7L - ,  (Since/? > -1 then 0 < oo) (4.6)
l l k A 1 + P
Pl /Pk
If  /? = 0, then cr = 1, as seen in Cobb-Douglas production function. From equation (4.4) 
and (4.5), with a perfect competition assumption, MPL = w and MPK = r while w and r 
denote a real wage rate and a real rate of return of capital respectively. Taking the 
logarithm of (4.4) yields:
l„w = ln(1- f f ) + ( l  + /3)ln(j) (4.7)
Alternatively, following the notation used by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and 
Solow (1961), equation (4.7) can be seen as:
Yln(—) = y + cr ln(w) (4.8)
L
1
where parameter y denotes a constant term and o* = -—-^ -denotes an elasticity of
substitution between the two inputs. By using econometric estimation of equation (4.8) 
the parameter cj , and thus the implicit J3, can be estimated. Assuming labour in this 
model is a human capital-augmented labour, H , and considering a panel data model, 
equations (4.3) and (4.8) can be seen as:
ln)j, =ln A„ - - H oK M  + (4.9)
ln(~~ ) = y + cj ln(wiV) + uit (4.10)
U
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As mentioned, an average share of physical capital (a ) for all countries in the 
period of study (1971-2000) was roughly 1/3 (see Appendix 3.4 for the detailed table), 
then it is useful to assume that a common share of physical capital for all considered 
countries is 1/3. Since the parameter cr (thus the implicit fd) in equation (4.10) can be 
estimated by a simple linear least square procedure then equation (4.10) is selected to 
estimate the common elasticity of substitution parameter (cr). Therefore after obtaining 
the estimated fd from (4.10) and utilising value of share of physical capital, a -  1/3 
known from Chapter 3, the only unknown variable, i.e. the TFP level, can be estimated 
from rearranging equation (4.9) which is:
In 4  = ± n  (a K p  + ( l- a ) H p )  + \n Y„(4.11)
r
- 1where a = 1/3 and fd = ---- 1.
cr
That is our estimated TFP level is a component of a fixed intercept of the function 
(InAit) plus the estimated change in the intercept (£.,) reflecting TFPG. In addition, it
should be noted that, in our equation, a time trend is not included and the physical capital 
is measured at constant price. That is all vintages of physical capital are heated alike. 
This means that the technical change associated with physical capital investment 
becomes part of the error term in our model. Moreover, the absence of time trend in the 
model means that the error term also includes the ‘disembodiment technical progress’ (a 
detailed discussion can be seen in Thirlwall (1994)). Thus, our estimated TFP level from 
this specification includes: the technical change related with the increasing in quality of 
the physical capital assuming that the new vintage of capital is more productive than the 
old one, and the technical advance that is not embodied in both inputs (physical capital 
and human capital-augmented labour). The following section identifies the data used and 
sources.
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4.2) Data Used and Sources
The data used in this chapter were mostly obtained from Chapter 3. These include 
total output (Yit), physical capital (K it), human capital-augmented labour and its share in
total output (Hitmd (1 -« )) . Moreover, as it is necessary to change a country’s own
currency units to one international unit, the US dollar was selected. There are two 
exchange rates used in this chapter, an official exchange rate and a PPP exchange rate. 
Both rates were obtained from the World Development Indicators database of the World 
Bank.
Indeed, for an international comparison, the PPP exchange rate is preferred. 
However, the PPP data is not available for Taiwan, and the data for other countries is 
available from 1975 onwards only. Therefore, in order to allow us to compare our results 
from this chapter with the one from the last chapter fully, in this chapter we present two 
sets of results. The first set is based on the official exchange rate including all five 
countries considered (i.e. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the US) from the year 
1970 to 2000, as in chapter 2. For the second set - based on the PPP exchange rate, we 
drop Taiwan and consider the data only from the year 1975 to 2000.
4.3) Relative Productivity of East Asian countries
The following two sections present the relative productivity of East Asian 
countries by using non-parametric and parametric methods respectively.
4.3.1) Non-parametric Approach
As mentioned above, in the non-parametric section, the relative productivity level 
among countries is calculated by comparing the TFP level of the US in the year 2000 
with the four East Asian countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) and that of the 
US itself. To be able to see the change in relative TFP level during the period of study, 
there are seven points of time being considered: 1971, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 
and 2000. Then following equation (4.1) the translog multilateral productivity indices 
were calculated. Originally, as seen in the equation, a calculated index for the base 
country (the US) equals zero for the base year (2000) since the difference of productivity
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level between base country and itself equals zero. However, tables below show the 
normalised indices1 while the original relative TFP value can be seen in Appendix 4.1.
Table 4.1: Translog Multilateral Productivity Indices: Official Exchange Rate
N orm alised Relative 
T FP  Level
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Japan 0.46 0.57 0.69 0.71 0.88 1.00 0.96
Korea 0.75 0.66 0.55 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.54
Taiwan 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.78 0.83 0.76
Thailand 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.26 0.32 0.25
USA 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.9 0.91 0.93 0.96
Mean 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.69 0.74 0.69
Standard Deviation 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.30
cov* 0.63 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.39 0.37 0.44
Source: Calculation from equation (4.1) by using the official exchange rate.
Standard Deviation
Note: COY* denotes coefficient of variation =
Mean
It should be noted that the calculation based on equation (4.1) uses the official 
exchange rates while the base countiy is the US. The indices shown above are the 
normalised indices. Therefore, the maximum value is one (1) and the minimum is zero 
(0). In other words, in this case, we assumed that the relative TFP level gap between the 
highest (of all the samples) and the lowest point is one hundred basis points. For 
instance, there are five countries and each country’s relative TFP level was measured at 
seven points of time. Thus, there are 35 relative indices (5 times 7) in our case. The 
highest is 1.00 for Japan in 1995 and the lowest is 0.00 for Thailand in 1971. In the year 
2000, both the US and Japan had the equally highest relative TFP level, which was 0.96 
and the gap between the highest and the lowest relative TFP level (Thailand) was 71 
basis points. Compared with the gap in 1971, which was 90 basis points, we can then 
conclude that the TFP gap between Thailand and the US was smaller in 2000. Moreover, 
as a whole, considering a decreasing trend of the coefficient of variation of our sample, it
1 Given xu is the translog multilateral productivity index for country i at time t , the normalised index for 
_ _ xit — min(x)
country I at period t is Xit- --------------------------------  thus Xit e [0 ,1 ], where min(x) (max(x) ) is the
max(x) -  min(x)
minimum (maximum) value o f  all x s in the data set for all countries over all years.
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can be concluded that there is a strong evidence of productivity convergence between all 
considered countries.
Table 4.2: Translog Multilateral Productivity Indices: PPP Exchange Rate
N orm alised Relative 
T FP  Level
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Japan 0.37 0.49 0.65 0.74 0.77 0.84
Korea 0.84 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.48 0.55
Thailand 0.04 0.00 0.1 0.22 0.27 0.22
USA 0.89 0.86 0.9 0.92 0.94 1.00
Mean 0.54 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.62 0.65
Standard Deviation 0.40 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.34
COV* 0.76 0.76 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.53
Source: Calculation from equation (4.1) by using the PPP exchange rate.
tvt * j  * cr • + r • *• Standard DeviationNote: COV* denotes coefficient of variation = ------------------------
Mean
The calculation for table 4.2 also based on equation (4.1) uses the PPP exchange 
rates. The interpretation of the indices shown above is similar to the explanation for the 
prior table. In this case, the highest relative TFP level is that of the US in 2000 and the 
lowest is Thailand in 1980. The relative TFP gap between Thailand and the US has been 
decreasing from 85 basis points in the year 1975 to 78 basis points in the year 2000. As 
previously seen in the case of the official exchange rate, similarly, in this case (using 
PPP exchange rate) the coefficient of variation of the sample reduced from 0.76 in 1975 
to 0.53 in 2000. This shows that, except Korea, the productivity convergence hypothesis 
is applicable for the case of East Asian economic development in the last three decades. 
In other words, it is implied that, as a whole, the productivity growth of the selected East 
Asian countries is higher than that of the US. This conclusion coincides with the findings 
from Chapter 3. Additionally, for the case of Korea, it is clear that relative TFP level of 
this country has been decreasing over the period of study. This also coincides with the 
results for estimated TFPG for Chapter 3 that Korea is a country with the lowest TFPG 
rate in the group. Figures below present the normalised relative TFP levels.
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Figure 4.2: Relative TFP Levels (Official Exchange Rate)
From figure 4.2, there are some points to consider. Firstly, there was a similar 
pattern of the trends of the relative TFP levels among the East Asian countries. It can be 
seen that, as a whole, a sharp increasing trend of the relative TFP level of these countries 
started in 1985, reached its top level at 1995, and declined significantly after that (i.e. 
1995-2000). Coincidently, these trends were similar to the economic growth patterns 
from 1980s to 1990s which started with a high economic expansion period in the 1980s 
and ended with the East Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s. This evidence shows a 
pro-cyclical behaviour of the TFP as discussed in Aghion & Saint-Paul (1993).
Secondly, despite a high economic growth during 1971 to 1985, the relative TFP 
level of Korea has declined sharply. Specifically, the real GDP at factor cost of Korea 
grew on average 6.97% per year during the 14 years. However, the relative TFP level fell 
more than 20 basis points during 1971-1985 (the official exchange rate case). As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 3, this can be explained by the excessive growth in 
physical capital accumulation in the period i.e. the average growth rate of physical 
capital stock of Korea in the period was 9.43% per year (while the growth rate of human 
capital-augmented labour was 5.15% per year). Therefore, it can be concluded that the
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relative TFP level of Korea during the period suffered from the over accumulation of 
physical capital.
The following figure shows the calculation results based on the PPP exchange
rate.
Figure 4.3: Relative TFP Levels (PPP Exchange Rate)
Normalised Relative TFP Levels
Japan 
Korea 
Thailand 
US
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: Calculation
By using the PPP exchange rate, we can see that only Thailand’s relative TFP 
level shows a slightly decreasing trend after 1995. This is because, in general, the official 
exchange rates in the period were understated relative to the true value of the currencies 
of the countries in the region. With the correction by using the PPP exchange rate, most 
of the decreasing trend in the relative TFP levels after 1995 was eliminated.
Additionally, as there are significant differences between the official and PPP 
exchange rates (detailed in Appendix 4.2), the results shown in table 4.1 and 4.2 reflect 
these discrepancies. In the case of Japan, since the official exchange rate overvalues the 
Japanese Yen compared with the PPP rate, then the relative TFP indices based on PPP 
exchange rates are lower than those based on the official rate. Meanwhile the opposite is 
found for Korea and Thailand. Nevertheless, these differences do not effect the 
conclusion that TFPG of East Asian countries are higher than that of the US (from 
Chapter 3) and also the findings in this chapter, which show the productivity 
convergence between the countries.
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In addition, it is clear that the average relative productivity of the five countries 
has been increasing (even one of our sample, Korea, shows a decreasing trend). If  we 
assume that the speed of change of the average TFP levels is constant and other things 
being equal, then we may be able to predict the speed of productivity convergence. In 
this case, our simple exercise suggests that, for the official exchange rate case, the 
average TFP level grows at the rate around 0.78% per year (calculated from the 
continuous average growth rate of the mean of the relative TFP levels from 1971 to 
2000). That means it will take us another 47 years to see the average TFP level reaches 
the value of one. In other words, with this constant growth rate of average TFP level 
among our sample countries, we guess that, on average, in the year 2047 the TFP levels 
of the countries may converge to the same level. Similarly, for the case of the PPP 
exchange rate, the average growth rate is 0.74% while the predicted year for the 
productivity convergence is 2058. Nevertheless, this is a rather rough estimation. There 
are factors that can slow down or accelerate the speed of convergence especially changes 
in the ‘social capability’ or institutional factors as mentioned in Abramovitz (1986). This 
aspect relating roles of the institutional factors will be discussed in the next chapter. For 
a comparison, a parametric approach of accounting the relative TFP levels among 
nations is presented next.
4.3.2) Parametric Approach
In this section equation (4.10) is estimated by using both the fixed and random 
effects model on a panel data set of 5 countries from the year 1971 to 2000. As 
mentioned before, there are two exchange rates used in this chapter: the official and PPP 
exchange rate. Therefore, there are four models to be estimated. The results for the 
estimated a and implicit fd are shown below:
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Table 4.3: Estimated cr and implicit J3
Model Estimated cr11 Implicit p 12 95%  Confidence interval74
Fixed Effects 
(O fficial exchange rate)
0.9381142
(0.0131106)
0.065968 0.9122 to 0.9640
Random Effects 
(O fficial exchange rate)
0.943387
(0.011618)
0.060010 0.9206 to 0.9662
Fixed Effects 
(PPP/3 exchange rate)
0.9613411
(0.0272775)
0.040214 0.9072 to 1.0154
Random Effects 
(PPP/3 exchange rate)
0.957889
(0.018297)
0.043962 0.9220 to 0.9938
Source: Calculation, detailed in Appendix 4.3
/I  Numbers in parentheses are standard error.
/2  Implicit j3 =  (1 /< t)  — 1
/3 M odels with PPP exchange rate did not include Taiwan.
/4  For the case o f  fixed effects m odel with PPP exchange rate, the null hypothesis o f  H0: < 7 = 1  cannot be 
rejected at 99%  (the calculated t-stat =  1.42 compared with the critical t-stat at 2.58). For the random 
effects m odel with PPP exchange rate, the null also cannot be rejected at 99%  (the calculated t-stat =  2.30 
compared with the critical t-stat at 2.58).
From the table above, at a 95% significance level, it can be seen that, for the 
official exchange rate case, the estimated cr range is from 0.9122 to 0.9662. Meanwhile, 
for the case of PPP exchange rate the range is from 0.9072 to 1.0154. By using random 
effect (in both official and PPP exchange rate), the estimated cr tends to be a slightly 
higher value than that of the fixed effect model. Since our Hausman Specification Tests 
(detailed in Appendix 4.3) conclude that the estimated slopes from the fixed and the 
random effects models are not systematically different, the random effects model is 
valid. For the case of PPP exchange rate using a random effects model, it is suggested 
that the use of Cobb-Douglas technology as seen in Mankiw et al (1992) seems 
applicable since the upper bound of the estimated cr approaches unity (i.e. the 95% 
confidence interval of the estimated cr is [0.9220 , 0.9938], and the null hypothesis of 
unitary elasticity of substitution (H0: cr = 1) cannot be rejected at 99%). In their paper, 
there are three inputs: physical capital, labour, and human capital. All these three inputs 
share an equal share of output, 1/3. These are consistent with our non-parametric
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findings in the last chapter where an average share of physical capital equals 1/3 while a 
share of human capital-augmented labour equals 2/3 .
The next step is to conduct a relative TFP level accounting from equation (4.11). 
As in the non-parametric section, we present 2 scenarios. The first one is a model using 
official exchange rate. The second one is for the PPP exchange rate. In each scenario, 
two cases are considered: a lower bound and an upper bound value of <x.
For the official exchange rate case, the lower bound case represents cr= 0.9122 
(thus ># = 0.0963), while the upper bound is for cr= 0.9662 (thus (3 =0.0349). The 
normalised estimated TFP level for the two cases are shown below (the detailed table can 
be seen in Appendix 4.4):
Figure 4.4: Estimated TFP Levels (Official exchange rate, cr= 0.9122)
Relative TFP Levels (1971-2000)
JPN
•KOR
■TWN
•THA
US
Source: Calculation
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Figure 4.5: Estimated TFP Levels (Official exchange rate, cr = 0.9662)
From figure 4.4 and 4.5, it is clear that there is no significant difference between 
the upper and lower bound cases of the parameter cr selected. Moreover, comparing the 
results with the non-parametric section, in general, the results from this section coincide 
with the findings in the prior section. The estimated relative TFP levels from this section 
almost show the same trends as seen in figure 4.2. Nevertheless, one more conclusion 
can be drawn. For this case, we can see that during 1998 to 2000 the relative TFP levels 
of East Asian countries started to rise again after the economic crisis in 1996 to 1997. 
Moreover, concerning the productivity convergence argument, figures below show the 
coefficient of variation of the estimated relative TFP levels from this section:
Figure 4.6: Coefficient of Variation of the Relative TFP Levels
(Official Exchange Rate Case)
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From figure 4.6, the decreasing trends of the computed coefficients for both cases 
lead us to the conclusion that during the last three decades there is a strong evidence of 
the productivity convergence between East Asian countries and the US. However, during 
the economic crisis in the late 1990s there were some degrees of divergence (since an 
increase in the coefficient of variation was observed). Nonetheless, as previously 
mentioned, the relative TFP levels of the East Asian countries started to increase again 
after 1998. Then the coefficient of variation showed a decreasing trend again during 
1998 to 2000.
Additionally, for the PPP exchange rate case, two cases are considered: the lower 
bound case where cr = 0.9072 (thus J3 =0.1023), and the upper bound case reflects a 
possibility of Cobb-Douglas technology where cr approaches the value of one. That is in 
this case it is assumed that cr= 0.9999 thus ># = 0.0001. Figure 4.7 and 4.8 exhibit the 
estimated relative TFP levels for both cases:
Figure 4.7: Estimated TFP Levels (PPP exchange rate, cr= 0.9072)
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Figure 4.8: Estimated TFP Levels (PPP exchange rate, cr = 0.9999)
From the two figures above, it can be seen that these results are very similar to 
the findings from the non-parametric section (PPP case, i.e. figure 4.3). Firstly the TFP 
level of the US shows a comparatively lower rate of change compared with that of East 
Asian countries, while Japan’s relative TFP level shows a distinctive increasing trend. 
For the case of Thailand, the relative TFP level of the country still shows a substantially 
increasing rate over the period of study. On the other hand, for the case of Korea, as 
found in the non-parametric section, the relative TFP level of this country still shows a 
decreasing trend. That is, so far, all methods have confirmed that the relative TFP level 
of Korea in the year 2000 is lower than that of the year 1971. It should be noted that this 
does not necessary mean that the ‘absolute’ TFP level of the country has been 
decreasing. The finding, indeed, shows that the TFPG of Korea is generally lower than 
the rest of the countries in our sample. Our explanation is that the over accumulation of 
physical capital (especially during the 1970s) undermined the TFPG and thus the relative 
TFP level of Korea.
Turning to the question of productivity convergence, the following figure shows 
the coefficient of variations of the sample countries:
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Figure 4.9: Coefficient of Variation of the Relative TFP Levels
(PPP Exchange Rate Case)
As previously seen in figure 4.6, figure 4.9 also shows the decreasing trends of the 
coefficients for both cases. This means that during the considered period, in general, the 
relative TFP levels of the 4 sample countries have less deviation (adjusted by mean of 
the sample). In summary, this is evidence supporting the productivity convergence 
argument.
Furthermore, comparing the results based on the two exchange rates used, apart 
from Japan, the use of the PPP exchange yields the higher TFP level. This is caused by 
the undervaluation of the official exchange rate for these countries. In the case of Japan, 
the overvaluation of the official exchange rate has the opposite effect causing the relative 
TFP level to be higher than when using the PPP exchange rate. The next section presents 
a relationship between the relative TFP and income levels among the countries.
4.4) TFP Level and Income Differences among Countries
From the findings of this chapter, a strong positive relationship between relative 
TFP and income levels was found. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
framework shown in Appendix 4.5. From the appendix, it can be seen that long run per 
worker income growth rate depends solely on TFPG. This implies that the lower the 
TFPG the lower the relative TFP level and thus the lower the per worker income level.
Moreover, the figure below shows us an interesting relationship -  the effect of 
TFPG on income per human capital-augmenting labour. It can be seen that the
no
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relationship between the two variables is exponential. For example, an increasing in TFP 
level from 0.6 to 1.00 (i.e. 1.67 times) leads to the rise in income per human capital- 
augmenting labour from around $5,000 to $25,000 per year (i.e. 5 times). Our 
explanation for the exponential growth of output is the simultaneous relationship 
between TFPG and output. The TFPG induces the increasing in output, saving, and 
investment (in both physical and human capital) for the economy which in turn leads to 
the higher value of output and a higher level of TFP simultaneously. The following 
figure shows the relationship found between income per human capital-augmented 
labour (Y/H ) and TFP level (A).
Figure 4.10: Income per Human Capital-Augmented Labour and TFP Level.
$US/Year Income per Human Capital-Augmented Labour and TFP Level
Source: Calculation from all 5 countries during 1971-2000 by using a parametric approach (official 
exchange rate case, given cr = 0.9434)
Moreover, the findings in this chapter also suggest that the higher the relative 
TFP level (as seen in the case of the LIS) the lower the TFPG rate. This is consistent with 
the productivity convergence assumption discussed in Abramovitz (1986). Christensen et 
al (1995) also showed evidence supporting the productivity convergence hypothesis. 
They found that, by using the translog multilateral productivity index as seen in equation 
(4.1), the TFP gaps between 9 countries (i.e. Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, UK, and the US) during 1947-1973 have narrowed. 
From these results it could be implied that if the existing technologies are assumed to be 
free public goods in the long run, that is every firm is free to choose the best technology 
available (Parente & Prescott 2000), then TFP and thus income level of countries in the
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world must converge to a certain level - less income inequality would therefore be 
expected. However, the higher levels o f income inequality between countries are still 
evident. Regarding the productivity and income difference issue, Hall & Jones (1999) 
showed that productivity and output per worker of the nations are driven by differences 
in institutions and government policies. They suggested that the differences in the 
institutional factors (i.e. ‘ social infrastructure’ as in their paper or ‘ social capability’ as in 
Abramovitz (1986)) among the countries create the differences in economic 
environment. This will influence individuals’ and firms’ economic decisions. Ultimately, 
the TFP and thus output per worker depend on the institutional factors given for each 
country. Therefore the differences in institutional factors might be able to explain the 
differences in TFP level among the nations. This area will be explored in the next 
chapter.
4.5) Conclusions
In this chapter we conducted both non-parametric and parametric estimations of 
the relative TFP levels among the East Asian countries compared with the level o f the 
US. The findings from both methods agreed that, apart from South Korea, the relative 
TFP levels o f the selected East Asian countries increased during the period of the study. 
Moreover, the productivity gaps among the countries and the US narrowed. This 
confirms the results o f the growth accounting study presented in Chapter 3. Specifically, 
in Chapter 3, we concluded that the TFPG roles of the East Asian countries were 
generally higher than that o f the US. Meanwhile, in this chapter, we confirmed the 
results by showing that the relative TFP levels o f the selected East Asian countries have 
increased and the rates of change of the levels were actually higher than that of the US. 
Therefore, the findings from both Chapter 3 and 4 support the productivity convergence 
assumption; the advanced country (the US in our case) tends to have a lower TFPG than 
that o f the developing countries (the East Asian countries in this case); and if these 
differences in TFPG rate are true, then the productivity convergence should be observed.
Furthermore, despite a significant increase in capital-labour ratio, observed for 
most of the East Asian countries, we can conclude that the main source of economic 
growth of the countries, apart from South Korea, is technology driven. Moreover, it is
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clear that the productivity gaps between the US and East Asian countries are 
diminishing. However, the gaps are still considerably wide. Ultimately, these relative 
TFP gaps are the underlying cause of income differences between these considered 
countries.
The general question is how we can explain the differences in the TFP level 
among the countries. As suggested by literature, the possibility of a technologically 
backward country catching-up the advanced country depends on the ‘ social capability’ 
(or ‘social infrastructure’) or the institutional factors within the developing country itself. 
Productivity advancement must be supported by the adjustment in institutions e.g. the 
change in laws, government policies, market competition, industrial relations. Without 
the supportive adjustments, the developing economy will fail to exploit the available best 
technology. The following chapter presents a discussion o f the development of the 
related institutional factors within the East Asian countries.
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A p p e n d i x  4 .1
R e la t iv e  P r o d u c tiv ity  L e v e l  
(The Original Value)
Translog Multilateral Productivity Indices: Official Exchange Rates
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Japan -1.29 -1.01 -0.70 -0.64 -0.20 0.10 0.01
Korea -0.55 -0.77 -1.06 -1.16 -0.91 -0.91 -1.09
Taiwan -0.80 -0.79 -0.69 -0.74 -0.47 -0.33 -0.52
Thailand -2.47 -2.25 -2.33 -2.35 -1.79 -1.64 -1.82
USA -0.16 -0.17 -0.22 -0.16 -0.12 -0.09 0.00
Source: Calculation
Note: The calculation is based on equation (4.1) using the official exchange rates. The 
base country is the US (2000), then the relative TFP of the US at the year 2000 equals 
zero.
Translog Multilateral Productivity Indices: PPP Exchange Rates
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Japan -0.98 -0.79 -0.54 -0.41 -0.36 -0.25
Korea -0.24 -0.77 -0.64 -0.69 -0.82 -0.71
Thailand -1.49 -1.56 -1.40 -1.22 -1.14 -1.22
USA -0.17 -0.23 -0.16 -0.12 -0.09 0.00
Source: Calculation
Note: The calculation is based on equation (4.1) using the PPP exchange rates. The base 
country is the US (2000), then the relative TFP of the US at the year 2000 equals zero.
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A p p e n d i x  4 .2  
T h e  O ff ic ia l  a n d  P P P  E x c h a n g e  R a te
Official Rate Japan Korea Thailand Taiwan
1970 360.0000 310.5558 20.8000 40.0000
1971 350.6777 347.1475 20.8000 40.0000
1972 303.1725 392.8942 20.8000 40.0000
1973 271.7017 398.3217 20.6196 38.2500
1974 292.0825 404.4725 20.3751 38.0000
1975 296.7875 484.0000 20.3793 38.0000
1976 296.5525 484.0000 20.4001 38.0000
1977 268.5100 484.0000 20.4001 38.0000
1978 210.4417 484.0000 20.3361 36.9500
1979 219.1400 484.0000 20.4189 36.0000
1980 226.7408 607.4325 20.4764 36.0000
1981 220.5358 681.0283 21.8204 36.7900
1982 249.0767 731.0842 23.0001 39.1199
1983 237.5117 775.7483 23.0001 40.0600
1984 237.5225 805.9758 23.6394 39.6199
1985 238.5358 870.0200 27.1589 39.8600
1986 168.5198 881.4542 26.2989 37.8499
1987 144.6375 822.5675 25.7228 31.8700
1988 128.1517 731.4683 25.2939 28.6100
1989 137.9644 671.4558 25.7021 26.4099
1990 144.7925 707.7642 25.5855 26.8899
1991 134.7067 733.3533 25.5168 26.8199
1992 126.6513 780.6508 25.4001 25.1599
1993 111.1978 802.6708 25.3196 26.3899
1994 102.2078 803.4458 25.1500 26.4599
1995 94.0596 771.2733 24.9152 26.4899
1996 108.7791 804.4533 25.3427 27.4599
1997 120.9909 951.2892 31.3643 28.7000
1998 130.9053 1,401.4370 41.3594 33.4599
1999 113.9068 1,188.8170 37.8137 32.3222
2000 107.7655 1,130.9580 40.1118 31.2603
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
and Penn World Data (Taiwan only)
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A p p e n d i x  4 .2  ( C o n t . )
T h e  O ff ic ia l  a n d  P P P  E x c h a n g e  R a te
PPP Rate Japan Korea Thailand
1975 286.6802 218.9168 11.6527
1976 280.5268 244.9592 11.0019
1977 274.1322 261.3461 10.6684
1978 269.4894 304.1894 10.9407
1979 263.1810 344.0871 11.2428
1980 258.4180 402.6413 11.8560
1981 238.0213 417.3318 11.2715
1982 218.7783 404.4612 10.6753
1983 204.1735 391.8671 10.2085
1984 204.9955 402.1310 10.0631
1985 207.0712 410.8489 10.0761
1986 214.5359 440.8352 10.4110
1987 221.5739 485.0802 11.2766
1988 222.6322 522.8939 11.9337
1989 207.7925 508.1369 11.6196
1990 198.3618 525.6754 11.4610
1991 194.9980 556.1087 11.5420
1992 196.2929 591.0559 11.8270
1993 191.7335 614.2997 11.8966
1994 187.3804 646.2053 12.2819
1995 184.6095 683.5303 12.8054
1996 178.5283 689.7365 12.8862
1997 172.1628 680.9741 12.8028
1998 166.5280 683.2881 13.4331
1999 162.8404 667.8430 12.8479
2000 158.5172 651.7395 12.8804
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Chapter 4 The Relative levels of TFP among Countries
A p p e n d i x  4 .3
Stata Estimation Result for Elasticity of Substitution Parameter
Group 1: Official Exchange Rates: Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models 
(Note: the bolded texts are added to explain the results from Stata)
lo g : c :\ js ta ta \ a s ia .lo g
log type: text
opened on: 5 Jun 2003, 1 8 :5 4 :5 7
. i i s  country 
. t i s  time
. ts s e t  country time, yearly
panel v a ria b le : country, 1 to 5
time v a ria b le : time, 1971 to 2000
. sort country time 
Fixed Effects Model
. xtreg logyh logw, fe
F ix ed -e ffects  (within) regression Number of obs = 150
Group variable (i) : country Number of groups = 5
R-sq: within = 
between = 
overall =
0.9726  
0.9980  
0.9952
Obs per group : min = 30 
avg = 30 .0  
max = 30
c o rr(u _i, Xb) = 0.4657
F (1,144) 
Prob > F
5119.96
0.0000
logyh | C oef. Std. Err. t P>11 j [95% C on f.In te .]
logw |
.9640283
_cons | 
1.113295
.9381142
.9028929
. 0131106 
.1064478
71.55 0.000  
8.48 0.000
.9122002 to  
.6924909 to
sigma_u | 
sigma_e | 
rho |
. 0578022 
.05755524 
.50214085 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F te s t  that a l l  u _ i= 0 : F(4, 144) = 23 .69 Prob > F = 0.0000
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R ando m  E f f e c t s  M o d e l
. xtreg logyh logw
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs 150
Group variable (i) : country Number of groups = 5
R-sq: within = 0.9726 Obs per group:: min = 30
between = 0.9980 avg = 30 .0
overall = 0.9952 max = 30
Random e ffe c ts u _i ~ Gaussian Wald c h i2 (1) 6593.00
c o rr (u _ i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 0.0000
logyh | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. In te . ]
logw j .9433867 .0116184 81.20 0 . 000 .920615 to
.9661585
_cons | .8601262 .0977476 8 . 80 0 . 000 .6685446 to
1. 051708
sigma_u | . 05710892
sigma_e | .05755524
rho | .4961077 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Hausman specification test
. xthausman
Hausman sp ec ifica tio n  te s t  (O ffic ia l Exchange Rate)
  C o effic ien ts  -------
| Fixed Random
logyh | E ffects  E ffects  D ifference
logw | .9381142 .9433867 -.0052725
T est: Ho: d ifference in c o e ffic ie n ts  not systematic
c h i2 ( 1) = ( b - B )  > [SA (-1 )]  ( b - B ) , S = (S_fe - S_re)
0 .75
Prob>chi2 = 0.3854
That is the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, in other words the random 
effects model is valid.
. log close
log : c :\ js ta ta \ a s ia .lo g
log type: text
closed on: 5 Jun 2003, 19 :01 :0 6
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Group 2: PPP Exchange Rates: Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models
(Note: the bolded texts are added to explain the results from Stata)
lo g : c :\ jsta ta \ a sia p p p .lo g
log type: text
opened on: 6 Jun 2003, 10 :5 1 :1 5
. i i s  country 
. t i s  time
. ts s e t  country time, yearly
panel va ria b le : country, 1 to 4
time varia b le : time, 1975 to 2000
. sort country time
Fixed Effects Model
. xtreg logyh logw, fe
F ix ed -e ffe cts  (within) regression Number of obs = 104
Group variable (i) : country Number of groups = 4
R-sq: within = 
between = 
ov era ll =
0.9262  
0 . 9986 
0.9926
Obs per group : min = 26 
avg = 26 .0  
max = 26
co rr(u _i, Xb) -0 .1700
F (1,99) 
Prob > F
1242.07
0.0000
logyh | C oef. Std. Err. t P>111 [95% C on f.In te .]
logw |
1.015466
_cons | 
1.190933
. 9613411 
.7353806
.0272775
.2295882
35.24 0.000  
3.20 0.002
.9072166 to 
.2798279 to
sigma_u ] 
sigma_e j 
rho j
.02736637 
. 05304582 
.21020621 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F te s t  that a l l  u _i=0 : F(3, 99) = 6.72 Prob > F = 0.0004
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Random Effects Model
. xtreg logyh logw
Random-effects GLS regression  
Group variable (i) : country
R -sq: within = 0.9262
between = 0.9986
overall = 0.9926
Random e ffe c ts  u_i ~ Gaussian
c o rr(u _i, X) = 0  (assumed)
Number of obs = 104
Number of groups = 4
Obs per group: min = 26
avg = 26 .0
max = 26
Wald c h i2 (1) = 2740.60
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
logyh | Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z | [95% C on f.In te .]
logw |
.9937512
_cons | 
1.067909
. 9578888 
.7644306
. 0182975 
.1548387
52 .35 
4 .94
0.000  
0 .000
.9220263 to  
.4609523 to
sigma_u | 
sigma_e | 
rho |
.03130487
.05304582
.25831116 (fraction of variance due to u _ i)
Hausman specification test
. xthausman
Hausman sp ec ifica tio n  te s t  (PPP Exchange Rate)
  C o effic ien ts  -------
) Fixed Random
logyh j E ffects  E ffects D ifference
 +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
logw | .9613411 .9578888 .0034523
T est: Ho: d ifferen ce in c o e ffic ie n ts  not systematic
ch i2( 1) = (b-B) ' [S^ (-1)3 (b -B ), S = (S_fe - S_re)
0.03
Prob>chi2 = 0.8645
That is, again, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, in other words the 
random effects model is valid.
. log close
lo g : c :\ jsta ta \ a sia p p p .lo g
log type: text
closed on: 6 Jun 2003, 1 0 :54 :1 3
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A p p e n d i x  4 .4  
E s t im a te d  T F P  L e v e l
C ase l: Official exchange rate, a=  0.9122
Year Japan Korea Taiwan Thailand USA
1971 0.53 0.67 0.58 0.00 0.85
1972 0.59 0.63 0.60 0 .02 0 .8 6
1973 0.63 0.64 0.60 0.05 0 .8 6
1974 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.07 0.85
1975 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.08 0.85
1976 0.62 0.59 0.61 0 .1 0 0.85
1977 0.65 0.60 0.62 0 .1 0 0.85
1978 0.72 0.60 0.63 0.11 0.85
1979 0.71 0.60 0.64 0.13 0.84
1980 0.71 0.52 0.64 0 .1 0 0.83
1981 0.72 0.50 0.64 0 .1 2 0.83
1982 0.70 0.49 0.63 0.11 0.83
1983 0.71 0.49 0.64 0 .1 0 0.84
1984 0.72 0.50 0.65 0 .1 0 0.85
1985 0.73 0.49 0.63 0.09 0 .8 6
1986 0.82 0.50 0 .6 6 0.11 0 .86
1987 0 .8 6 0.53 0.69 0.16 0 .86
1988 0.91 0.57 0.70 0 .20 0 .86
1989 0.89 0.59 0.71 0.24 0.87
1990 0.89 0.58 0.72 0.25 0.87
1991 0.91 0.58 0.73 0.27 0.87
1992 0.92 0.57 0.74 0.29 0.87
1993 0.96 0.57 0.76 0.30 0.87
1994 0.98 0.58 0.77 0.32 0 .88
1995 1.00 0.60 0.78 0.33 0 .88
1996 0.97 0.59 0.79 0.33 0.89
1997 0.94 0.56 0.75 0.31 0.89
1998 0.92 0.45 0.69 0.24 0.90
1999 0.96 0.51 0.72 0.26 0.90
2 0 0 0 0.98 0.54 0.72 0.28 0.91
Source: Caleu ation
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Case2: Official exchange rate, cr= 0.9662
Year Japan Korea Taiwan Thailand U SA
1971 0.52 0.71 0.63 0.00 0.87
1972 0.58 0.68 0.64 0.02 0.88
1973 0.62 0.68 0.65 0.05 0.89
1974 0.60 0.68 0.64 0.08 0.88
1975 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.08 0.88
1976 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.11 0.88
1977 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.10 0.88
1978 0.71 0.64 0.68 0.12 0.88
1979 0.71 0.64 0.68 0.14 0.87
1980 0.71 0.55 0.68 0.11 0.86
1981 0.72 0.53 0.68 0.13 0.86
1982 0.70 0.52 0.67 0.12 0.85
1983 0.71 0.53 0.68 0.11 0.87
1984 0.72 0.54 0.69 0.11 0.88
1985 0.73 0.52 0.67 0.10 0.88
1986 0.82 0.53 0.70 0.12 0.89
1987 0.87 0.56 0.73 0.17 0.89
1988 0.91 0.60 0.75 0.21 0.89
1989 0.90 0.62 0.76 0.26 0.90
1990 0.90 0.61 0.76 0.27 0.90
1991 0.92 0.61 0.78 0.29 0.89
1992 0.93 0.60 0.79 0.31 0.90
1993 0.96 0.60 0.80 0.32 0.90
1994 0.98 0.60 0.81 0.33 0.91
1995 1.00 0.62 0.82 0.35 0.91
1996 0.97 0.62 0.83 0.35 0.92
1997 0.94 0.58 0.79 0.32 0.92
1998 0.92 0.47 0.72 0.25 0.93
1999 0.95 0.53 0.75 0.27 0.93
2000 0.97 0.56 0.75 0.29 0.94
Source: Calculation
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Case3: PPP exchange rate, cr =  0.9072
Year Japan Korea Thailand U SA
1975 0.47 0.75 0.00 0.90
1976 0.49 0.71 0.07 0.90
1977 0.52 0.70 0.07 0.89
1978 0.54 0.63 0.08 0.89
1979 0.56 0.58 0.09 0.88
1980 0.58 0.47 0.00 0.85
1981 0.63 0.46 0.08 0.86
1982 0.67 0.49 0.11 0.85
1983 0.71 0.54 0.12 0.87
1984 0.72 0.57 0.13 0.89
1985 0.74 0.56 0.11 0.90
1986 0.73 0.56 0.10 0.90
1987 0.72 0.53 0.09 0.91
1988 0.74 0.52 0.08 0.92
1989 0.79 0.53 0.13 0.92
1990 0.82 0.53 0.17 0.92
1991 0.84 0.53 0.20 0.92
1992 0.83 0.51 0.20 0.93
1993 0.83 0.50 0.23 0.93
1994 0.85 0.49 0.25 0.94
1995 0.86 0.49 0.26 0.95
1996 0.88 0.49 0.28 0.96
1997 0.90 0.50 0.26 0.97
1998 0.91 0.49 0.19 0.98
1999 0.92 0.54 0.23 0.99
2000 0.95 0.57 0.24 1.00
Source: Calcu ation
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Case4: PPP exchange rate, cr— 0.9999
Year Japan Korea Thailand U SA
1975 0.39 0.82 0.00 0.89
1976 0.41 0.78 0.08 0.89
1977 0.44 0.77 0.08 0.89
1978 0.46 0.71 0.09 0.89
1979 0.49 0.65 0.10 0.88
1980 0.51 0.52 0.02 0.86
1981 0.55 0.51 0.10 0.86
1982 0.60 0.54 0.13 0.85
1983 0.63 0.59 0.14 0.87
1984 0.65 0.61 0.14 0.89
1985 0.66 0.60 0.12 0.90
1986 0.66 0.60 0.12 0.91
1987 0.65 0.58 0.11 0.91
1988 0.67 0.57 0.11 0.92
1989 0.72 0.58 0.16 0.92
1990 0.75 0.57 0.21 0.92
1991 0.76 0.56 0.23 0.92
1992 0.75 0.53 0.23 0.93
1993 0.75 0.52 0.26 0.93
1994 0.76 0.51 0.27 0.94
1995 0.77 0.50 0.28 0.95
1996 0.80 0.50 0.29 0.96
1997 0.81 0.51 0.26 0.97
1998 0.81 0.48 0.17 0.98
1999 0.82 0.53 0.22 0.99
2000 0.84 0.56 0.23 1.00
Source: Calculation
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A p p e n d i x  4 .5  
T F P  a n d  I n c o m e  D iffe r e n c e s  a m o n g  C o u n tr ie s
Given a production function with two inputs (capital, K, and labour, L) and 
Hicks’ neutral technology, the production function of country A  and B can be written as:
Y‘=A(t)-YA(KA(t),LA(f)) (A4.1a) and
Y; = B(t)-YB(KB(t),LE(t)) (A4. lb)
■ y t
Assuming constant returns to scale and Hick’s neutral technology, giveny\ - — —  and
L; (0
K (t}kit) - — A z  the equations above can be rewritten as:
' 4 (0
y'A =  A(0 ■ y,i (kJ (0 ) =  yA ( 4  (0> -4(0) (A4.2a)
and
Yb =  B(t) • yB {kB (0) =  yB (kB (t),B(t)) (A4.2b)
Differentiating both equations by time and dividing by itself yields:
4  =  0 k  A +M  (A 4.3a)
yA A kA A(t)
ik = 0  A  +  M  (A4.3b)
y‘B ‘ K  B(t)
where ^  _  s|iare 0f  capital in aggregate output (under perfect
Tl
competition ) for country L 
(A 4 .3a )-(A 4 .3b ) yields:
=  +  (A4.4)
yA T* kA kB A(t) B(t)
As seen in Solow’s growth model, as long as decreasing returns in k and constant 
depreciation rate of capital and a constant growth rate of labour are assumed, the steady
1 2 5
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state, where the change in capital stock per worker over time equals zero (i.e. kt =  0 ),
exists as shown below:
Assuming that:
i) Investment per worker (z) is the constant fraction of output per worker (y), 
that is: I/L = i = sy = sAf (k(t)) given s is constant and 0 < s < 1.
ii) Change in capital stock overtime equals net investment (i.e. investment minus 
depreciation), that is:
K-I-SK , given 8  denotes a constant depreciation rate.
If k = K/L, then die/ dt =  k/L-1m = i~k(n + 8 ) ,  given n denotes a constant labour 
growth rate. That is:
ic =  sAf (k(t))-k(n + 8 ).
Thus, if sAf (k(t))>k(n + 8 ) then, k > 0 .
While, if sAf (k(t)) <k(n + 8 ) then, k < 0.
Therefore, after the transition period, when the capital accumulation per worker 
reaching a certain level, the economy will experience an equilibrium known as a steady
state when rate of change of k (i.e. k ) equals zero. Hence, in the steady state, it can be 
seen that the equation (A4.4) collapses to:
/j y‘B A(t) B(t) ;
Equation (A4.4) and (A4.5) conclude that, in the transition period (equation 
(A4.4)), the differences in growth rate of output per worker among the nations are caused 
by the differences in the growth rate o f capital stock per worker coupled with the 
difference in technical growth. Therefore, in the short-run, the higher relative increase in 
capital accumulation per worker and/or the more the relative technical progress in a 
country may cause the higher growth rate of output per worker comparatively. 
Meanwhile, in the long run or at the steady state (equation (A4.5)), only the difference in 
technical growth can explain the difference in the growth rate of output per worker 
among the nations. Moreover, the higher the TFPG rate the higher o f its level and thus 
the higher the level o f income.
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C h a p t e r  5  
E a s t  A s ia n  L a b o u r  U n io n s  
a n d  G o v e r n m e n t  P o lic ie s  to w a r d s  L a b o u r  M a r k e t
5.1) Introduction
From the last 2 empirical chapters, it has been shown that there are differences in 
productivity growth and levels for each country. The questions arise as to what would be 
the underlying factors causing these differences; why does Japan’s TFP perform better 
than that o f the other countries; and why does South Korea’s (hereafter Korea) relative 
TFP level show a distinctive divergence trend (i.e. a decreasing trend) from the group. 
Certainly, there must be numbers of sound reasons to explain this. However, in this 
thesis, the focus will be on institutional issues as previously mentioned especially in 
industrial relations topics including: employment practices, related government laws and 
policies, and last but not least, labour unions and its movement.
According to the economic growth literature, the underlying source of long-run 
economic growth is technical progress. Once a new way of production has been 
invented, it must be adopted by firms in the economy. The question is whether workers 
will collectively agree to adopt it or not. The answer depends on a number of factors but 
most of all, the bargaining power o f the labour union and the firm. It is reasonable to 
assume that the union aims to minimise the job losses and maximise its member’s utility 
while the firm aims to maximise its profit. A  strong labour union, indeed, can dictate the 
work practice used in the firm and select a production technology in order to minimise 
job losses due to the change in technology. For this reason, a strong labours’ (or 
insiders’) coalition can be seen as a barrier to a more efficient technology (as seen in 
Parente and Prescott (2000)). Moreover, the conflicts between the firm and the labour 
union can lead to a lack of long-term commitment between the two sides. Ultimately, 
this problem may lead to the neglect of skill-improving programmes for workers and 
thus to a lowering of the productivity o f the firm (You 1994).
Furthermore, the strength o f the union depends on the institutional environment 
in each particular country. For example, it is expected to see a very weak and
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disorganised labour union in the country that does not have a law to protect the union’s 
leader. In other words, in this case, the strength of the unions depends on the 
government’s attitude reflected by its policies and laws. In addition, Nickell (1999) 
suggested that there is a possibility of rent sharing between the labour force and 
monopoly through the collective bargaining process. He also quoted the work of Nickell 
& Nicolitsas (1997) that more competition will lead to a lower profit and a lower market 
share for each firm. This tends to yield reduction in wage increases and a change in work 
practice, which then increases the productivity of the firm. That is the market 
competition environment affects work practices used in the firm via the collective 
bargaining process. The higher the degree of market competition, the lower the chance 
that the uncompetitive firm will survive. Therefore, this fact will undermine the 
resistance of the union to adopt a more efficient work practice otheiwise the firm will not 
be able to compete in the market, and the union will face total job losses due to the firm’s 
bankruptcy. In summary, the relationship between productivity of the firm (and thus the 
nation as a whole) and the related institutions can be seen in the figure below:
Figure 5.1: Productivity and the Related Institutions
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To explain this cobweb-like figure above, for simplicity, it is useful to use an 
opened-and-democratised-country as an example as follows. Democracy plays a key role 
in how the members of the government of a particular country link to their 
constituencies. This is directly related to government’s policies and the likelihood o f the 
existing and the forthcoming laws. O f course, the evolution and the strength of the 
democratic system in any country depends on its history, culture, norms, and the level o f 
education of its population. Government’ s policies and laws govern the interest of 
international trade, foreign investment, and the internal market competition conditions. 
Moreover, international trade and foreign investment help to increase the degree of the 
domestic competition. As mentioned, the incentive to invent depends on the degree of  
market competition and the related laws (such as intellectual property rights legislation) 
and indeed some technology can be imported through international trades and foreign 
investments. However, before adopting a new technology, there must be a minimum 
quality threshold o f labour needs to be achieved. This can be done by educating or 
training the employed workforce. Therefore other educational related institutions must be 
considered. Moreover, the firm must overcome the resistance of the labour’s coalition 
since the adoption may lead to job losses. Meanwhile, the strength of the coalition 
depends on the advocating of government policies, laws, and the market competition 
conditions given. If the government policies and laws are biased towards the labour 
union, then this will strengthen the labour resistance to adopt the new technology. 
Meanwhile, the higher the degree of market competition the lower the resistance from 
the union since the disagreement to adopt the new competitive technology may lead to 
the firm’s bankruptcy. Again, these factors are not independent from the other 
institutions (e.g. democracy, cultures, norms, education, history, and etc.). Through the 
bargaining process between the firm and the coalition, the new technology will be 
adopted or dismissed. Consequently, this will affect the productivity of the firm and 
finally the country as a whole.
As a result, for a good understanding of the circumstances in East Asia, this 
chapter presents the historical facts, the development of the labour union, and the related 
institutions such as labour related laws and government policies for the four selected East 
Asian countries. The next sections present the case of Japan, followed by Korea, 
Thailand, Taiwan, and the conclusions respectively.
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5.2) Japan
This section presents the roles and policies o f the Japanese government on the 
labour market followed by the Japanese lifetime employment prospective and its 
development.
5.2.1) Roles o f Japanese G overn m en t
In this section, for a better understanding o f Japan’s labour market, a short 
summary of the employment situation and the related government policies during 1940s 
to 2000 is presented, based on Takanashi (1999) and Kameyama (2001).
After the Second World War, according to the Japanese Statistics Bureau-April 
1946, roughly 25%  o f Japanese workers were unemployed. Until June 1950, the 
beginning of the Korea War, the war related exports, so-called ‘ special procurement’ , 
drove the Japanese manufacturing production index by 35% within the last 6 months of 
that year. This effect led the Japanese economy to grow at more than 10% for 3 
consecutive years. However, by March 1952, there was around 30%  of the total 
workforce still underemployed. To solve the problem, numbers o f large-scale public 
work programmes in rural area were introduced. By the early 1960s, around 350,000 
people were employed by these public projects. Moreover, to solve the unemployment 
problem in the long run, the Japanese government could not depend on the public 
projects alone. Therefore the government units, Public Employment Security Offices 
(PESOs), provided a job matching service between workers and private employers, were 
established. This led to a change in the Employment Security Law in 1963, which turned 
the job positions in public work to be the last resort in solving the unemployment 
problem. Consequently, the proportion o f public workers has declined significantly since 
then.
In 1964 the ‘Labour Market Centre’ were established and combined the jobs of  
PESOs nationwide. To solve the shortage of labour in some areas, the role of this 
government office was not only local job matching but also allocating workers across the 
nation. This centre is still operating with the online computer system (installed in 1990s) 
linking employment organisations all over the country. This is part of the evidence
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showing the important role of the Japanese government in facilitating the domestic 
labour market.
After the first oil crisis in 1973, the unemployment problem became evident 
again which led to a necessity to need a comprehensive employment insurance scheme in 
1975. The main government policy was still focusing on full employment under the slow 
economic growth environment. One of the policies is the Employment Adjustment 
Subsidy, which is to prevent companies laying off their employee by paying a subsidy to 
a company that apply temporary lay off or retraining policy. Moreover, to manage the 
unemployment problem more efficiently, the company that plans to lay off a substantial 
amount of workers was required to inform the local PESO in advance. The Japanese 
economy started to expand rapidly again during 1980s and early 1990s. This is the so- 
called ‘Bubble Economy’ period.
The recent economic recession started in the early 1990’ s. The unemployment 
rate reached 5.2 percent in 2001 (Bank o f Japan). This crisis is inevitably connected with 
the change in attitude towards the Japanese ‘ lifetime employment’ scheme, which will be 
discussed next. The attitude that one person can work for one company for a lifetime has 
been gradually changed. ICameyama (2001) showed that nearly 60 percent of workers 
hired in 1998 came from other industries and companies. Moreover 19 percent of the 
young unemployed workers (aged 15-24 years) in 1999 left their job because they 
wanted to try some other job while only around 5 percent of the middle age group (aged 
45-54 years) shared the same reason. That is, the younger age workers feel more 
comfortable with the idea of changing job. This attitude is also reflected in the new 
government policy. The policy has now changed from the job protection to the job 
creation scheme and the job transfer strategy. In January 2000, the new policy of the 
Ministry of Labour included four new areas. The first is promoting job creation from the 
small and medium-scale enterprise (SMEs) by subsidising the new firms that create jobs. 
The second is a subsidy for a company that hires the middle age or the senior involuntary 
unemployed workers in the particular areas of the country. The third is a financial 
support scheme for the company in the 15 growing industries such as IT and 
telecommunication. The last was similar to the post World War II policy: a local job 
creation by introducing public work projects.
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From this short summary, similar to the rest of the economy, it can be seen that 
labour market in Japan after the Second World War has continuously seen intervention 
by Japanese government. This also shows a strong relationship between the government 
and the firms in Japan. The next section discusses the ‘ lifetime employment’ system in 
Japan.
5.2.2) T h e  L ife tim e  E m p lo y m e n t System  and R ecent A d justm ents
The Lifetime employment system is generally known as a system that a worker 
can work in one company since he or she graduated until the time of retirement. This 
system was introduced in Japan during the First World War (Takanashi 1999). The 
lifetime employment does not mean that the firm cannot terminate the work contract. 
The right to terminate the contract is still reserved. In addition, to balance the demand 
and supply of labour in a firm when the economic conditions change, the worker can be 
asked to move to the company’ s subsidiaries or related companies. Therefore, it is 
necessary to the workers to learn how to work in other jobs by attending in-house 
training and work rotation. That is, in this system, labour does move within the related 
firms. This may suit the Japanese conglomerates, which have a wide range of business in 
the group.
With this style o f worker and firm relationship, it is less possible that the labour 
union will refuse to adopt a new technology or a new work practice since they know that 
the adoption will not lead to job losses. However, in the economic slowdown 1990s, the 
internal job rotation alone could not cope with the situation. Therefore new policies were 
needed (Takanashi 1999). One alternative to reduce the overall worker number in the 
firm is to introduce an early retirement scheme. This is not only to reduce the number of  
workers in the firm but also to cut the burden of high-paid workers even though the 
scheme must compensate the early retiree with a reasonably good amount of 
remuneration.
Furthermore, apart from the early retirement process, there were new types of  
employee introduced. These were dispatched workers, part-time workers, and contract 
workers. The dispatched workers are the special type of workers acquiring some certain 
skills and being hired through the employment agency with a short-term work
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agreement. By the Japanese Worker Dispatching law it is permitted only some 
professionals to be eligible for this job. At the start in 1985 there were only 13 
occupations allowed. However, in 1996, the other 10 types were included (details can be 
seen in Talcanashi (1999) p.50). Thus, according to this law, a relatively low skilled 
labour in the firm cannot be replaced by this type of worker. This shows some degree of 
job protection from the Japanese government.
Since the firm cannot replace the low skilled-labours by using dispatched 
workers, then to increase the flexibility of the firm labour force, the full-time traditional 
workers were asked to reduce their overtime workload. This overtime working hours are 
then transferred to the part-time workers. Therefore, the number o f part-time worker 
working hours is a cyclical series reflecting business cycle o f the country. Hiring this 
type of worker was an important mechanism to increase the flexibility of the Japanese 
firm in determining the amount o f working hours needed under the economic recession 
without harming the long-term workers. During 1985 to 1997 the number of part-time 
employee increased significantly from 4.7 millions to 11.1 millions (Talcanashi 1999).
In addition, for more flexibility to discharge employed workers, a contract worker 
system was also introduced. By law, this type of employee is being employed under a 
fixed period o f time (which is not permitted to be over one year) and a specific job 
description. A  survey in 1997 quoted in Talcanashi (1999) showed that 24.1%  of the firm 
has adopted the scheme compared with only 7.9%  in 1987.
All these new policies introduced during the economic slowdown in 1990s in 
Japan directly prevent the conflict between the labour union and the firm. The firms can 
flexibly change working practice or reorganise the firms with less union resistance since 
the introduction of such policies does not cost job losses of the long-term workers i.e. the 
traditional worker with lifetime employment prospect. This may be shown in the lowest 
labour dispute record (International Labour Organization - ILO) among 4 countries: 
Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the US. Details can be seen in the Appendix 5.1. Therefore, 
with this low rate of labour dispute the chance to introduce a new technology and being 
rejected is rather slim. Consequently, perhaps this is one of the reasons that made the 
Japan TFP level the highest among the four East Asian countries.
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5.3) Korea
Similarly to the case o f Japan, the Korean labour market can be considered as a 
highly government controlled market. As the political regime in Korea has just been 
democratised after 1987, before that year, the labour union and its role was repressed by 
the previous authoritarian governments. As far as a dictatorial government is concerned 
the internal stability and sound economic growth are factors that guarantee the existence 
of the regime since these factors will bring a substantial political support from the people 
of Korea. Therefore, to facilitate the export-led growth policy, the role of the government 
to minimise collective activities was still a priority since the absence of the collective 
bargaining was a guaranteed condition for the cheap supply of labour. However, the 
policy in promoting individual labour welfare was also required.
The history of Korean labour union started with the establishing of the Korean 
Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU) in 1946. As also mentioned in Park (1994) that the 
main aim of the KFTU was to resist communism more than to protect the workers’ 
interest. That is at this point, the labour union in Korea emerged from politically based 
rather than economic reasons.
Moreover, to understand the Korean labour market clearly, it is necessary to 
mention the relationship between Korean conglomerates - chaebol and the military 
government. Unlike the Japanese conglomerate, the Korean chaebol has had a long-term 
tight relationship with Korean militant governments. After the Korean War, the 
chaebol’s capital formation was assisted by the government through the distribution of 
Japanese factories and land (left after the Second World War Japanese occupation) and 
foreign aid (from the US government). The Korean government regarded the chaebol’ s 
business as the main economic engine. Therefore, with the support from government, the 
‘authoritarian labour management’ was then implemented in chaebol’ s factory. This 
management system consists o f a strict supervision and work intensification. Any 
resisting workers or activist trade union members were dismissed. In turn, the chaebol 
committed itself to the government by extending their business empire and adjusting the 
conglomerate direction according to the government economic development plans (i.e. 
the five years plans, first introduced by President Park in 1962) and sometimes by 
political donations (Kwon and O ’Donnell 2001).
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Until 1987, the labour union’s activity had been restricted and suspended 
especially after the introduction of ‘Yushin’ constitution in 1972. As seen in Appendix 
5.1, the number o f labour disputes reflected by the days not worked, was increasing 
substantially during 1978 to 1980. This was followed by the assassination of President 
Park and the military coup in 1980. Therefore, this coincidence o f an increase in labour 
disputes and the crumbling of the military regime in Korea shows a significant 
relationship between the regime’s stability and trade union movement. Whenever an 
authoritarian political system was weakened, a major increase in labour disputes erupted 
(You 1994). It is suggested that, after the regime changed, the end of the fourth Republic 
led by President Park, the new government desired to calm the labour dispute which had 
reached the highest point in 1981 with the introduction of the Labour-Management 
Council Act in the same year. There were some areas in this law which tried to improve 
labours’ welfare e.g. a greater concern in the working environment and the expansion of 
the scope of the Industrial Accident Insurance and Compensation Act (Park 1994). As a 
result, from 1981 to 1983, the days lost caused by labour dispute dropped significantly 
from 7 days to only 1 day per one thousand workers per year.
During the early years of the 1980s, the movement for a more democratic 
political system led by the joint forces of students and labour unions had grown stronger. 
Although the minimum wage law was enacted in 1986, this could not stop the force from 
removing the authoritarian political regime. The highest labour dispute record (1,243 
days per one thousand workers per year) coupled with the student-led demonstrations 
caused the Democratisation Declaration in June 1987. The general election was held in 
the year after. The opposition to the current government gained control in the National 
Assembly. In return for the help of the labour unions, amendments in the related labour 
laws aiming to strengthen labour rights was proposed. However, it was rejected by the 
President at the time (Park 1994). In addition, the change in Korean politics from 
authoritarian military rule to the more democratic system caused the change in 
govemment-chaebol relationship. Fewer interventions in industrial relation from the 
government were seen (ICwon and O ’Donnell 2001). Without the repression from the old 
authoritarian regime, the labour unions in Korea had grown stronger and more work 
disruptions were witnessed.
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Turning to the economic slowdown in the early 1990s, the high numbers of 
labour disputes were believed to be one of the factors responsible for the economic 
recession. Then the Korean labour unions accepted the amended related labour laws 
aiming to prevent a further major labour dispute. Despite the amendment in 1991, during 
the 1990s, the Korean labour dispute records were still considerably high. Indeed, the 
records for Korea had been decreasing substantially from its peak level in 1987. 
However, in the year 2000, Korea’s labour dispute record was still the highest among the 
four considered countries - Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the US.
In responding to the crisis in 1997, more amendments in labour relation laws 
were required by the IMF. This adjustment aimed to restructure the Korean economy 
with less resistance from the labour unions. Consequently, numbers of workers were 
dismissed during 1997-1998. Nevertheless, Kwon and O ’Donnell (2001) suggested that 
Korean independent trade union affiliates still had a potential to cause ‘considerable 
disruption’ to the economy. Ultimately, this disruption may be seen as a barrier to a more 
productive work practice. It should be noted that the findings from the last chapter 
indicate that Korean relative TFP level exhibited the divergence trend (i.e. a negative 
slope, in other words relative lower TFPG rate) compared with the group.
5 .4 ) T h a i la n d
There are at least three factors that can be concluded as similarities between the 
Thai and Korean economic development experience. Firstly, in politics, both countries 
have a long period of dictatorship with numerous coup d'etats and general political 
unrest. Secondly, concerning the relationship between institutions, likewise the case of  
chaebol and the Korea government, the relationship between the government of Thailand 
and business entrepreneurs was always strong. In both cases, labour was considered as a 
source of cheap input in promoting foreign investment and export. Thirdly, both 
countries followed the idea of export-led growth policy under the five-year central 
economic development plans. However, compared with the Korean labour union, the 
unions in Thailand can be seen as a relatively disorganised and more fragmented 
institution.
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A  study of the role of Thai governments and labour unions in Thailand may start 
with the abolishing of the 1956 Labour Relations Act in 1958 (Piriyarangsan &  
Poonpanich 1994). After that, all labour union activities were banned and the union 
leaders were arrested by the military government. However, after the political unrest in 
late 1973, the activities were allowed. Thereafter, with the rise o f socialism, the labour 
movement and political situation in Thailand started to tie together. The highest record of 
labour disputes in Thailand after the first oil shock was in 1975 (i.e. 346 days not worked 
per one thousand workers per year) coupled with the student-led political demonstrations 
protesting against a trip to Thailand of an exiled ex-military Major. In the same year 
Labour Relations Act 1975 was enacted. The law can be seen as a tool to encourage a 
small labour union establishment. By this law, to form a labour union only 10 members 
were needed and a formation o f National Labour Congress needed only 15 unions. This 
led to the small, fragmented labour unions in Thailand. For an extreme case, there were 
22 unions in a state enterprise, the Bangkok Mass Transport Organisation. In addition, 
the law also did not provided the immunity status for labour union activists. As a result, 
numbers of union leaders and activists being were dismissed (Piriyarangsan &  
Poonpanich 1994).
Apart from the inadequate government support in forming the professional trade 
union, Piriyarangsan & Poonpanich (1994) listed the three main factors which caused the 
weakness of labour union in Thailand which were: the lack of full-time administrative 
staff in the unions, the insufficiency of labour market information provided, and the 
absence of the long term policies and strategies to organise the professional labour 
unions.
Moreover, there was a vast proportion of Thai labour that migrated from the 
agricultural sector and worked as the temporary (or seasonally) workers. This can be 
seen as one of the major factors that caused the relatively weak labour unions in 
Thailand. In addition, the special work contracts such as one-year temporary worker and 
outside-factory subcontracts were used as the tools that weakened the union negotiation 
power within a firm. These employment practises can be seen in most of the Thai 
manufacturing companies especially in the relatively low-techno logy garments and toys
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factories. For example, 61 per cent of workers in an industrial area called Omnoi and 
Omyai were employed as temporary workers (Piriyarangsan & Poonpanich 1994).
In contrast to the private sector, the unions within most of the state enterprises 
were considerably stronger and relatively more active especially in the public utilities 
sector. However, with threats to strike posted by the state enterprise labour unions, after 
the coup d’etat in 1991, the temporaiy government at that time decided to exclude state 
enterprise employees from the 1975 Labour Relation Act. Then the new law -  State 
Enterprise Labour Relations Law was introduced. This undermined the bargaining power 
of the state enterprise labour union substantially.
Furthermore, the Thai government did not encourage union involvement in 
politics. It can be seen that, before the current Thailand Constitution 1997 was 
introduced in which all members of the parliament must be directly elected, once in a 
while the representatives o f the unions were invited from the government to be a member 
of the Upper House (comparable to the House of Lords in the UK, i.e. unelected).
In summary, to promote foreign investment and export, the Thai government 
tried to facilitate the business sector with cheap labour and unorganised labour unions. 
The policies succeeded considerably. Therefore, according to the Appendix 5.1, the 
average days lost caused by labour disputes in Thailand was noticeably low i.e. on 
average from 1980 to 2000, there were only about 42 days not worked per one thousand 
workers per year -  5 times lower than Korea’s record and 3.5 times lower than that o f the 
US. Hence, for the case o f Thailand, a smaller chance of disruption from a major strike 
or walkout may account for the comparatively high TFPG rate and a positive trend of 
relative TFP level previously shown in Chapter 3 and 4.
5 .5  T a iw a n
Likewise, in the cases for Korea and Thailand, there has been a long-term strong 
relationship between the authoritarian government and the entrepreneurs in Taiwan. The 
government tried to ensure its own power by facilitating businesses with the cheap- 
disorganised labour forces. Taiwanese labour unions were established under a high 
degree o f government control. This phenomenon was then named as.‘authoritarian state
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corporatist control system’ . Corresponding to the democratisation process, the unions’ 
movement in Taiwan has just been liberalised after the year 1987. Before that time, 
under the martial law 1949, the formal labour movement was not allowed. Indeed, the 
Kuomintang (KMT) government allowed the formation o f labour union but it was 
considered as the highly government controlled labour unions namely ‘To Fu’ or 
‘Token’ unions (Huang & Hsiao 1992).
The development of the independent labour unions in Taiwan was very limited at 
the start. Galenson (1999) showed an example that, even after the liberalisation in the 
prior year, in 1988 an attempt of the union’s members of the Chinese Petroleum 
company to replace the KM T nominee for the union posts by their own independent 
candidate was strongly rejected and followed by the imprisonment of the union activists. 
In the same year the National Federation of Independent Trade Unions was established 
under KMT government authorisation but without a legal status.
Moreover, similar to the case o f Thailand, apart from being repressed by the 
government, the development of labour unions in Taiwan also faced a problem that the 
firms in Taiwan are small and consist o f a significant proportion of part-time workers 
coupled with a large informal sector (as discussed in Chapter 3). These are the obstacles 
to establishing large organised labour unions. Following Wu (1989) quoted in Huang and 
Hsiao (1992), Table 5.1 below shows the average labour dispute records in Taiwan.
T a b le  5.1: T h e  A verage L a b o u r D ispute  Records (1971 -  2000)
Year Cases Workers Involved 
(Persons)
Employed
Workers
(Thousands)
Workers/case Involvements
1971-80 397 10,665 5,688 27 0.19%
1981-90 1,353 20,113 7,569 15 0.27%
1991-2000 3,311 41,448 9,021 13 0.46%
Source: Calculation from  Statistical Y earbook o f  The Republic o f  China 2001
The table above shows that although numbers of labour dispute cases increased 
nearly ten fold from 1971 to 2000, the number of workers involved in each case on 
average dropped by half i.e. from 27 persons per case in 1970s to only 13 persons per 
case in the 1990s. Therefore, after the liberalisation in 1987, even the more labour 
dispute cases have occurred but the statistics suggested that labour unions’ activities in 
Taiwan have been more fragmented.
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Although the union movement in Taiwan was not supported by the KMT  
government, compared with the other developing countries, an individual worker’ s 
compensation scheme (i.e. wage paid and other remunerations) in Taiwan was 
reasonably high (Galenson 1999). Moreover, during the years 1991 to 2000, statistics 
show that on average less than 2%  o f labour dispute cases were left unsettled. Therefore, 
under the current circumstances (i.e. a large proportion o f small firms and informal 
businesses, the fragmented labour unions, a relatively high paid scheme, and low rate of 
unsettled labour dispute cases) the chance that labour unions’ dispute in Taiwan will 
disrupt the whole economy is rather slim. Consequently, this may be seen as one o f the 
factors in explaining the high TFPG of Taiwan in the last 3 decades.
5 .6 ) C o n c lu s io n s
In summary, from the findings in chapter 3 and 4 and the facts about labour 
unions and the related institutions from the four countries discussed above, it is 
suggested that our postulates about the relationship between the strength o f labour union, 
government policies, the related institutions, and the productivity of the firm seem to fit 
the facts of the selected four countries very well. For the case of Japan, with the job 
protection schemes provided by the government and the culture of the workers to 
dedicate themselves to a single company (a single conglomerate to be precise) help to 
prevent the conflicts between the firm and the labour union. As a result, this good 
relationship between the firms and the workers may explain the TFPG and the 
outstandingly high TFP level o f Japan. On the other hand, in the case of Korea, without 
the repressive policies posted by the past authoritarian regimes, the Korean militant style 
labour unions have grown stronger and caused considerable disruptions in the economy. 
Indeed, the relationship between the Korean democratic governments and the labour 
unions based on the fact that it was the labour unions’ campaign that brought down the 
old authoritarian regime. For this reason, the govermnent seemed to have less power to 
stop the labour unions’ movement until the external intervention from the IMF. 
Nevertheless, the result o f these disruptions (i.e. the negative trend of the relative TFP 
level) was shown in our studies. Accordingly, it should not be considered an accident 
that a country with the lowest labour dispute rate - Japan has the highest TFP level with a 
positive trend while the highest labour dispute rate country - Korea is the only country
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which has a distinct negative trend. Moreover, for the case of Thailand and Taiwan, the 
fragmented and less organised labour unions were the results o f the bias of government 
policies and laws. The governments of these two countries have always treated their 
labour forces as a cheap input to enhance the export-led-growth policy. The culture of 
family-based business also accounted for the small and less active labour unions. 
Consequently, the labour unions in the two countries were at a disadvantage in 
negotiating with the employers. With less resistance from the unions both countries’ TFP 
levels show the positive trends with the high growth rates. Additionally, it is not only just 
the trade union power that seems important but also how it is exercised. Thus, the other 
institutional factor such as culture is also a vital factor. In Japan there is a culture of 
cooperation even where the unions exist. On the other hand, in Korea we have the 
opposite; fairly strong unions with a political culture of confrontation. In Thailand and 
Taiwan, unions are relatively weak.
Lastly, the next chapter explores a theoretical model to explain the differences in 
TFP level across the nations using a framework based on the relationships between 
labour unions, government policies, and the TFP level.
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A p p e n d i x  5 .1
D a y s  N o t  W o rk e d * *  p e r  1 ,0 0 0  W o r k e r s  p e r  Y e a r  in  M a n u fa c tu r in g  S e c to r
Year Japan Korea Thailand USA
1974 381 5 213 601
1975 340 6 346 288
1976 106 6 318 745
1977 52 3 6 402
1978 38 3 2 276
1979 27 5 15 459"
1980’ 40 6 2 423
1981 17 7 89 70
1982 16 2 50 215
1983 13 1 21 324
1984 11 4 83 118
1985 9 15 6 123
1986 7 8 76 298
1987 6 1,243 37 125
1988 5 NA. 16 110
1989 4 NA. 36 128
1990 2 645 23 25
1991 2 396 68 61
1992 2 271 64 78
1993 3 250 61 13
1994 2 268 21 145
1995 1 59 50 245
1996 1 165 21 154
1997 1 71 35 102
1998 1 273 51 191
1999 1 224 33 89
2000 1 247 47 76
Source: Calculated from ILO database (http://www.ilo.org)
Notes (ILO):
**Days not worked due to strikes or lockouts.
Japan:
Statistics are collected with respect to all labour disputes. The data on lockouts, strikes lasting less than 
half a day, and go-slows are published separately. Unofficial strikes are not included. Minimum threshold 
None. However, the series on work stoppages concerns strikes lasting half a day or more and all lockouts. 
Korea:
Sympathetic strikes and political or protest strikes are not included. Minimum threshold None.
Thailand:
Political or protest strikes, sympathetic strikes and general strikes are not included, nor are sit-ins, working 
to rule, go-slows or overtime bans. Minimum threshold None.
USA:
Political strikes, working to rule, go-slows and overtime bans are not covered. Minimum threshold A  
minimum of 1,000 workers simultaneously involved, with the stoppage lasting at least a full shift. Prior to 
1982, stoppages involving six employees or more and lasting at least a full shift.
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A p p e n d i x  5 .2
T a iw a n  L a b o u r  D is p u te s  R e c o r d s
Y ea r Cases W orkers Involved 
(Persons)
Employed
W orkers
(Thousands)
W orkers/case Involvem ents
1971 157 2,329 4,738 15 0.05%
1972 217 2,774 4,948 13 0 .06%
1973 262 28,498 5,327 109 0 .53%
1974 494 17,456 5,486 35 0.32%
1975 458' 16,809 5,521 37 0 .30%
1976 371 12,817 5,669 35 0 .23%
1977 380 4,047 5,980 11 0.07%
1978 506 4,084 6,231 8 0.07%
1979 503 11,529 6,432 23 0.18%
1980 626 6,305 6,547 10 0.10%
1981 891 7,053 6,672 8 0.11%
1982 1,153 9,501 6,8l”l 8 0 .14%
1983 921 12,344 7,070 13 0.17%
1984 907 9,069 7,308 10 0.12%
1985 1,443 15,486 7,428 i i 0 .21%
1986 1,485 11,307 7,733 8 0.15%
1987 1,609 15,654 8,022 10 0.20%
1988 1,314 24,237 8,107 18 0.30%
1989 1,943 62,391 8,258 32 0.76%
1990 1,860 34,089 8,283 18 0 .4 1 % .
1991 1,810 12,696 8,439 7 0.15%
1992 1,803 12,394 8,632 7 0.14%
1993 1,878 37,949 8,745 [ 20 0.43%
1994 2,061 30,890 8,939 15 0.35%
1995 2,271 27,342 9,045 12 0.30%
1996 2,659 21,654 9,068 8 0.24%
1997 2,600 81,004 9,176 31 0.88%
1998 4,138 103,568 9,289 25 1.11%
1999 5",860 30,440 9,385 5 0.32%
2000 8,026 56,543 9,491 7 0.60%
Source: Calculation from  Statistical Y earbook o f  The Republic o f  China 2001
Note: The table above was calculated by follow ing W u (1989) quoted in Huang and Hsiao (1992).
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C h a p t e r  6
6 .1 )  B a c k g ro u n d
The main objective o f this chapter is to develop a model to explain the 
differences in TFP levels across the nations based on the idea that the degree of 
competition in the final goods market and the labour coalition power within countries are 
important factors determining TFP.
Indeed, one can trace the theory that links the relationship between the market 
competition and the growth of the nation back to the works of classical economists. The 
main elements of the theory are based on competition, allocation, and economic 
efficiency. More competition leads to better resource allocation and thus increased 
economic efficiency. With a perfect competition environment, the nation will reach the 
most efficient choice of resource allocation and with these efficiently allocated resources 
the nation will meet its optimum wealth. The existence of monopoly rights in the market 
causes the inefficiency in resource allocation and thus sub-optimum wealth.
In contrast Schumpeter (1976) proposed a concept so-called ‘Schumpter's 
creative destruction’ . His theory starts with the idea that price competition is less 
important than competition between incumbent and the rival with a new invention. Price 
competition between competitors will affect only the profit margin o f the incumbent 
monopoly. However, with the introduction of a new product, process of production, or 
management practice, the importance o f price competition becomes negligible. In effect, 
these new innovations in product or process will affect not only the profit margin of the 
incumbent but also its existence. In other words, as far as the incumbent monopoly is 
concerned about the risk posed by possible new entrants geared with new inventions, 
then the monopoly will become proactive as there is a real threat to its survival in the 
market. As a result, the monopoly will try to invent a new product or new process of 
production or a new way of management to avoid a process called 'creative destruction'. 
This process consists of the dynamic development of capitalism - the old products,
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production techniques, and management practices will be continuously replaced or 
destroyed by the new one which has been created within the system itself.
Thus, in this sense, price competition is less relevant for the development of 
capitalism and wealth accumulation o f the nation. The essence of capitalistic revolution 
is the introduction of new inventions. Therefore, as long as the environment in an 
economy supports the inventors to invent and introduce their new product, new process 
of production, new management practice in the market, economic progress is ensured. 
Consequently, the existence of monopoly rights, which encourage the inventors to invent 
and earn a substantial amount of money for financing the cost o f invention plus a profit 
as a prize to the inventor, is not a negative factor for economic development if and only 
if the market is contestable. Without the contestability condition in the market, there is 
no incentive for the monopoly to replace itself with its own invention and therefore 
protecting itself from being replaced by someone else.
Considering open economy scenario, literatures have emphasised the importance 
of international trade and investment on economic development. Findlay (1978) 
suggested that foreign direct investment (FDI) would enhance economic growth. The 
reason was that, in his model, FDI was assumed to have a positive effect on 
technological progress within the host countiy. Thus, FDI can be seen a channel 
transferring technology from the advanced to the developing countries. BlomstrOm et at 
(1992)1, however, found that FDI significantly influenced income growth only if the host 
country has ability to absorb technology from the multinational firms. A  positive effect 
of FDI on economic growth was found for the case of the higher income developing 
countries only. For the lower income developing countries, other variables (such as 
secondary education, changes labour participation rates, and the initial distance behind 
the USA -  i.e. income gaps between the US and the considered country) were the main 
factors explaining economic growth of the countries. They summarised that “the ‘least 
developed countries ’ may learn little from the multinationals, because local firms are too 
far behind in their technological levels to be either imitators or suppliers to the 
multinationals” .
1 They used the data o f  78 developing countries during 1960-85, including H ong K ong, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Only Taiwan and Thailand were categorised as 
the low er incom e developing countries.
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Likewise, Acemoglu & Zilibotti (2001) showed that the productivity (and thus 
income per worker) differences across the nations can be explained by the differences in 
ability to utilise the transferred technologies. They reasoned that numbers of 
technologies were invented and designed to fit the skills o f the OECD countries’ 
workforces. Although the less developed countries (LDCs) can later access these 
technologies, it may not be fully utilised since workforces in these countries do not 
acquire adequate skills. A  mismatch between the requirements o f the new technology 
and the skills of LDC workers is a factor explaining low productivity in LDCs.
In addition, Frankel & Romer (1999) found that with-in and international trade 
raise income per worker through different channels. They showed that, for the case of a 
simple OLS estimation, a proportion o f trade share in GDP only had a significant 
positive effect on physical and human capital accumulations, but did not relate with the 
productivity levels o f the nations. However, for the instrument variable (IV) case, the 
proportion of total trade share in GDP (instrumented by distances between the nations, 
population sizes of the trade partners, areas of the countries, and dummy variables e.g. 
landlocked and common border between countries) only had a moderately statistically 
significant positive effect on productivity levels of the nations. Therefore, they 
concluded that although they found a strong positive relationship between trade and 
income per worker, it was not clear to determine a channel of trade contribution to 
income growth.
Alternatively, Hall & Jones (1999) explained the productivity and output per 
worker differences by employing sociology framework in explaining an important role of 
social infrastructure on productivity differences across the sample countries. They found 
significant relationships between the differences in social infrastructures (treated as 
endogenous variables which are determined by countries’ location, other factors captured 
in part by languages, and output per worker) and the differences in factors promoting 
output per worker (i.e. physical and human capital accumulations, and productivity 
level). It was concluded that, in the long-run, rich countries achieved its high rates of 
investment both in physical and human capital because these inputs were used with a 
high level o f productivity. These productive activities were driven by social 
infrastructures i.e. institutions, and government policies. With a proper social
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environment, individuals and firms can make decisions in investing, crating and 
transferring ideas, and producing goods and services efficiently.
Indeed a similar argument (but more specific for East Asian growth experience) 
about roles of social environment on productivity was earlier proposed by Landes 
(1990). He reasoned that East Asian economic growth might be explained by the 
relatively homogeneous society with a high degree of historical and cultural uniqueness. 
With great unity and less ethnic conflict within the country, the development process 
would be made easier. Similarly, Easterly & Levine (1997) also concluded that ethnic 
diversity could explain at least 25 percent of the East Asia-Africa growth differences. 
They also claimed that high degree of ethnic fragmentation as in Sub-Saharan Africa 
significantly explained most o f the growth obstructing factors (e.g. low schooling, 
political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, and distorted foreign exchange 
markets) found in the region. Rodrick (1997) also showed that the differences in the 
quality of the country’s institutions (e.g. quality of the bureaucracy, rule of law, and risk 
of forced nationalisation o f the business) can explain the growth performance of East 
Asian countries. The higher the quality of institutions, the better the growth performance.
Considering the relationship between output market competition, labour market, 
and productivity, Nickell (1999) suggested that there is a possibility of rent-sharing 
between the labour and monopoly through the collective bargaining process. He also 
quoted the work o f Nickell and Nicolitsas (1997) that more competition will lead to 
lower profits and a lower market share for each firm. This tends to yield the reduction in 
wage increases and changes in work practice which then increases the productivity of the 
firm. Moreover, he also reasoned that the monopoly power in the product market causes 
slackness in management level since there are fewer opportunities to compare the 
management performance with the competitors and the chance of firm’s bankruptcy is 
minimal. Even though the empirical evidence supporting these ideas is not conclusive, as 
a whole it tends to suggest a negative relationship between the product market power and 
the productivity of the firm.
Parente & Prescott (2000) suggested that monopoly rights play an important role 
in the economic development process. The poor countries are poor because inferior 
technologies have been used (and/or being used inefficiently). This is because there are
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too many monopoly rights existing in the market. Instead of considering the rights as the 
incentive to invent a new product or process o f management, they believed that these 
rights are the barriers preventing a firm (thus a countiy as a whole) from adopting 
existing superior technology. This conclusion came from the idea that the coalition of the 
insiders, i.e. the labour union, will refuse to adopt a better technology as long as there is 
no potential threat in the final product market. Without this threat, the coalition will 
reject any change in work practice which aims to increase productivity levels since the 
cost o f job losses from accepting this change would be higher than the gain from a better 
wage paid for the coalition as a whole. However, with the potential threat of the new 
entrant(s), to avoid total job losses (since the incumbent may be totally replaced by a 
new rival), the coalition must sacrifice some of their members and accept to adopt a 
superior work practice allowing the incumbent to be a more competitive firm.
Comparing this view from Parente & Prescott (2000) with Schumpeter’ s idea, the 
latter seems to be more in favour o f monopoly existence. However, as previously 
mentioned, from the Schumpeter’ s view, to ensure that the incumbent monopoly will 
create a new invention continually, the final product market must be at least contestable. 
That is Schumpeter’s idea also does not agree with ‘too strong’ monopoly power in the 
market. In other words, both Schumpeter and Parente & Prescott’ s idea are not in favour 
of monopoly rights especially when there are too many. In summary, Parente & Prescott 
(2000) proposed that the cause of TFP differences across the nation is the differences in 
degree of market competition. The higher the degree of market competition the lower the 
resistance from insiders’ coalition and thus the higher the productivity. A  table 
summarising the related literatures on income and productivity differences is provided 
below:
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T a b le  6.1: List o f studies on Income and Productivity Differences
A u th o r(s ) D escriptions E xp lanations fo r  T F P  
and In co m e D ifferences
Schumpeter (1976) Theoretical work 
(verbal explanation)
Differences in ‘ Social Capability’ lead to differences 
in productivity levels. Final product market must be 
at least ‘ contestable’ in order to force an incumbent 
m onopoly to invent. Long-run econom ic growth 
depends on innovation rather than price competition.
Findley (1978) Theoretical M odelling FDI is a channel transferring technology across the 
nations. Implicitly, a policy  promoting FDI is 
preferred in order to close productivity gaps between 
the rich and the poor.
L andes(1990) Theoretical and 
historical comparisons
Ethnic conflict within a cou n ty  retards the 
development process. East Asian econom ic growth 
might be explained by  the relatively homogeneous 
society with less ethnic conflicts.
Blomstrom et at (1992) Empirical w ork on 78 
developing countries, 
during the years 1960- 
1985
FDI had a positive effect on incom e growth only i f  a 
host country could absorb the technology transferred 
from  the multinational firms. Differences in workers’ 
skill might be able to explain the difficulty in 
technology diffusion between countries.
Easterly &  Levine (1997) Empirical work, 
comparing growth 
experiences o f  Sub- 
Saharan African 
countries and other 
countries during the 
years 1960s to 1980s.
Ethnic diversity can explain most o f  the growth 
obstructing variables (e.g. low  schooling, political 
instability, and distorted foreign exchange market).
A t least one-fourth o f  the growth difference between 
East Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries can be 
explained by  the variable captured ethnic 
fragmentation within the countries.
Frankel &  Rom er (1999) Empirical w ork on 
effect o f  trade on 
growth based on data 
from  Summers &  
Heston (1991), Penn 
W orld Table Mark 5.
With-in and international trade had a strong positive 
relationship with incom e per worker. However, it is 
not clear that whether increase in trade proportion to 
GDP can raise TFP level o f  the nation.
Hall &  Jones (1999) Empirical study on 
TFP level accounting 
and the effect o f  social 
variables on 
productivity level, 
based on the data o f  
127 countries o f  die 
yearl988.
Differences in ‘ Social Infrastructure’ lead to 
differences in choices o f  econom ic agents. With a 
proper social environment, econom ic agent w ill 
select a productive action (rather than diversion) 
since the expected return o f  the unproductive activity 
(such as corruption and thievery) is lower than that 
o f  the productive one. The incom e differences across 
the nation can be explained by  the differences in 
social infrastructures.
A cem oglu  &  Zilibotti (2001) Theoretical and 
empirical w ork on TFP 
levels o f  the U N  three- 
digit manufacturing 
sectors from  22 
countries (year 1990).
Skill mismatch between OECD and LDCs workers is 
the main reason to explain productivity differences 
across the nations. LDCs cannot fully utilise the best 
technology available because workforces in the 
countries do not acquire adequate skills.
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6 .2 )  M o d e l In t ro d u c t io n
Parente & Prescott (2000) concluded that poor countries are poor because inferior 
technologies have been used and sometimes been used inefficiently. This is because 
labour coalitions in the country have been protected by the government coupled with 
monopoly power in the final product market. The explicit assumptions o f the model are:
• Government (or State) laws assist the existence of monopoly rights. Finns 
failed to dictate better work practices because of the biased behaviour of the 
state (predominantly towards labour coalitions).
• There are two types o f final products -  agricultural and manufacturing. The 
coalition can dictate work practice, technology used, and thus productivity in 
the manufacturing industry only.
• Consumers have an inelastic demand for the final products, i.e. the elasticity 
of substitution between the two products is less than one.
• For the firm to switch from the existing inferior technology to the superior 
one is almost costless due to the new technology being available for a long 
time before the decision o f adoption must be made. Thus, monopoly rent is an 
unnecessary condition in adopting a new technology.
If the above assumptions hold, then the labour coalition will be able to select 
technology used, wage, the amount o f employed members, and thus the price of the final 
product by treating consumers as the price takers. Therefore, if the market demand 
function and the cost o f entry are known, then the coalition will be able to deter the new 
entrants by setting a minimum size of its members which makes the entrants’ profit less 
than the cost o f entry.
Moreover, since it is more likely that, with protection from the state, the coalition 
will refuse to adopt the more superior technology then the next question is whether the 
state can offer a compensation scheme to persuade the coalition to adopt the new 
technology or not. It is suggested that offering such a scheme would be considered as a 
politically unpopular option in a democratic society since, in their model, the wage paid 
for the coalitions’ member is already higher than the rest o f the country i.e. the wage in 
agricultural sector.
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Concerning the option of buying off a subset of the coalition to adopt the new 
technology, it can be concluded that since it is assumed that the coalition will be able to 
earn monopoly rent only in the first period then the higher income per head earned in the 
first period is not enough to compensate for the lower wages earned in all subsequent 
periods. Lastly, if it is assumed that the coalition can earn the rent perpetually but they 
have to pay a lump-sum amount to compensate the members who lost their job. The 
coalition would still not accept this as an incentive to adopt the new technology, since 
the present value of their income flow in the case of adopting the new technology is still 
lower than the case of not doing so.
There are some points of consideration. Firstly, the model is based on the 
protected monopoly environment i.e. the number of firms is fixed and exogenous. 
Therefore the monopoly can earn the rent without any threat from the new entrants. As a 
result the coalition of the insiders can dictate the work practice and thus the firm’s 
productivity without any risk of losing job because there is no competitor. Secondly, 
consumer demand is assumed to be inelastic i.e. the elasticity o f substitution between 
two final products (agricultural and manufacturing product in this case) is less than one. 
Since it is assumed that, to a consumer’s point o f view, the two products are barely 
substitutable then indirectly this will strengthen the power o f the coalition in controlling 
work practice, productivity, and thus price of the manufacturing product.
W e modify the model in one important aspect. That is the number of firms in a 
model presented next is endogenous. The rent earned by the incumbent monopoly will 
attract the new entrants. When the profit is equal to zero, the entry of the new firms do 
not occur. This is demonstrated in the free enterprise model. Therefore, one can see the 
effect of the change in the elasticity of parameters on the concerned variables under the 
free entry environment.
Moreover, we undertake some simulations not examined in Parente & Prescott 
(2000). Under the monopoly rights environment, we explore the effect of the change in 
elasticity parameters on the concerned variables. Additionally, as previously mentioned, 
the higher the degree of market competition (or at least the higher the degree of market 
contestability) tends to yield a higher productivity level o f the firm. Thus, in our 
exercises, we will examine the choice of the work practice and thus the productivity of
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the firm chosen by the coalition for the given two scenarios. The first one assumes that 
the institutional environment in the model, such as laws and government policies, allows 
more firms to compete with the incumbent firms. That is, in this case, we explore the 
choice made by the coalition in response to the higher degree of competition from the 
firms in the same business, i.e. the firms which produce an identical product or service as 
the incumbent firms. For example, comparing this to the real world, the question asked 
from this scenario is: what will happen with the productivity of the existing 
manufacturing companies if the institutional environment allows more companies to 
produce and sell the same product to the customers, given that all workers in this 
industry are members of the only one labour union. Therefore, the union’s decision 
affects all the firms in the industry. There will be no difference in productivity and thus 
wage paid across the firms. This will allow us to explore the change in the overall 
productivity level o f the firm, i.e. the industry productivity, after the new environment 
was imposed.
The second scenario presents the case of what would be the reaction from the 
coalition if the incumbent has to compete with the substitute products. In other words, 
the competition in this case is a game between the old product and the substitute product. 
As in the model, it is assumed that there are two products - agricultural and 
manufactured products to serve the consumers’ demand and they are substitutable. 
However, in this case we still assume that the elasticity of substitution of the two 
products is less than one. The present exercise explores the effect o f increasing the 
elasticity of substitution on the coalition’ s choice of technology. That is we are about to 
investigate the coalition’ s reaction when a substitute product becomes more 
substitutable. Comparing this scenario to the real practice, this exercise is to study the 
effect of introducing a more substitutable product in the market on the choice of labour 
union work practice. In other words, the question asked from this study is: what could be 
the effect on the productivity of the firm (which is dictated by the labour union) if a 
substitute product is introduced.
The next section presents the formation of the model and the simulation results 
respectively.
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6 .3 ) M o d e l F o rm u la t io n
Following Parente & Prescott (2000) (P&P) there are three sectors -  household, 
agricultural, and manufacturing, in the model. The each household unit acquires a unit of 
land and a unit of labour. There are three inputs in agricultural sector i.e. land, labour, 
and input from the manufacturing sector. While in the manufacturing sector there is only 
one input - labour. Therefore the three sectors and labour market are interrelated as show 
in a figure 6.1 below:
F ig u re  6.1: Three Sector Model
•  T h e  Household  Sector
Households of type h = a, x, employed in the agricultural and manufacturing 
sector respectively, each own one unit of labour (TV) (which may work either as a worker 
in agricultural or manufacturing sector) and one unit of land (L) (as an input for the 
agricultural sector) and earns a wage wh and a rent r respectively, wa ^  wx necessarily.
It should be noted that the model is static. Therefore there is no need to introduce 
intertemporal aspects. The optimisation problem of the household of type h is to choose 
quantities ah and xh (z) of the agricultural goods and the differentiated manufacturing 
goods of type i =  1, 2 ,... n respectively, to maximise utility
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u, X X 0 7  + /Jarh
i=1
subject to a budget constraint
t l
ai, + ! ? < » / , ( ' )  = wl:+r
(6.1)
(6.2)
1=1
where p(i) is the price of variety i and the price o f the agricultural good is set at unity 
(i.e., the agricultural good is the numeraire). Equation (6.1) is a CES utility function with 
elasticity o f substitution between each variety of manufacturing and the agricultural good
given by e - -------- . If y < 0 then the elasticity s < 1 and this is the ‘price inelastic’ case
i -r
chosen by P&P.
To carry out the type h household's optimisation problem define a Lagrangian
4  = YjXiM Y
(=1
w.
n
+ r-ah~Yp(})x,,{i)
i=l
(6.3)
where A > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions (foe) are
xn(0  : Y xiAY
»=1
T-ir
xl 1 “  Zp(i) = 0
a Y x,,(fY + ml
i=l
1-1
jLtaYh 1 -  A =  0
Hence dividing the foe we have
P(i) =  — 
P \xhftj
Substituting back into the budget constraint, we arrive at
n
[pp(i)Y + X P(j)xh U) = wh+r ; i =  1,2,
M
ah=[pp(i)Yxh(i)
(6.4)
(6.5)
(6.6)
(6.7)
(6.8)
If manufacturing firms are identical then we have a symmetric equilibrium with 
p(f) =  p and xh (z) =  xh leading to demand functions
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X, =
wh +r 
np +  [ppY
= xiXwh>r>n>P) ; h = a,x (6.9)
=  ~ -  ah(wh,r,n,p) ; h = a,x (6.10)
np + [pp]
• The Agricultural Sector
Given factor inputs X a if) o f manufacturing of typez, labour, Na and land, La , 
farms produce according to the following CES production function:
Y =T*  a  a
n
P_ P
w 2 X o r " +  Q  - v W M T Y (6.11)
_ M
where Ta is the TFP in agriculture, 1
1 — O'
is the elasticity of substitution between each
manufacturing input, under a condition o e  [0,1). If <x = 0 then the two inputs are 
perfectly substitutable. The CES production function collapses to Cobb-Douglas
1
technology when o approaches to one (cr ->  1 ).
1 ~P
is the elasticity of substitution
between manufacturing inputs and labour and land grouped together and p e [0,1).
Farms are price-takers and the first order profit-maximising conditions equate the 
marginal product to the factor price giving
X M Y a
(6.12)
dXa(i) f y  \
O.j
w. _ 3 Ya _ Ta(l-r)a[NZLl? r lNr 1L'?
8Na(i) (Y
(6.13)
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In a symmetric equilibrium with Xa (i) =  X a and p(i) - p , this leads to the following 
factor shares in total output of manufacturing inputs (ms), wages (ws) and rent ( rs )
nX„pnXa ms = —   =  y/
w NWS =  y- a- = (1 -  lj/)a
T p n p t y - ' - \ )
N al}~aTa a a
rs = =  (1 -  y/)(l - a) N aLl~aTf a a a
(6.15)
(6.16) 
(6.17)
• The Manufacturing Sector
The Manufacturing sector producing the ith good employs only labour Nx(i) and 
produces output given by the production function
X(i) = nxNx(i) (6.18)
where the labour-augmented technology (nx) takes one of the three values <nx < n2 
and n2 denotes the best technology available. It follows that profits in the iih industry 
Ilfr /) are given by
TAx(i) = (nxp(i)-wx)Nx(i) (6.19)
That is in this model the three sectors are independent. Total labour forces 
provided by household have to be allocated between the agricultural and manufacturing 
firms. The household utility function depends on the amount of agricultural and 
manufacturing products consumed subject to total income from wage and rent earned 
from the two production sectors. At the same time, to produce the agricultural product 
needs: inputs from the manufacturing sector, and the technology used in the 
manufacturing firms which is dictated by the choice of labour coalition. Simultaneously, 
the choice of technology utilised in the manufacturing firms determines the real wage 
paid to the workers and ultimately the effective demand for the products.
The following section explores the case when the free competition environment is 
allowed.
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6.4) The Free Enterprise Arrangem ent
In the free enterprise arrangement there are no monopoly rights and no 
constraints on the use by firms of technology. Hence firms try to use the best technology 
available. That is nx =  n2 . Firms are free to enter the manufacturing sector until profits
are forced down to zero, i.e. n x(i) =  0 . Thus, drawn from the zero profit condition, real
wage of labour equals the productivity of the firm, i.e. n2 = = — . Workers move
P(f) P
freely between the manufacturing and agricultural sectors until wage rates equalise, i.e. 
wx =wa =w  for instance. It follows from (6.9) that household demands would then be
xx = xa = x , and ax = aa = a, and are given by
X = — W* r = x(w, r, n, p) (6.20)
np + [jup]
„ [ppY(w + r) ..........a==---------- —  -—  = a(w,r,n,p) (6.21)
np+ [/.&]
• The Equilibrium
In equilibrium the four markets: labour, land, agricultural goods and 
manufacturing goods all clear. This leads to the market clearing conditions:
Na+nNx= N  (6.22)
L„=N  (6.23)
nA  + nA  =Na = Y„(6.24)
Nax +  nNxx +  nXa =  Nx + nXa =  nX (6.25)
The free entry conditions in agriculture and manufacturing completes the equilibrium:
Ya =  P»X. + + rLa (6.26)
w - n2p (6.27)
In our equilibrium of identical manufacturing firms we can write agricultural output and 
manufacturing output as:
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V =T y\nxj +(\-V)(
X  = 7T2N x.
(6.28)
(6.29)
Equations (6.15) to (6.17) and (6.20) to (6.29) give 13 equations in 12 endogenous 
variables: prices [w,r,p], labour allocations [Na ,NX], the land allocation La, sector
outputs [X, X a,Ya], consumption [x,a] and the number of firms n . This appears to give
us one too many equations. However Walras' Law tells us that in a general equilibrium 
model with n markets, market clearing in (n-l) of them implies the nth market also 
clears. For example, it is straightforward to show that (6.21), (6.24) and (6.26) => (6.20). 
We can therefore dispense with one of these market clearing equations: we choose to 
drop (6.24). Figure 6.2 shows the inter-relationships between the three sectors and labour 
market conditions.
Figure 6.2: The Free Enterprise Arrangement
Household
n
max(J(ah>xh(i))) s.t. ah+YpQK(0=>Vr
In Summary, for the numerical solution, there are 12 equations (i.e. equation 
(6.30) to (6.41)) in 12 endogenous variables:[w,r,p], [Na,Nx,La], [X,Xa,Ya], [x,a],
and n . The following three equations show factor shares in total output of manufacturing 
inputs (ms ), wages ( ws) and rent (rs) respectively.
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pnXms =  —   = w
7  Y
M L
Y,
w„Nn
ws =  y  ~  ( V)a
rs = df = (\-y/)(\-a)
TPnP(<r-'-l)
. Y .  „
K l'/tX
(6.30)
(6.31)
(6.32)
Equation (6.33) and (6.34) are demand functions of the manufactured and agricultural 
products under a symmetric equilibrium.
w + r , Nx = ------------------=  x(w,r,n,p)
nP + lPP] 
[ ju p Y ( w + r)
np + [PPY
= a(w,r,n,p) .
(6.33)
(6.34)
Market clearing conditions for the three markets, i.e. labour, land, and manufacturing 
product, are:
Na+nNx= N  (6.35)
La= N  (6.36)
Nx + nXa =  nX . (6.37)
While the free entry conditions (i.e. zero profit conditions) in agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors give:
Y« =PnXn+wN„ +rLa 
w  = n 2p  .
Lastly, the production functions of the two sectors are:
(6.38)
(6.39)
Y =Ta a ¥[nxX + 0  - y w
X  = 7T2Nx .
(6.40)
(6.41)
From this system of 12 equations, ultimately we aim to find the relationships between the 
change in parameters (i.e./? and y) in the system and the value of interested variables
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such as price, rent, and employment in both production sectors. The next sections present 
model calibration and simulations respectively.
•  C a lib ra tio n
In this process we set the values of weights in the utility and production functions 
to be consistent with observations of data in the form of consumption shares and factor 
shares within each sector. To simplify our exercise, a careful choice of units was selected 
as detailed next. The choice of numeraire and number of households in the calibration 
exercise were also included. There are 7 parameters required: production parameters 
defining elasticities (p and cr), a consumption parameter defining elasticity of
substitution between the agricultural and manufacturing products ( / ) ,  production 
weights (ccandy/), a consumption weight ( / / ) ,  and a TFP in agricultural sector (Ta). 
The calibration now proceeds through the following stages:
1) Choices o f N u m e ra ire : As previously mentioned, we have already chosen the 
price of a unit of the agricultural good as our numeraire.
2) N u m b e r o f Households and L a n d : For simplicity we choose to normalise 
our number of households as unity (N = 1). Consequently, since each 
household owns one unit of land, our unit of land is unity as well ( i.e. La = 1 ) . 
For example, in a real economy of say 50 million households occupying 105 
km2 of agricultural land, this defines 105/(5 x 107) =  0.02 Ion2 as our unit of 
land.
3) U n it  o f W ag e  and Price: Since it is assumed that with perfect competition a 
technology used in the manufacturing sector will be the best technology 
available (n2) and fixed, then it is useful to assign that n2= 1. So from the 
zero profit condition, our baseline value of wage, price, and productivity level 
are unity (w  = p = n2 =1). It should be noted that in the monopoly rights 
model price and wage are no longer unity.
4) E lastic ity  Param eters: For p , cr, and y we utilise the econometric 
estimated values from P&P as our baseline values.
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5) Consumption Weight: Let the consumption proportion — -cp. Utilising the
x
A
observed data for cp from P&P denoted by cp. Then from (6.8) we have that
a ~ a i-r
ju = cp - cp (6.42)
6) Production Weight: To set the baseline value of a, we used the data
A  A
provided data for ws and rs from P&P. Given the information from (6.31)
A
and (6.32) we have that —  =  ■■ giving:
A I—a rs
A
W S _  . _ v
a = - — r  (6.43)
ws+ rs
7) Remaining Parameters: These are y/ and Ta they need to be calibrated 
together. From (6.30) with p =  1 we have ms - y/mspTfnp(a '_1). Hence
A  1 - P
ms . . .
V =  .  — ^ n • (6.44)
Tapnp(a _1)
which is a function of the TFP parameter, Ta, still to be determined, and the
number of firms n. The latter we need to set as unity n~ 1 as a normalised 
baseline. That is in reality n =  1 would mean there are one hundred firms in the 
market, for example. To determine Ta and y/ jointly we use the free-entry 
condition (6.38) and (6.40) which in the baseline calibration becomes
_ i
yt[nx:r+{l-y/)N:P P. (6.45)
To complete the calibration we need to solve for baseline values for r,Na, and 
X a . From (6.30), (6.31) and (6.32) with w - p = La =  1 we have that:
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A
(6.46)
ws
A
(6.47)
hws
From (6.35), (6.37) and (6.41) we have:
Nx(w, r, n, p) + nXa = n2nNx = 7t2(N -Na) (6.48)
We can now substitute for x(-) from (6.33) and for rand X a from (6.46) and (6.47) to 
solve N a. In our baseline calibration with p - w = N  = La=n2= 1 and using observed 
data we arrive at:
Substituting for r , X a and Na from (6.46), (6.47) and (6.49), and for y/ from (6.44) we 
can use (6.45) to solve for 7 $  Then from (6.44) y/ is also obtained. This calculation is 
undertaken using the M ATLAB subroutine Fsolve to solve a function of Ta. The next 
section presents M ATLAB simulations and results.
• M ATLA B  Simulations
Our M ATLAB programs again use Fsolve to solve the following set of equations
A A
(h - 1  +  cp) ws
(6.49)A A A  A
h +  cp+ cp rs+ (1 -  h) rs
for:
(6.50)
(6.51)
(6.52)
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w + r
x= r i g~x(w9r9n,p) (6.53)np + [pp\
Ya  = PnXa  + w N a  + r L a (6.54)
w = n2p (6.55)
II /[nXlf +(1 -Y)Y
1
(6.56)
Nx(w,r,n,p) + nXa =7T2 (N-Na) (6.57)
This leaves x,p, and Trtto be determined by (6.53), (6.55), and (6.56). For the baseline
calibration the initial root [1 ,r,Xa,Na,n] with r,Xa, and Na is given by (6.46), (6.47)
and (6.48) respectively, and in fact gives the actual solution providing a useful check on 
our algebra.
Having run Fsolve with all parameters at their baseline values and confirmed that 
the initial and final roots coincide, we are now in the position to carry out some 
interesting simulations. Ultimately we wish to compare a monopoly rights outcome with 
the free enterprise outcome using the same calibrated parameters as well as studying the 
changes in the endogenous variables [w,r,Xa,Na,n]. For now we do a simpler 
experiment: keeping all other parameters at their baseline values we allow two 
parameters, i.e. pm\&y, to vary in turn.1 Table below summarises calibrated parameters 
in the model:
1 Chosen or calibrated parameter values, taken largely from P&P, are: y -  -0.11, p  =  0.71, and <j= -1.
The follow ing data was based on P&P, table 8.2: ms = 0 .7 2 , rs -  0.035 and ws =  0.245. From cp=  1.09 
g a v e // =  1.10 as in P&P. W e arbitrarily choose h =  1 as our normalised baseline. With this choice, the 
remaining calibrated parameters worked out as: a  = 0.875, xp =  0.5891, and Ta = 1.8427.
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Table 6.2: Summarised Baseline Calibration for Free Enterprise Arrangement
Parameter Value Method of Calculation
P 0.71 Econometric Estimation (P&P)
r -0.11 Econometric Estimation (P&P)
cr -1.0 Econometric Estimation (P&P)
P 1.10
A
Calculated from Equation (6.42), given c p =  1.09, 
and / =  -0.11.
a 0.875
A
Calculated from Equation (6.43), given m s -  0.72, 
r s =  0.035 and thus w s  = 0.245 from P&P.
¥ 0.5891 M A T LA B  Calculation (Fsolve)
T„ 1.8427 M A T LA B  Calculation (Fsolve)
Given information from the baseline calibration, the following figures, obtained 
from M ATLAB , show the model simulation results.
Figure 6.3: Free Enterprise Model: Change in parameter p
Source: Model Simulation
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Our first exercise is to explore the effects of the change in parameter p  on the 
important variables in the model. Since — —^  is the elasticity o f substitution between
1 -p
manufacturing inputs and labour and land inputs grouped together in the agricultural 
production function, then the higher the/?, the higher the elasticity of substitution 
between the two groups of input. As the inputs are seen as the more substitutable 
products, thus under the perfect competition the decrease in price o f these inputs is 
expected. The model (shown in figure 6.3) suggests that the higher the elasticity 
parameter/? the lower the price of the manufactured product and thus the more 
manufactured input w ill be required in producing agricultural output. Thus, considering 
labour allocation between two sectors, less labour w ill be employed in the agricultural 
sector and hence more labour w ill be utilised in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, the 
total labour coalition size in manufacturing sector ( n N x) is expected to be bigger.
However, it is suggested that the number of firms w ill increase leading to the expectation 
that the size of the labour coalition within each firm will be slightly smaller.
Figure 6.4: Free Enterprise Model: Change in parameter/
Source: Model Simulation
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Figure 6.4 shows our second exercise considering a change on the consumer side. 
The elasticity parameter y determines the elasticity of substitution between
manufacturing and agricultural product in the consumer’s utility function, i.e. s =
i -r
and in this case it is assumed that y < 0 i.e. the price inelastic case. Since it is assumed 
that demand is inelastic, then even if the two products (i.e. the manufacturing and 
agricultural product) are more substitutable we do not expect a significant change 
(especially a decrease) in the price of the products. That is, from the model, it is 
suggested that even if the parameter y changes from -0 .5  to -0 .1 1 , the price of the 
manufacturing input is still almost unchanged. Therefore, in addition, there are also no 
significant changes in: the amount of each input used in producing the agricultural 
product, the labour allocation between sectors, and the number of manufacturing firms 
competing in the model.
In other words, under the free enterprise arrangement, the change in the supply 
side elasticity parameter, p , has a much bigger impact on resources allocation and thus 
prices of inputs than the change in the demand side. This perhaps is owned to the profit 
maximisation behaviour of the producer. Once the two inputs (manufacturing inputs and 
labour and land inputs grouped together) are more substitutable, the profit maximising 
producer will switch to a cheaper input instantly. On the other hand, considering the 
demand side, since the consumer’s demand is inelastic, then there is no reason for the 
profit maximising producer to lower their price and thus there will be no significant 
change in resources allocation and prices. The next section presents the monopoly rights 
model.
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6 .5 )  T h e  M o n o p o ly  R ig h ts  M o d e l
This section explores a scenario where there is monopoly rights in the model. The 
degree of monopoly power in the final product market is high enough to strengthen the 
power of the coalition of the insiders to be able to dictate the work practice of the firm. 
In other words, imder the highly protected environment in the final product market, the 
competitiveness of the firm is not a relevant issue to ensure the well-being of the labour 
union’s members. Therefore, the labour coalition will be able to dictate the technology 
used in the firm in order to maximise its members’ utility.
The model can be summarised as followed. Similar to the Free Enterprise 
Arrangement, in this model, there are three sectors-household, manufacturing, and farm. 
The each household unit acquires a unit of land and a unit of labour. There are three 
inputs in agricultural sector i.e. land, labour, and input from manufacturing sector. While 
in the manufacturing sector there is only one input, i.e. labour. Three production 
technologies are available for the manufacturing sector i.e. nQ<nx<n2, and
manufactured output can be seen as: x =  nxN xi given N  - N a +nNx as a total number
of labours. Na and Nx are the number of labours work in agricultural and manufacturing
sector respectively, while n denotes number of manufacturing firms. Technology nx is
fully labour-augmented. Thus, labour productivity and real wage for labour is —  = n ,
P
while p denotes price of the output. It should be noted that, as the numeraire, the price of 
agricultural output set at unity. Real wage paid in agricultural sector is then wa.
As mentioned, the model assumed that, with the biasness of the government 
policy, the coalition of the insiders (labours in the manufacturing firms) can dictated 
choice of technology used. Therefore, to maximise the members of the coalition’ s utility, 
the best accessible technology n2 will not be used. Hence the choice of technology lies 
between nx e [ttq , nx ]. The new entrants with the lowest technology, /r0, face no entry 
cost. However, to enter the market with the superior technology, n2, will face a cost of
w
entry of waNtp . To resist new entrants with the technology a limit price, p < — -, is
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set by the coalition. To resist the entry of the n2 technology the minimum coalition size 
is set. A  condition for the existing o f the coalition is wa < wx.
Assuming that at the first stage wa < wx, thus the coalition exists. For the new
entrants to overcome the resistance from the coalition, the cost of entiy must be less than 
the profit of entering. Given the entrant’ s choice of price is the price to maximise a profit 
function:
P ( N x ( i ) )  = argmax wa p  *
V % 2 J
w
where —+ is marginal cost of the new entrant, the coalition produces at their 
7l2
maximum limit, nxNx, and demand function is D(p). It can be seen that the entrant’ s
profit function is decreasing in N x. Therefore to prevent the new entrant with the n2
technology from competing in the market the coalition sets its minimum size satisfying 
the following condition:
max-j
r \
W aP -------
V 711 J
{D{p) - nxNx (/)) \<waN(j) (ii)
In other words, the coalition tiy to prevent the new entrants with the superior technology 
by setting its minimum coalition size in order to maximise its market share for the final 
product. By doing this, there will be no such price that satisfy the condition that the 
profit of the new entrants must be higher than the cost of entry. That is if the cost of 
entry is know to the coalition, then the coalition would maximise their market share 
n N
(__2— 4 )  by setting a minimum size of its member (N  ) in order to minimise the profit of 
D(jp)
the new entrants and make the entiy unattractive. Consequently, the best accessible 
technology, n2, will never be used. Thus, under the conditions given, a strong labour 
coalition in this model acts like the barrier to the best technology.
In brief, in this model, a coalition of size N x in manufacturing chooses a 
technology nx<nx<n2. Unlike the case o f the free enterprise arrangement, in this 
model it turns out that wx > wa. New entrants who wish to use the best technology n2
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must resist protection at a cost o f waN<j). However, new entrants who use the worse 
available technology nQ will face no entry costs. To resist the latter the incumbent firms 
w
set a limit price p < — - . To resist the former a minimum coalition size is set.
• A  P o st-E n try  E q u ilib r iu m
We first construct a general equilibrium model following entry given the price of 
manufacturing p and given the coalition size Nx where wx # . This is as follows:
p
r / n ' l ' " - 0 (6.58)
pnXnms =  — = w
Yn
nX„
Y„
w„N„ws — - tr -  (1 -  ifaa
ra =  ±  =  ( l - ^ ) ( l - a ) N aL'-aTa a a
(6.59)
(6.60)
Similar to the Free Enterprise model, the first three equations, i.e. (6.58) to (6.60), are 
factor shares in agricultural output. However since wx & wa then there are four demand 
equations in this model which are:
w +r
x- =    - = xa(w„r,n,p)
“ np+IPPr
w„ + r
=
np + lPPY
= xx(wx,r,n,p)
„ iPP](wa+r) .................N
aa =  77 7T~ = ao(Wa^n,p)
np + [PP]
_ [ ///7 ]£(wx + r ) __ -----------  — _ _  _  Ux , r, n, p)
np + [pp] 1
(6.61)
(6.62)
(6.63)
(6.64)
The three following equations are the market clearing conditions for labour, land, and 
manufacturing goods respectively.
Na+nNx=N
L = N
(6.65)
(6.66)
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D = Nax„+nNxxx+nXa (6.67)
For zero profit conditions in agricultural and manufacturing sector, the following two 
equations must hold:
giving 13 equations in 13 endogenous variables: [wa,wx,r], [Na,La\, [D,Xa,Yn], 
[xa,xx,aa,ax\ and n , given p and N x. D  denotes the total demand for manufacturing 
referred to in P&P as D(p) . In fact it is also a function of Nx and must be determined 
simultaneously with the rest of the general equilibrium model.
In M ATLAB we use Fsolve to solve the system above which outputs the demand 
D  and solves the following set o f equations for [wa,wx,r,Xa,n] given p and Nx with the
aim of constructing the demand D = D(p,Nx).
Ya =pnXa+wNa+rLa (6.68)
(6.69)Wx = 7 T l P
Lastly, the production function for the agricultural sector is:
(6.70)
(6.71)
(6.72)
a L «
(6.73)
(6.74)
(6.75)
K =pnXa + wNa+rLa (6.76)
(6.77)Wx = !T tp
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Y. =T (6.78)
D  =  Naxa (wa, r, n, p) +  raA^x* (wx, r ,«, p) + (6.79)
Na+nNx= N  (6.80)
The price pe that an entrant using the best technology and employing outsiders at 
a wage wa would set is found by solving:
p =argmax w„ P  iLTV (D(p,Nx)-n^Nx) (6.81)
This is done using the minimisation subroutine FMIN and the subroutine 
f=postentryprofit. Resisting the monopoly and gaining entry is assumed to cost an 
amount waN<f> for the entrant using the best technology. Consequently entry is deterred 
if
r \w
Pe~ —
V n T. J
CD{p\Nx)-nnxNx) < waN(j) (6.82)
The left-hand-side of (6.82) is decreasing in N x. When equality is achieved we have the 
smallest Nx which deters entry which is the equilibrium coalition size.
The monopoly rights model is now complete. The price is given by the limit price
w .
P  = —JL and the coalition size Nx are given by (6.81) and (6.82) respectively. Given this
price insiders can award themselves an income wx given by 
nN,wx =  pD(p,Nx) 
by choosing a technology nx < nx given by
D(p,Nx)
nNv
< 71 x
(6.83)
(6.84)
That is the nominal wage is wx =  pnx. Finally we must have the condition wx > wa for a 
coalition of any size to exist.
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Summary of Monopoly Rights Equilibrium
(i) Evaluate in the Post-Entry Equilibrium:
p  =argmax
waN</> -
7
LV j
w.
( .D (p ,N x)-n 7 T \N x)
p ° — ^  \(D (p ’ ,N x) -
\  7 l 'l J
(ii) Given N x evaluate the Monopoly Rights Equilibrium:
p
p n X n nX „  
ms =  — = w  — —
Ym
w N
w s  =      —  =  (1 -  y j )c i
r s  =  d y  =  Q . - i i / ) ( \ - a )
t p 1>
. K
X , L
" P + I M p Y
+ r
n p  +  l f-tp]
Ya = p n X a + w N a + rL a
= x a(wa,r ,n ,p )  
=  x x ( w x >r , n , p )
N a + n N x = N
w.
D = = Nax a (wa > r,n ,p ) + n N xx x (wx, r, n, p )  + n X a 
pD_
X n N x
D
71 x = ----
n N x
In summary, the model can be illustrated as the figure below:
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Figure 6.5: Monopoly Rights Model
As mentioned in the free enterprise arrangement section, we wish to compare a 
monopoly rights outcome with the free enterprise outcome using the same calibrated 
parameters. The following figures from MATLAB show the changes in the endogenous 
variables [w ,r,X a,N a,n] given the changes in the elasticity parameter p  and y .
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Figure 6.6: Monopoly Rights Model: Change in parameter p
p p p
Source: Model Simulation
In this exercise, under the monopoly rights environment, we explore again the 
change in the elasticity parameter in the supply side. The higher the p  the higher the 
elasticity of substitution between the inputs in the agricultural sector, i.e. manufactured 
product and land with labour grouped together. In a competitive environment, it is 
expected that all input prices (limit price ( p e), agricultural wage (vvn) and rent ( r )) 
would decrease. However, in this model, we see that the agricultural producer will 
switch to use more land and labour as the inputs, owning to the fact that, with the high 
degree of monopoly power in the market, the manufactured input was over priced. It 
should be noted that in the free enterprise arrangement, with the same calibrated 
parameters, the prices of manufactured input range around only 1 to 1.04. However, from 
figure 6.6 above, with the monopoly environment the prices are almost doubled i.e. the 
prices range around 1.9 to 1.94.
Therefore, the higher the demand for land and labour in the agricultural sector the 
higher the price paid to these two inputs (i.e. the higher the r  and thew„). Since it is 
assumed that consumer demand is inelastic, then the demand for manufactured output, as
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a final product, would not change significantly. Thus, the total demand for the 
manufactured product will decrease since less manufactured input in producing the 
agricultural product is expected. Consequently, with almost unchanged number of 
manufacturing firms as suggested in the model, the output from each firm and thus total 
output would decrease. Hence, less labour input will be needed in the production 
process. The following figure shows manufacturing output.
Figure 6.7: Manufacturing Output and the Change in parameter p
p
S o u r c e :  M o d e l  S i m u l a t i o n
Additionally, with the presence of the monopoly rights in the model, the coalition 
of insiders will try to minimise the number of job losses in this process. Therefore, the 
coalition will choose a work practice which has low productivity. Thus, the model 
suggests that the productivity level ( n x) will be lowered. Consequently, since we can
observe that both limit price ( p e) and productivity level (/rv) is decreasing in parameter 
p  then an increasing in parameter p  causes a decreasing in the nominal wage paid 
(w x ~ Pnx)t0 ^ e manufacturing workers, i.e. the coalition’s members. This leads to the 
diminishing in wage difference between the two sectors ( wx -  wa). So, in this case, the 
labour market power of insiders also falls. Moreover, it should be noted that, under the 
monopoly rights environment, the productivity level (value of the parameter n x) of the
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firm drops by nearly 2/3 of the level in the free enterprise model at the baseline 
/?=0.71.
In summary, the increase in elasticity of substitution in the supply side leads to 
the lower productive work practice selected by the coalition and also lowers the market 
power of the coalition in the labour market.
Then the next step of our study is to explore a similar scenario in the demand 
side, i.e. the effect of the increasing in elasticity of substitution in the consumer’s 
demand function ( y ). The following figure shows simulation results:
Figure 6.8: Monopoly Rights Model: Change in parameter y
S o u r c e :  Model Simulation
Turning to changes in the elasticity of demand by consumers, y , from figure 6.8, 
when manufactured and agricultural products are assumed to be more substitutable from 
the consumer point of view then lower prices for both goods can be charged. Then, 
unlike the case of the free enterprise model, since at the start of the game the 
manufacturing goods is overpriced (i.e. at the baseline, the limit price is 1.9 compared 
with 1 from the free enterprise model) again it is expected that the consumers will switch
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to consume more agricultural product and the price of the manufacturing goods (i.e. the 
limit price) will fall. The higher the demand for agricultural product the higher the 
demand for its inputs. Hence, the model suggests that the rent and agricultural wage will 
increase and slightly more manufacturing input would be needed to produce the 
agricultural product. As seen in figure 6.9, the total manufacturing output is thus slightly 
increasing in parameter y .
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the price of the manufactured product (i.e. in 
this case the limit price to deter entry) is expected to decrease more significantly 
compared with the case of free enterprise arrangement. Furthermore, in a more 
competitive environment, fewer competitive firms are expected to stay. In addition, as 
seen in figure 6.8 and 6.9, although the size of the coalition is smaller, with the higher 
productivity level, the total manufacturing output is slightly increased. Considering the 
productivity level, the increase in the elasticity parameter y  from -0.295 to -0.11 causes 
the productivity level to rise from 0.33 to 0.38. One may conclude that with a more 
competitive environment in the final product market, to allow the firm to be more 
competitive, the coalition must agree to adopt a more productive production technique 
and to accept some job losses (but the remaining members will receive a higher wage 
paid).
Figure 6.9: Manufacturing Output and the Change in parameter y
y
S o u r c e :  M o d e l  S i m u l a t i o n
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In summary, considering the demand side, the increase in the elasticity parameter 
from the demand side ( y )  (i.e. the two products are more substitutable in the consumers 
point of view) causes a more competitive environment in the model. This leads to a 
reduction in price of the manufacturing output, a slight increase in manufacturing output 
produced and sold, a smaller size of labour coalition, and a higher productivity level.
Additionally, as mentioned before, it is assumed that the number of firms in this 
model is endogenous. So, the next step is to explore the possible reaction of the coalition 
to the changes in the number of the firms given at the start of the game. That is in the 
next model we assumed that the institutional factors in the economy allow more 
homogenous firms (i.e. the firms with the same output and same technology) to compete 
in the market. In other words, the model explores the effect of market liberalisation on 
one particular industry, given that the there is only one coalition of workers in the 
industry. Therefore, there is no difference in wage paid among the firms. The coalition’s 
decision affects all the firms in the industry. The number of firms at the start of the game 
is determined exogenously by the government policy and other institutional factors but 
the number of firms remaining at the end of the game is determined endogenously by the 
market.
Let nb be the arbitrary number of firms given at the start of the game given by
the institutional factors. Utilising the same model specification, as seen in equations 
(6.85) to (6.97), yields the results shown in the following figure:
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Figure 6.10: Monopoly Rights Model: Increase in number of competing firms in the market
S o u r c e :  M o d e l  S i m u la t i o n
It can be seen that the more firms there are at the start, the higher the number of 
firms left at the end of the game. Therefore there will be more competition in the market 
that causes the decrease in price of the manufacturing product. Consequently, since the 
price of the manufacturing input is lowered, more manufacturing product is used as the 
input into the agricultural sector. Meanwhile, as the price of the manufacturing product 
decreases then the decrease in the nominal wage of the manufacturing sector (wt) is 
expected. However the real wage of the manufacturing worker depends on the change in 
productivity of the manufacturing sector { n x) discussed next. Additionally, the model
suggests that there will be more firms left competing in the market and the higher the 
number of firms in the market the lower the level of output produced from each firm. 
Therefore, with the same productivity level, there will be a number of job losses for each 
firm. However, since it is assumed that the coalition of insiders can dictate the work 
practice utilised in each firm in the industry, then to minimise the number of job losses 
the coalition would decide to adopt an inferior technology, i.e. a lower productivity work 
practice.
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Consequently, this will lower the real wage paid to workers and thus lower the 
purchasing power of the workers. As a result, this will lower the budget constraint of the 
individual worker, which in turn lowers the effective demand for the total output and 
lowers the output produced simultaneously. In other words, the more competition 
imposed in the model, the lower is output produced and sold in each firm. Without a 
strong labour coalition, given a fixed technology, the number of job losses in each firm is 
expected. On the other hand, with a strong labour coalition, the coalition will dictate the 
choice of technology and select a lower technology or a lower productivity work practice 
in order to minimise the number of job losses. Simultaneously, this will lower the total 
manufacturing output produced and sold in the model.
To a policy maker, dealing with a strong labour coalition, introducing new 
homogenous firms into the system may have a negative effect on the selected 
productivity for each firm even if this policy may be able to decrease the price of the 
final product. In other words, with the presence of a strong labour coalition, the policy 
that aims to increase the number of homogenous firms to compete with the incumbent 
may have a negative effect on the productivity level of firms since it is assumed that the 
coalition can dictate the choice of work practice for the whole industry. On the other 
hand, as seen in figure 6.8, the change in consumer behaviour such as the case of 
increasing parameter y  will have a positive effect on the productivity level selected by 
the coalition. Therefore, in order to make an influence on the consumer behaviour, 
especially in the case of elasticity of substitution, the policy maker may introduce the 
different substitutable products in the market.
Consequently, the model suggests that, to tackle the resistance from the coalition 
of the insiders in a particular industry in preventing the change to a more efficient work 
practice, an efficient policy is to introduce a more substitutable product into the market 
in order to provide a wider choice to the consumers. Since the coalition does not have the 
power to dictate the choice of technology used in an industry that produces a substitute 
product, then to allow the incumbent firm to be more competitive and to survive 
competition, the coalition must adopt a more productive work practice in order to 
prevent total job losses.
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6.6) Conclusions
From our model simulation, we conclude that under the monopoly environment, 
the productivity level of the firm drops by nearly 2 / 3 of the level of the free enterprise 
model. This fits with the assumption used by P&P that the best choice of productivity 
level in monopoly rights arrangement is the value of 3 while the best available 
productivity level is 9. Therefore, it is clear that, without competition, the productivity 
level of the firm may drop more than half. Moreover, P&P suggested that the coalition 
will never accept the compensation options (as referred to previously) offering the 
coalition to adopt a higher productivity work practice. Therefore, this implies that the 
monopoly rights in the market act as a barrier to a more productive technology. 
Consequently, in order to be able to utilise such technology in the market, more market 
competition is needed. Our study suggests that, given the environment as set in P&P 
paper i.e. strong labour coalition in a particular industry, introducing more firms in a 
particular' industry would not be the most appropriate choice to tackle the resistance from 
the coalition since it is assumed that the coalition still has the power to dictate the choice 
of technology used in the new entrant firms.
For example, to overcome the resistance from the trade union in the railway
o #
industry (e.g. RMT ), introducing another train company would not help improving 
industry productivity since the union would still be able to intervene in the choice of 
work practice of the new firm. By doing so not only the productivity cannot be 
improved, but also it may be worsen as the coalition may decide to adopt the inferior 
technology to minimise the number of job losses due to the lowering of the output 
produced from each firm. The solution suggested by our study is the introduction of 
substitute services such as domestic low-priced airlines. Since the union cannot dictate 
the airline’s choice of technology and thus price and quality of the service, then to 
compete with such competition the union must adopt the more productive work practice 
in order to allow the train company to survive the competition. However, as our model 
based on the assumption that the substitute product (i.e. agricultural goods) has an input 
from manufacturing sector, then as a demand for the substitute product goes up the
2 R M T  is  a  U K  tr a d e  u n io n  w h i c h  it s  m e m b e r s  c o m e  f r o m  m o s t  o f  th e  t r a n s p o r t  in d u s t r y  i.e .  r a i lw a y ,  
u n d e r g r o u n d ,  b u s e s  a n d  r o a d  f r e ig h t  ( s h i p p in g  i s  a ls o  i n c lu d e d ) .  S e e  h t t p :/ / w w w .r m t .o r g .u k
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manufacturing output does not fall. Therefore, to rectify our analogy to fit the 
assumption mentioned, there must be a backward linkage from the low-priced airlines to 
the train and other services controlled by the RMT. We may consider services such 
airport-bus link, express train to airport, and luggage check-in service at the train station 
(and of course the luggage will be carried through the train network to the airport) as our 
linkages. As demand for these services is a derived demand from airlines business, then 
the rise in demand for airlines does not crowd out all the demand for train services. 
Consequently, with these links, introducing the low-priced airlines will lead to the higher 
productivity and thus output in the railway industry.
From a macro view, to enhance the productivity level of a country, the 
competition from substitute products (or services) is needed. This competition may come 
from both inside and outside the country. Domestic competition is a vital step for 
improving the productivity of a developing country. Additionally, since the domestic 
coalition of the insiders cannot dictate the choice of production productivity and thus 
price of the imported products, then the only way left to the coalition is to allow the 
domestic firms to improve the technology used and to compete with the imported 
products. Therefore, international trade promotion between countries helps improve the 
productivity level within the trade partner countries. However, to achieve this, one 
condition must be met; there must be a substantial backward linkage between 
international and domestic firms. This condition support the ‘minimum local contents’ 
argument for the international trade agreements. Without the linkage the stronger 
international firm will simply replace the domestic business. Similarly, the liberation of 
the services sector of a country is also a recommended policy.
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A p p e n d i x  6.1 
M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s  M o d e l :  P a r e n t e  a n d  Prescott (2000)
According to Parente & Prescott (2000), there are three sectors-household, 
industrial, and farm in the model. The each household unit acquires a unit of land and a 
unit of labour. There are there inputs in agricultural sector i.e. land, labour, and input 
from manufacturing sector. While in the manufacturing sector there is only one input- 
labour. Three production technologies are available for the manufacturing sector i.e. tt0 <
n x< n 2, and manufactured output can be seen as: x = n xN x, given N  -  N a + n N x as a 
total number of labours. N a and N x are the number of labours work in agricultural, 
manufacturing sector respectively, while n denotes number of manufactured firms. That 
is the technology n x is fully labour-augmented. Labour productivity and thus real wage 
wfor labour is —-  = ttx , while p  denotes price of the output. It should be noted that their 
P
model has been normalised by using the price of agricultural output, set at unity, as the 
numeraire. Real wage paid in agricultural sector is wa.
The model assumed that, with the biasness of the government policy, the coalition 
of the insiders (labours in the manufacturing firms) can dictated the choice of technology 
used. Therefore, to maximise the members of the coalition’s utility, the best accessible 
technology n 2 will not be used. Hence the choice of technology lies between 
7ix e [^0,^j]. The new entrants with the lowest technology-7T0 face no entry cost. 
However, to enter the market with the superior technology- n 2 will face a cost of entry of
.  w
waN(p . To resist new entrants with the 7r0 technology a limit price- p  < is set by the
coalition while to resist the entry of the n 2 technology the minimum coalition size is set. 
A condition for the existing of the coalition is wa < wx, otherwise all the labours will 
work in the agricultural sector.
Given at the first stage wa < w x , thus the coalition exists. For the new entrants to 
overcome the resistance from the coalition the cost of entry must be less than the profit of 
entering. Given the entrant’s choice of price is the price to maximise the profit function:
r
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P
(A6.1)
where —1—is the marginal cost of the entrant, the coalition produces at their maximum
limit-7T1N X, and the demand function is D ( p ) . It can be seen that the profit function of
the entrants is decreasing in N x . Therefore to prevent the new entrant with the n 2
technology to compete in the market the coalition sets its minimum size  satisfying the 
following condition:
In other words, the coalition try to prevent the new entrants with the superior 
technology by setting its minimum coalition size in order to maximise its market share
that the profit of the new entrants must be higher than the cost of entry. That is if the
profit of the new entrants and make the entry unattractive. Consequently, the best 
accessible technology- n 2 will never be used. Thus, under the conditions given, a strong 
labour coalition in this-model acts like the barrier to the best technology. A full detailed 
explanation of the model can be seen in Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000). The game 
between the coalition and the new entrants can be summarised as in the flowchart below:
(A6.2)
for the final product. By doing this, there will be no such price that satisfy the condition
cost of entry is know to the coalition, then the coalition would maximise their market
71 Nshare ( ^ - y ) by setting a minimum size of its member ( N x) in order to minimise the
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A p p e n d i x  6.1 (Cont.)
S t a g e  1 :  W ,  < W X S t a g e  1 :  w a < w x
maxj P  —
N o  e n t r y  C a s e
\
7t.
S t a g e  2 :  P o t e n t ia l  e n t r a n t  d e c id e s  
w h e t h e r  to  o v e r c o m e  th e  r e s is t a n c e  
to  u s e  712 . C o s t  o f  e n t r y  i s  waN(f) .
2 j
T h i s  c o n d it io n  i s  l i k e l y  w h e n  d ie  c o a lit io n  
s i z e  i s  s u f f i c i e n c y  la r g e
S t a g e  3 :  
C o a l i t i o n
s e le c t s  7TX t e c h n o lo g y  
( 7 1  x  < 7 T { )
P r i c e
P = - W a /7T0
( B r e a k e v e n  p o in t  o f  f a r m  s e c t o r  u s i n g  
F 0 )
W a g e  p a i d
Wr = * x P
w  % / » . )  K
K*0
( S o ,  i f  7 1  % €  [ w 0 , 7 T ,  ] ,  t h e n  w a  <  w x  )
F i n a l  P r o d u c t
nxN x=D(wt /ttq)
( M a r k e t  c l e a r i n g  c o n d it io n )
S o ,  i f  th e  c o a l i t io n  w a n t s  to  d e t e r  th e  
e n t r y ,  a t  le a s t  it s  m e m b e r  s i z e  m u s t  s a t i s f y  
t h is  c o n d it io n :
mpX{(p ~ ~ 7TlA?-x'^)|= WaNif
S i n c e  g a i n  to  th e  e n t r a n t  i s  d e c r e a s in g  in  
N x , t h e n  th e  c o a l i t io n  h a s  a  c h o i c e  to  d e t e r  
t h e  e n t r y  b y  m a x i m i s i n g  N x  st.
D ( - )
71 v =■
N x
a n d  7 t „  e
E n t i j y  c a s e
S t a g e  3 :
7T2 t e c h n o lo g y  i s  u s e d  ( w it h  f r e e  
r id e r s  w h o  d id  n o t  p a y WaN(/>).
T h u s ,  th e  e n t r a n t  c a n n o t  e a r n  
m o n o p o ly  r e n t  in  u s i n g  
7V2 t e c h n o lo g y .
T h e  e n t r a n t  s e le c t s  p  w i t h  a  m a r g in a l  c o s t  o f
w
~  , w h i le  th e  c o a l i t io n  p r o d u c e s  a t  t h e ir  
^2
m a x i m u m  l im it ,  tc\ N x  .
E n t r a n t ’ s  C h o i c e  o f  P r i c e
P (N x(i ) )=ar  gmaxmxj |  P ~ — 1  
P [V n2 j
( D ( p ) - n {N x (i))
T h u s ,  th e  p o s s ib le  p r ic e  f o r  th e  e n t r a n t  is :
w„
P ( P X (  0 ) e
 o_ ,YCl
7 I2 71]
St. c o s t
c o n s t r a in t
V
m a x
p 77,
P    ( D ( p )  -  TV, N x  ( 0 )  } > w a N<J)
W a g e  p a i d
w* = n x P  =  n \P
I f  w a >  w x , th e n  th e  c o a l i t io n  c e a s e s  to  e x is t .  
F i n a l  P r o d u c t  — D ( p )
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A p p e n d i x  6.2 
M A T L A B  C o d e s  for the F r e e  Enterp r i s e  A r r a n g e m e n t
The following m-files subroutines were used in conducting model simulations in 
the free enterprise arrangement.
• F r e e e n t e r e n d o g n . m
f u n c t i o n  f = f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ( z )
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  p i 2
w = z ( 1 ) ;
r = z  ( 2 )  ;
X a = z  ( 3 )  ;
N a = z  ( 4 )  ; 
n = z  ( 5 )  ; 
p = w . / p i 2 ;
Y a = T a . * ( p s i . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) . * ( X a . A r h o ) + ( 1 -  
p s i ) . * N a . A ( r h o . * a l p h a ) ) . A ( 1 . 0 . / r h o ) ; 
x = ( w + r ) . / ( n . * p + ( m u . * p ) . A ( X . 0 . / ( 1 - g a m m a ) ) ) ;
f ( 1 ) = w . * N a . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * a l p h a . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o ;  
f ( 2 ) = r . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * ( 1 - a l p h a ) . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o ;  
f ( 3 ) = p . * n . * X a . / Y a - p s i . * ( X a . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) ; 
f ( 4 ) = x + n . * X a - p i 2 . * ( 1 - N a ) ; 
f ( 5 ) = Y a - p . * n . * X a - w . * N a - r ;
• T F P C a l . m
f u n c t i o n  f = T F P C a l ( x )
g l o b a l  r h o  s i g m a x  a l p h a  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  
T a = x ( l )
p s i = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( T a . A r h o . * n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) ) ;  
Y a b = T a . * ( p s i . * n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) . * ( X a b . A r h o ) + ( 1 -  
p s i ) . * N a b . A ( r h o . * a l p h a ) ) . A ( 1 . 0 . / r h o ) ; 
f ( 1 ) = Y a b - ( n b . * X a b + N a b + r b ) ;
• P P F r e e E n t e r g a m m a l o o p . m
% P P F r e e E n t e r g a m m a l o o p . m  
% L o o p  i n  p a r a m e t e r  g a m m a
% U s e s  s u b r o u t i n e s  f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n  a n d  T F P C a l
% R e q u i r e s  O p t i m i z a t i o n  t o o b o x  a n d  f s o l v e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r
‘6
o,'o------------------------------------------------- - -----------
%
%B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
Cl'oo. _ ___  _'O
o,*o
g l o b a l  m u g a m m a  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 20."o
% S t e p  0
% C h o o s e  b a s e l i n e  f i r m  n u m b e r  n b  a n d  e l a s t i c i t y  s i g m a x < 0
cp
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nb=l;
sigmax=-l;
'O
% N o t e  t h a t  s i g m a x  i s  s i g m a  i n  t h e  p a p e r
% S t e p  1 C h o o s e  E l a s t i c i t i e s  g a m m a < 0  a n d  r h o > 0  a s  i n  P P  p a g e  1 2 4
o .
'o
g a m m a = - 0 . 1 1  
r h o = 0 . 7 1
a
'o
% S t e p  2 C h o o s e  d a t a
%
% w s b ,  r s b  a n d  m a s p  e q u a l  t o  f a c t o r  s h a r e s  o f  w a g e s ,  l a n d  a n d  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n p u t s
% i n  t h e  F a r m  S e c t o r  i n  b a s e l i n e  c a l i b r a t i o n
%
w s b = 0 . 1 4 . / 0 . 1 6 . * ( 1 - 0 . 7 2 )  ; 
r s b = 0 . 0 2 . / 0 . 1 6 * ( 1 - 0 . 7 2 )  ; 
m s b = l - w s b - r s b ;
%
% a g r i c u l t u r e / m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o n s u m p t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n s  c p
O.
'O
c p = 1 . 1 0 . A ( l . / l . l l )  ;
a
■o
Q.
'O
% S t e p  3 C h o i c e  o f  U n i t s
o ."6
a
"o
% L a = N = l ;  C h o o s e  u n i t s  s u c h  t h a t  p = w = l
% T h i s  i s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a l i b r a t i o n  t h a t  f o l l o w s
% I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
p i 2 = l ;
'O
% S t e p  4 C a l i b r a t e  a l p h a  mu
a
o
a
"o
a l p h a = w s b . / ( w s b + r s b ) ; 
m u = c p . ^ ( 1 - g a m m a ) ;
Q.
"O
% S t e p  5 C a l i b r a t e  p s i  a n d  T a
% N o t a t i o n :  d e n o t e  b a s e l i n e  v a l u e s  o f  N a ,  X a ,  r  b y  N a b ,  X a b ,  r b
% B a s e l i n e  N a b ,  X a b  a n d  r b  g i v e n  b y
*0
Nab=wsb.* (cp+nb-1)./(rsb+(nb+cp).*(1-rsb));
X a b = m s b . * N a b . / ( n b . * w s b ) ; 
r b = r s b . * N a b . / w s b ;
o.*o
% S o l v e  f o t  c a l i b r a t e d  T a = T F P  i n  A g r i c u l t u r e
9."d
o.
"o
o p t i o n s ( 1 )  = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6  ; 
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 )  = 5 0 0  ; 
p s i t r i a l = 0 . 5 ;
T F P 0 = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) . * p s i t r i a l ) ; 
T a = f s o l v e ( ' T F P C a l 1 , T F P 0 , o p t i o n s )
psi=(msbA(1-rho))./(Ta.Arho.*nb.A (rho./sigmax-rho)) 
pause
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% CH EC K B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
Cj
%     ______________________________________
Q,
Xt
% S o l v e  m o d e l  f o r  x = [ w ,  r ,  X a ,  N a ]  u s i n g  b a s e l i n e  s o l u t i o n  x O = [ l , l , X a b ,  
N a b ]  a s  i n i t i a l  r o o t
‘o
o p t i o n s ( 1 )  = 1  ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0  ;
x 0 = [ l ,  r b ,  X a b ,  N a b ,  n b ]
x = f s o l v e ( ’ f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ' , x O , o p t i o n s )
p a u s e
"6 — —---------------
%S I M U L A T I O N S  C H A N G I N G  O N E  P A R A M E T E R  g a m m a
%
<P_________ ___________ _______ _ ___________ ______ ______ _ _____________ _ _ _____
% I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
9.
n = 4 0 ;
g a m m a v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
w v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )  ; 
r v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
X a v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
N a v e c = z e r o s ( n ,  1 )  ; 
n v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )  ;
"o
%g a m m a l o o p
o ,
'o
f o r  i = l : n
g a m m a v e c ( i ) = - 0 . 1 1 - ( i - l ) . * 0 . 0 1
g a m m a = g a m m a v e c ( i ) ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6  ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;
x = f s o l v e ( 1 f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ' , x O , o p t i o n s ) ; 
x 0 = x ;
w v e c ( i ) = x ( 1 ) ;  
r v e c ( i ) = x ( 2 ) ;
X a v e c ( i ) = x ( 3 ) ;
N a v e c ( i ) = x ( 4 ) ;  
n v e c ( i ) = x ( 5 ) ;
e n d
O.'o
% P l o t s  
% F i n d  p
p v e c = ( w v e c . / p i 2 )
% F i n d  N x
N x v e c  =  1 -  N a v e c ;
% F i n d  T o t a l  N x  
T N x v e c  =  N x v e c . * n v e c ;
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f i g u r e
subplot(3,3,1) ; 
plot(gammavec,pvec); 
xlabel('\gamma')
y l a b e l ( ' P r i c e  o f  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 2 ) ;
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , X a v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 3 ) ;  
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , w v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )  
y l a b e l ( ' WAGE R A T E ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 4 ) ;  
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , r v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )  
y l a b e l ( 1 R E N T ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 5 ) ;
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , N a v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' A g r i . E m p l o y m e n t ’ )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 6 ) ;
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , n v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' N U M B E R  O F  F I R M S ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 7 ) ;
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , N x v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( N x ) ' )
s u b p l o t  ( 3 , 3 , 8 )  ;
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , T N x v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' T o t a l  C o a l i t i o n  ( n N x ) ' )
• P P F r e e E n t e r r h o l o o p . m
% P P F r e e E n t e r r h o l o o p . m  
% L o o p  i n  p a r a m e t e r  g a m m a
% U s e s  s u b r o u t i n e s  f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n  a n d  T F P C a l
% R e q u i r e s  O p t i m i z a t i o n  t o o b o x  a n d  f s o l v e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r
%
q.o ---------------------- ------
'6
%B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
'o
q.
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2  p i t r a i l
Cj.
%Step 0
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q.
*o
% C h o o s e  b a s e l i n e  f i r m  n u m b e r  n b  a n d  e l a s t i c i t y  s i g m a x < 0  
n b  = 1  ; 
s i g m a x = - l ;
% N o t e  t h a t  s i g m a x  i s  s i g m a  i n  t h e  p a p e r
o.
% S t e p  1 C h o o s e  E l a s t i c i t i e s  g a m m a < 0  a n d  r h o > 0  a s  i n  P & P  p a g e  1 2 4c|
g a m m a = - 0 . 1 1  
r h o = 0 . 7 1
Cj,
% S t e p  2 C h o o s e  d a t a
o .
o
% w s b ,  r s b  a n d  m a s p  e q u a l  t o  f a c t o r  s h a r e s  o f  w a g e s ,  l a n d  a n d  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n p u t s
% i n  t h e  F a r m  S e c t o r  i n  b a s e l i n e  c a l i b r a t i o n
%
w s b = 0 . 1 4 . / 0 . 1 6 . * ( 1 - 0 . 7 2 )  ; 
r s b = 0 . 0 2 . / 0 . 1 6 * ( 1 - 0 . 7 2 )  ; 
m s b = l - w s b - r s b ;
% a g r i c u l t u r e / m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o n s u m p t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n s  c p
q,
c p = 1 . 1 0 . A ( l . / l . l l )  ;£
O
o .
% S t e p  3  C h o i c e  o f  U n i t s
q.
o
5-
% L a = N = l ;  C h o o s e  u n i t s  s u c h  t h a t  p = w = l
% T h i s  i s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a l i b a r t i o n  t h a t  f o l l o w s
% I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
p i 2 = l ;a
■q
% S t e p  4 C a l i b r a t e  a l p h a  mu
O.
Q.
"O
a l p h a = w s b . / ( w s b + r s b )  ; 
m u = c p . A ( 1 - g a m m a ) ;  
a l p h a  
m u
p a u s e
o.
'o
% S t e p  5 C a l i b r a t e  p s i  a n d  T a
% N o t a t i o n :  d e n o t e  b a s e l i n e  v a l u e s  o f  N a ,  X a ,  r  b y  N a b ,  X a b ,  r b
' d
o,"6
% B a s e l i n e  N a b ,  X a b  a n d  r b  g i v e n  b y
q,
■o
N a b = w s b . * ( c p + n b - 1 ) . / ( r s b + ( n b + c p ) . * ( 1 - r s b ) ) ;
X a b = m s b . * N a b . / ( n b . * w s b ) ; 
r b = r s b . * N a b . / w s b ;
q
'o
% S o l v e  f o t .  c a l i b r a t e d  T a = T F P  i n  A g r i c u l t u r e
q.
o
q,
"O
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;  
p s i t r i a l = 0 . 5 ;
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%psib=0 . 9;
T F P O = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) . * p s i t r i a l ) ; 
T a = f s o l v e ( 1T F P C a l ’ , T F P O , o p t i o n s )
psi =(msb.A (1-rho))./(Ta.Arho.*nb.A (rho./sigmax-rho)) 
pause
%CH EC K B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
g,
%S o l v e  m o d e l  f o r  x = [ w ,  r ,  X a ,  N a ]  u s i n g  b a s e l i n e  s o l u t i o n  x O = [ l , l , X a b ,  
N a b ]  a s  i n i t i a l  r o o t
*o
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1  ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0  ;
x 0 = [ l ,  r b ,  X a b ,  N a b ,  n b ]
x = f s o l v e ( ' f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ' , x O , o p t i o n s )
p a u s e
O, ,__,___ _____________      _ _________ ___   ________________ __________________ — — ______ ______ —
%S I M U L A T I O N S  C H A N G I N G  O N E  P A R A M E T E R  r h o
%
g.'o •—    — — —--------- .-
% I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
o,'o
o.
o
g,*o
%I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
q.'O
n = 3 1  ;
r h o v e c = z e r o s ( n ,  1 )  ; 
w v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
r v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )  ;
X a v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
N a v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
n v e c = z e r o s ( n ,  1 )  ;
% r h o l o o p
Ci
'o
f o r  i = l : n
r h o v e c ( i ) = 0 . 7 1 - ( i - 1 ) . * 0 . 0 1
r h o = r h o v e c ( i ) ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;
x=fs o l v e ( ’ f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n 1 , x O , o p t i o n s ) ; 
xO=x;
w v e c ( i ) = x ( 1 ) ;  
r v e c ( i ) = x ( 2 ) ;
X a v e c ( i ) = x ( 3 ) ;
N a v e c ( i ) = x ( 4 ) ;  
n v e c ( i ) = x ( 5 ) ;
e n d
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% F i n d  p
p v e c =  ( w e e  . / p i 2 ) ;
% F i n d  T o t a l  N x  
T N x v e c  =  1  -  N a v e c ;
% F i n d  N x
N x v e c  =  T N x v e c . / n v e c ;
% f i g u r e  
f i g u r e
p l o t { r h o v e c , T N x v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' C o a l i t i o n  S i z e ' )
% P l o t s
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 1 ) ;  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , p v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( 1 \ r h o 1 )
y l a b e l ( ' P r i c e  o f  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 2 ) ;  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , X a v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ’ )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
subplot(3,3,3); 
plot (rhovec, w e e )  ; 
xlabel ( ' \ r h o ' )  
ylabel ( ' WAGE R A T E ' )
subplot(3,3,4); 
plot(rhovec,rvec); 
xlabel('\rho') 
ylabel ( ' R E N T ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 5 ) ;  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , N a v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' A g r i c u l t u r a l 1 E m p l o y m e n t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 6 ) ;
p l o t ( r h o v e c , n v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' N U M B E R  O F  F I R M S ' )
p r i n t  - d e p s  f i g u r e P P f r e e e n t e r r h o l o o p e
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 7 ) ;  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , N x v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l { ' C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( N x ) 1 )
subplot(3,3,8); 
plot(rhovec,TNxvec); 
xlabel ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' T o t a l  C o a l i t i o n  ( n N x ) ' )
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A p p e n d i x  6.3 
M A T L A B  C o d e s  for the M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s  M o d e l
The following m-file subroutines were used in conducting model simulations in 
the monopoly rights model.
• F r e e e n t e r e n d o g n . m
f u n c t i o n  f = f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ( z )
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  p i 2
w = z  ( 1 ) ;
r = z  ( 2 )  ;
X a = z ( 3 ) ;
N a = z ( 4 ) ;  
n = z ( 5 ) ;  
p = w . / p i 2 ;
Y a = T a . * ( p s i . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) . * ( X a . A r h o ) + ( 1 -  
p s i ) . * N a . A ( r h o . * a l p h a ) ) . A ( 1 . 0  . / r h o ) ; 
x = ( w + r ) . / ( n . * p + ( m u . * p ) . A ( 1 .  0 . / ( 1 - g a m m a ) ) ) ;
f ( 1 ) = w . * N a . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * a l p h a . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o ;  
f ( 2 ) = r . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * ( 1 - a l p h a ) . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . Ar h o ;  
f ( 3 ) = p . * n . * X a . / Y a - p s i . * ( X a . * T a . / Y a ) . ^ r h o . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) ; 
f ( 4 ) = x + n . * X a - p i 2 . * ( 1 - N a ) ; 
f ( 5 ) = Y a - p . * n . * X a - w . * N a - r ;
• T F P C a l . m
f u n c t i o n  f = T F P C a l ( x )
g l o b a l  r h o  s i g m a x  a l p h a  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  
T a = x ( 1 )
p s i = ( m s b . ^ ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( T a . A r h o . * n b . ^ ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) ) ;
Y a b = T a . * ( p s i . * n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) . * ( X a b . Ar h o ) + ( 1 -  
p s i ) . * N a b . A ( r h o . * a l p h a ) ) . A ( 1 . 0 . / r h o ) ; 
f ( 1 ) = Y a b - ( n b . * X a b + N a b + r b ) ;
• e n t r y d e t N x . m
f u n c t i o n  f = e n t r y d e t N x ( x )
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  g a m m a b  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2
p i l  p i O  p  N x  D  p h i
g l o b a l  p i x  w x  w a  zO
p m i n = l ;
p m a x = 2 ;
N x = x ( 1 ) ;
p e = f m i n ( ' p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ' ,  p m i n ,  p m a x ) ; 
m a x p r o f i t = - p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ( p e ) ; 
f = m a x p r o f i t - w a . * p h i ;
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• postentryprofit.m
f u n c t i o n  f = p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ( p e )
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  g a m m a b  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2
p i l  p i O  p  N x  D  p h i  p i x  w x  w a  r  X a  n  zO
% z O = [ w a ,  r ,  X a ,  n ] ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) =50 0 ;
P=Pe ;
z = f s o l v e ( ' p o s t e n t r y ' ,  z O , o p t i o n s ) ; 
w a = z ( 1 ) ;
f = - ( p e - w a . / p i 2 ) . * ( D - p i l . * n .  *  N x ) ;
% f = -  ( p e - w a . / p i 2 ) . *  ( D - 0  . 5  . * p i l . * N x )  ;
• p o s t e n t r y . m
f u n c t i o n  f = p o s t e n t r y ( z )
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  g a m m a b  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  p i 2  p i l  p  N x  D n  
w a = z ( 1 ) ;  
r = z  ( 2 )  ;
X a = z ( 3 ) ;  
n = z  ( 4 )  ; 
w x = p i l . * p ;
N a = l - n . * N x ;
Y a = T a . * ( p s i . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) . * ( X a . A r h o ) +  ( 1 -  
p s i ) . * N a . A ( r h o . * a l p h a ) ) . A ( 1 . 0 . / r h o ) ; 
x a = ( w a + r ) . / ( n . * p + ( m u . * p ) . A ( 1 . 0 . / ( 1 - g a m m a ) ) ) ;  
x x = ( w x + r ) . / ( n . * p + ( m u . * p ) . A ( 1 . 0 . / ( 1 - g a m m a ) ) ) ;
D = N a . * x a + n . * N x . * x x + n . * X a ;
f ( 1 ) = w a . * N a . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * a l p h a . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o ;  
f ( 2 ) = r . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * ( 1 - a l p h a ) . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . Ar h o ;  
f ( 3 ) = p . * n . * X a . / Y a ~ p s i . * ( X a . * T a . / Y a ) . Ar h o . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) ; 
f ( 4 ) = Y a - p . * n . * X a - w a . * N a - r ;
• m onopolyrigh t4 .m
f u n c t i o n  f = m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 ( z )
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  g a m m a b  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2  
p i l  p i O  N x  D
g l o b a l  p h i  p i x  w x  w a  r  X a  n  
w a = z  ( 1 )  ; 
r = z  ( 2 )  ;
X a = z ( 3 )  ; 
n = z  ( 4 ) ;  
w x = z ( 5 ) ;  
p = w a . / p i 0 ;
N a = l - n . * N x ;
Y a = T a . * ( p s i . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) . * ( X a . Ar h o ) + ( 1 -
psi).*Na.A (rho.*alpha)).A (1.0./rho);
xa=(wa+r)./(n.*p+(mu.*p).A (1 .0 ./(1-gamma)));
xx=(wx+r)./(n.*p+(mu.*p).A (1 .0 ./(1-gamma)));
f ( 1 ) = w a . * N a . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * a l p h a . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o ;
f ( 2 ) = r . / Y a - ( 1 - p s i ) . * ( 1 - a l p h a ) . * ( N a . A ( a l p h a ) . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o ;
f ( 3 ) = p . * n . * X a . / Y a - p s i . * ( X a . * T a . / Y a ) . A r h o . * n . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x ) ;
f ( 4 ) = Y a - p . * n . * X a - w a . * N a - r ;
D m o n o p o l y = N a . * x a + n . * N x . * x x + n . * X a ; 
p i x = D m o n o p o l y . / ( n . * N x ) ; 
f ( 5 ) = w x - p . * D m o n o p o l y . / ( n . * N x ) ;
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• M o n o p o l y R i g h t s g a m m a l o o p . m
% M o n o p o l y R i g h t s g a m m a l o o p  
% L o o p  i n  p a r a m e t e r  Gamma
% U s e s  s u b r o u t i n e s  f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ,  T F P C a l ,  e n t r y d e t N x ,  p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t , 
p o s t e n t r y  a n d  m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 .
G."O
q , _  _  _  _ _________ _ _________________________ _ _________________________ _ _______ _ _  _  _  _
g.
x-
%B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N  U S I N G  F R E E - E N T E R P R I S E  M O D E L
g.o
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  g a m m a b  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2  
p i l  p i O  p  N x  D  p h i  
g l o b a l  p i x  w x  w a  z O  p e
"6
% S t e p  0
q.o
% C h o o s e  b a s e l i n e  f i r m  n u m b e r  n b  a n d  e l a s t i c i t y  s i g m a x < 0  
"6
n b = l  ;
s i g m a x = - l ;
"6
% N o t e  t h a t  s i g m a x  i s  s i g m a  i n  t h e  p a p e r
g.'o
% S t e p  1 C h o o s e  E l a s t i c i t i e s  g a m m a < 0  a n d  r h o > 0  a s  i n  P P  p a g e  1 2 4  
g a m m a = - 0 . 1 1  
%F i x e d  R h o  
r h o = 0 . 7 1
o_"o
% S t e p  2 C h o o s e  d a t a
g.
o
g.-&
m s b = 0 . 7 2 . / l ;  
r s b = 0 . 1 4 . * ( 1 - m s b ) ; 
w s b = ( 1 - 0 . 1 4 ) . * ( 1 - m s b ) ;
o ."o
% a g r i c u l t u r e / m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o n s u m p t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n s  c p
cp=1 .1 0 .A (l./l.ll) ;
q,■p
% S t e p  3  C h o i c e  o f  U n i t s
o„'d
% L a = N = l ;  C h o o s e  u n i t s  s u c h  t h a t  p = w = l
% T h i s  i s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a l i b a r t i o n  t h a t  f o l l o v / s
% I t  f o l l o v j ' s  t h a t :
pi2=l;
o.o
% S t e p  4 C a l i b r a t e  a l p h a  mu
O,'o
alpha=wsb./(wsb+rsb); 
mu=cp.A (1-gamma);
%
% S t e p  5 C a l i b r a t e  p s i  a n d  T a
% N o t a t i o n :  d e n o t e  b a s e l i n e  v a l u e s  o f  N a ,  X a ,  r  b y  N a b ,  X a b ,  r b  
% B a s e l i n e  N a b ,  X a b  a n d  r b  g i v e n  b y
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N a b = w s b . * ( c p + n b - 1 ) . / ( r s b + ( n b + c p ) . * ( 1 - r s b ) ) ;
X a b = m s b . * N a b . / ( n b . * w s b ) ; 
r b = r s b . * N a b . / w s b ;
o„"o
% S o l v e  f o r  c a l i b r a t e d  T a = T F P  i n  A g r i c u l t u r e
'o
9 -t>
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) =  5 0 0 ;  
p s i t r i a l = 0 . 5 ;
% p s i b = 0 . 9 ;
T F P 0 = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) . * p s i t r i a l ) ;
T a = f s o l v e ( ' T F P C a l ' , T F P O , o p t i o n s )
psi=(msb.A (1-rho))./(Ta.Arho.*nb.A (rho./sigmax-rho)) 
pause
Q.'O
Ct.________ _ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________
% CH EC K B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
15 
o."o ”  — — «  — — — — — —. — — *— — — —* — —. ------ - — --------------------------   _-------------------------
o'O
% S o l v e  m o d e l  f o r  x = [ w ,  r ,  X a ,  N a ]  u s i n g  b a s e l i n e  s o l u t i o n  x O = [ l , l , X a b ,  
N a b ]  a s  i n i t i a l  r o o t
o,'o
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;
x 0 = [ l ,  r b ,  X a b ,  N a b ,  n b ]
x = f s o l v e ( ’ f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ’ , x O , o p t i o n s )
w F E = x ( l ) ;
r F E = x ( 2 )
X a F E = x ( 3 ) ;
N a F E = x ( 4 ) ;  
n F E = x ( 5 ) ;
N x F E = ( 1 - N a F E ) . / n F E ;
O.'o
% o t h e r  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s
%
o.
^ a l t e r n a t i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  ( P & P s  v a l u e )
%
p i 0 = l . / 9 ;  
p i l = l . / 3 ;
9*o
•'o “    — --------
a'o
%C A L I B R A T E  p h i  s o  t h a t  N x ( M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s ) = 0 . 7 * N x ( F r e e  E n t e r p r i s e ) .
N x h a t = 0 . 7 . * N x F E ;
N x = N x h a t ;
z0=[x(1), x (2), x (3) , x (5)] ; 
p m i n = l ;
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pmax=2 ;
pe=fmin ( ' p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ' ,  pmin, pmax) 
maxprofit=-postentryprofit(pe) 
pe
pause
%
% c a l i b r a t e  p h i
q,"o
w a ./pi2
%pe
phi=maxprofit./wa
%S I M U L A T I O N S  C H A N G I N G  ON E  P A R A M E T E R  Gamma
"O
9-  _______  ,____. _______________________________ __ _____ ______________ ________________ _
% I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
% I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
q
*o
n = 1 5  0 ;
o. o, Q, Cj, O,"o o  o  o  o
g a m m a v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
w M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )  ; 
r M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )  ;
X a M R v e c = z e r o s ( n ,  1 )  ;
N a M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
n M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
p i x v e c = z e r o s ( n ,  1 )  ;
N x v e c = z e r o s ( n ,  1 )  ; 
w r e l v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
y 0 = [ N x h a t ] ;
z z O =  [ x  ( 1 )  , x  ( 2 )  , x  ( 3 )  , x  ( 5 )  , x  ( 1 )  ] ;
q*o
%gamrna l o o p
q
x .
f o r  i = l : n
g a m m a v e c ( i ) = - 0 . 1 1 - ( i - l )  . * 0 . 0 0 1  
g a m m a = g a m m a v e c ( i )  ;
% S o l v e  f o r  n e w  N x  i n  M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s  M o d e lq
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) =  1 0 0 ;
z = f solve('e n t r y d e t N x ', y O , options)
N x = z ; 
y 0 = N x ;
p e = f m i n ( ' p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ' ,  1 ,  2 ) ;
"6
% M o n o p o i y  R i g h t s  M o d e l  g i v e n  N x
q
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
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o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) =  1 0 0 ;
z=fs o l v e { ' m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 ' , zzO , o p t i o n s )  
z z 0 = z ;
f = m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4  ( z )  ;
N x v e c ( i ) = N x ;  
w a M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 1 )  ; 
r M R v e c ( i ) = z  ( 2 )  ;
X a M R v e c ( i ) - z  ( 3 ) ;  
n M R v e c ( i ) = z  ( 4 ) ;  
w x M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 5 ) ;
w r e l v e c ( i ) = w x M R v e c ( i ) . / w a M R v e c ( i ) ; 
N x t o t a l v e c ( i ) = n M R v e c ( i ) . * N x ;
% N x t o t a l v e c ( i ) = n M R v e c ( i )  . * N x v e c ( i )  
p i x v e c ( i ) = p i x ;  
p e v e c ( i ) = p e ; 
e n d
% s t  o p
'o
%P l o t s
G,‘O
f i g u r e
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 1 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , p e v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' l i m i t  p r i c e  ( p Ae ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 2 )  
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , r M R v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )  
y l a b e l ( ' R E N T ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 3 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , X a M R v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 4 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , w x M R v e c ) /
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l  ( 1 M a n u f a c t u r i n g  W a g e  ( w _ _ x ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 5 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , w a M R v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ’ \ g a m m a T )
y l a b e l ( ' A g r i c u l t u r a l  W a g e  ( w _ a ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 6 )  
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , p i x v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l  ( '  \ g a r n m a  ' )  
y l a b e l ( ' \ p i _ x ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 7 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , N x t o t a l v e c )  ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' T o t a l  C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( n N x ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 8 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , N x v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( 1 C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( N x )  ' )
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s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 9 )
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , n M R v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' N U M B E R  O F  F I R M S  ( n ) ' )
p a u s e
% C a l c u l a t i n g  t o t a l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  o u t p u t ,  n N x * p i x = t o t a l M o u t p u t
t o t a l M o u t p u t v e c ( i ) =  N x t o t a l v e c . * p i x v e c ;
f i g u r e
p l o t ( g a m m a v e c , t o t a l M o u t p u t v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ g a m m a ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  O u t p u t ' )
• M o n o p o l y R i g h t s r h o l o o p . m
% M o n o p o l y R i g h t s r h o l o o p  
% L o o p  i n  p a r a m e t e r  r h o
% U s e s  s u b r o u t i n e s  f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ,  T F P C a l ,  e n t r y d e t N x ,  p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t , 
p o s t e n t r y  a n d  m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 .
% R e q u i r e s  O p t i m i z a t i o n  t o o l b o x ,  a n d  f m i n  a n d  f s o l v e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r
o,
v*
O.Xj —  — ra~ — — —  —  — --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -_
O,
O
%B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N  U S I N G  F R E E - E N T E R P R I S E  M O D E L
Q.
■o
q .______________      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. _  _  ____ ,____ _ ___ _ ___ ____ ____ _ ____
q.
Xj
g l o b a l  m u g a m m a  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2  p i l  p i O  p  
N x  D  p h i
g l o b a l  p i x  w x  w a  z O p e
Q.
Xj
% S t e p  0
q."o
% C h o o s e  b a s e l i n e  f i r m  n u m b e r  n b  a n d  e l a s t i c i t y  s i g m a x < 0  
n b = l  ;
s i g m a x = - l ;
O,
’o
% N o t e  t h a t  s i g m a x  i s  s i g m a  i n  t h e  p a p e r
%
% S t e p  1 C h o o s e  E l a s t i c i t i e s  g a m m a < 0  a n d  r h o > 0  a s  i n  P P  p a g e  1 2 4  
’6
g a m m a = - 0 . 1 1  
r h o = 0 . 7 1
%
% S t e p  2 C h o o s e  d a t a
m s b = 0 . 7 2 . / I ; 
r s b = 0 . 1 4 . * ( 1 - m s b ) ; 
w s b = ( 1 - 0 . 1 4 ) . * ( 1 - m s b ) ;
% a g r i c u l t u r e / m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o n s u m p t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n s  c p
o„
c p = l . 1 0 . A ( l . / l . l l )  ;q
% S t e p  3 C h o i c e  o f  U n i t s
q.
% L a = N = l ; C h o o s e  u n i t s  s u c h  t h a t  p = w = l
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% T h i s  i s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a l i b a r t i o n  t h a t  f o l l o w s
% I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
pi2=l;
% S t e p  4 C a l i b r a t e  a l p h a  mu
*6
alpha=wsb./(wsb+rsb); 
mu=cp.A (1-gamma);
g
o
% S t e p  5 C a l i b r a t e  p s i  a n d  T a
% N o t a t i o n :  d e n o t e  b a s e l i n e  v a l u e s  o f  N a ,  X a ,  r  b y  N a b ,  X a b ,  r b  
% B a s e l i n e  N a b ,  X a b  a n d  r b  g i v e n  b y
g
'o
N a b = w s b . * ( c p + n b - 1 ) . / ( r s b + ( n b + c p ) . * ( 1 - r s b ) ) ;
X a b = m s b . * N a b . / ( n b . * w s b ) ; 
r b = r s b . * N a b . / w s b ;
g
'O
% S o l v e  f o t  c a l i b r a t e d  T a = T F P  i n  A g r i c u l t u r e
g
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;  
p s i t r i a l = 0 . 5 ;
%psib=0 .9;
T F P 0 = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) . * p s i t r i a l ) ; 
T a = f s o l v e ( ' T F P C a l ' , T F P O , o p t i o n s )
psi=(msb.A (1-rho))./(Ta.Arho.*nb.A (rho./sigmax-rho)) 
pause
<2.      _'o ~ — — —
% CH E CK  B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
g"o
% S o l v e  m o d e l  f o r  x = [ w ,  r ,  X a ,  N a ]  u s i n g  b a s e l i n e  s o l u t i o n  x O = [ l , l , X a b ,  
N a b ]  a s  i n i t i a l  r o o t
g'o
o p t i o n s ( 1 )  = 1  ;
o p t i o n s (2)= l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 )  = 5 0 0  ;
x 0 = [ l ,  r b ,  X a b ,  N a b ,  n b ]
x = f s o l v e ( 1 f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n 1 , x O , o p t i o n s )
W F E = X ( 1 ) ;  
r F E = x (2)
X a F E = x ( 3 ) ;
N a F E = x ( 4 ) ;  
n F E = x ( 5 ) ;
N x F E = ( 1 - N a F E ) . / n F E ;
% o t h e r  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s
% a l t e r n a t i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  ( P & P s  v a l u e )
%
pi0=1 ./9; 
pi1=1 ./3;
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% C A L I B R A T E  p h i  s o  t h a t  N x ( M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s ) = 0 . 7 * N x ( F r e e  E n t e r p r i s e ) .
O .     _ __________________ _ ____  _ _ _ _ _ _ _'O ”
N x h a t = 0 . 7 . * N x F E ;
N x = N x h a t ;
z 0  =  [ x  ( 1 )  , x  ( 2 )  , x  ( 3 )  , x  ( 5 )  ] ;
p m i n = l ;
p m a x = 2 ;
p e = f m i n ( ' p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ' ,  p m i n ,  p m a x )  
m a x p r o f i t = - p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t  ( p e )  
p e
p a u s e
o.
'o
% c a l i b r a t e  p h i
%
w a . / p i 2  
p e
p h i = m a x p r o f i t . / w a
%
O
o.____________________ _________ __________________________ _ _______________________________
%S I M U L A T I O N S  C H A N G I N G  O N E  P A R A M E T E R  R h o
Q. _____________ _______ ______
"o
% I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
Q.
% I n i t i a l i z e  v e c t o r s  u s e d  i n  p l o t s
O
t = 5 0  ;
r h o v e c = z e r o s ( t , l ) ; 
w M R v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;  
r M R v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;
X a M R v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;
N a M R v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;  
n M R v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;  
p i x v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;
N x v e c = z e r o s ( t , 1 ) ;  
w r e l v e c = z e r 6 s ( t , 1 ) ;  
y 0  = [ N x h a t ] ;
z z 0 = [ x ( 1 )  , x  ( 2 )  , x  ( 3 )  , x  ( 5 )  , x  ( 1 )  ] ;
Q.
X>
% r h o l o o p
O..
f o r  i = l : t
r h o v e c ( i ) = 0 . 7 1 - ( i - 1 ) . * 0 . 0 0 5  
r h o = r h o v e c ( i ) ;
o
'o
% S o l v e  f o r  n e w  N x  i n  M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s  M o d e l
9.
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 1 0 0 ;
z = f s o l v e ( ' e n t r y d e t N x ' , y O , o p t i o n s )
N x =  z  ; 
y 0 = N x ;
p e = f m i n ( " p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t 1 , 1 ,  2 ) ;
%’O
%Monopoly R ig h ts  Model g ive n  Nx
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o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 1 0 0 ;
z = f s o l v e ( ' m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 1 , z z O , o p t i o n s )  
z z 0 = z ;
f = m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 ( z )  ;
N x v e c ( i ) = N x ;  
w a M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 1 ) ;  
r M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 2 ) ;
X a M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 3 ) ;  
n M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 4 ) ;  
w x M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 5 ) ;
w r e l v e c ( i ) = w x M R v e c ( i ) . / w a M R v e c ( i ) ;  
N x t o t a l v e c ( i ) = n M R v e c ( i ) . * N x ;  
p i x v e c ( i ) = p i x ;  
p e v e c ( i ) = p e ;
e n d  
% s t  o p
g.'o
% P l o t s
Q.
*o
f i g u r e
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 1 )
p l o t ( r h o v e c , p e v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( 1 \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( Tl i m i t  p r i c e  ( p Ae ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 2 )  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , r M R v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ?) 
y l a b e l ( 1 R E N T ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 3 )
p l o t ( r h o v e c , X a M R v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o 1 )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 4 )
p l o t ( r h o v e c , w x M R v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  W a g e  ( w _ x ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 5 )
p l o t ( r h o v e c , w a M R v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o 1 )
y l a b e l ( ' A g r i c u l t u r a l  W a g e  ( w _ a ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 6 )  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , p i x v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o 1 ) 
y l a b e l  ( '  \ p i _ _ x  ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 7 )
p l o t ( r h o v e c , N x t o t a l v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( TT o t a l  C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( n N x ) ’ )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 8 )  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , N x v e c ) ;
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x l a b e l ( 1 \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( N x ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 9 )  
p l o t ( r h o v e c , n M R v e c ) ;  
x l a b e l ( 1 \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' N U M B E R  O F  F I R M S  ( n ) ' )  
p a u s e
D v e c = ( n M R v e c . * N x v e c ) . * p i x v e c ;
D v e c
p a u s e
f i g u r e
p l o t ( r h o v e c , D v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' \ r h o ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  O u t p u t ' )
• M o n o p o l y R i g h t s n b l o o p . m
% M o n o p o l y R i g h t s n b l o o p  
% L o o p  i n  p a r a m e t e r  n b
% U s e s  s u b r o u t i n e s  f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ,  T F P C a l ,  e n t r y d e t N x ,  p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t , 
p o s t e n t r y  a n d  m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 .
% R e q u i r e s  O p t i m i z a t i o n  t o o l b o x ,  a n d  f m i n  a n d  f s o l v e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r
%
q         _ _o  — — —  —  —  — — ---------------------— ----------------— *------------------------ — -------- ~  — ------------
%B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N  U S I N G  F R E E - E N T E R P R I S E  M O D E L
g,
'o
"d — —  — -----------     — -— ------------------------------------------- ---------
’o
g l o b a l  m u  g a m m a  r h o  p s i  a l p h a  T a  s i g m a x  m s b  X a b  N a b  r b  n b  p i 2  p i l  p i O  p  
N x  D  p h i
g l o b a l  p i x  w x  w a  zO p e
o .o
% S t e p  0
q
% C h o o s e  b a s e l i n e  f i r m  n u m b e r  n b  a n d  e l a s t i c i t y  s i g m a x < 0  
% i n  t h i s  c a s e  n b  i s  a  s e r i e s  s t a r t s  f r o m  1 t o  1 . 5
s i g m a x = - l ;
q
"o
n = 1 0 0 ;
% B a s e d  v a l u e  
n b v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )
T a v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 )  
p s i v e c =  z e r o s ( n , l )
N a b v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
X a b v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
r b v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
% F i n a l  V a l u e  
w M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
r M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
X a M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
N a M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
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n M R v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
p i x v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
N x v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;  
w r e l v e c = z e r o s ( n , 1 ) ;
f o r  i=l:n
n b v e c ( i ) = 1 + ( i - 1 )  . * 0 . 0 0 5 ;  
n b = n b v e c ( i ) ;
% S t e p  1 C h o o s e  E l a s t i c i t i e s  g a m m a c O  a n d  r h o > 0  a s  i n  P & P  p a g e  1 2 4
g a m m a = - 0 . 1 1 ;  
r h o = 0 . 7 1 ;
% S t e p  2  C h o o s e  d a t a  
'6
m s b = 0 . 7 2 . / I ;  
r s b = 0 . 1 4 . * ( 1 - m s b ) ; 
w s b = ( 1 - 0 . 1 4 ) . * ( 1 - m s b ) ;
P.‘O
% a g r i c u l t u r e / m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o n s u m p t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n s  c p
Q.'O
c p = 1 . 1 0 . A (l./l.ll);
p.’O
% S t e p  3 . C h o i c e  o f  U n i t s
"6
% L a = N = l ;  C h o o s e  u n i t s  s u c h  t h a t  p = w = l
% T h i s  i s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  c a l i b a r t i o n  t h a t  f o l l o w s
% I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
p i 2 = l ;
p.*o
% S t e p  4 C a l i b r a t e  a l p h a  mu
Q.“O
a l p h a = w s b . / ( w s b + r s b ) ; 
m u = c p . A ( 1 - g a m m a ) ;
9-*o
% S t e p  5 C a l i b r a t e  p s i  a n d  T a
% N o t a t i o n :  d e n o t e  b a s e l i n e  v a l u e s  o f  N a ,  X a ,  r  b y  N a b ,  X a b ,  r b
Q.*o
% B a s e l i n e  N a b ,  X a b  a n d  r b  g i v e n  b y
O,'O
N a b = w s b . * ( c p + n b - 1 ) . / ( r s b + ( n b + c p ) . * ( 1 - r s b ) ) ;
X a b = m s b . * N a b . / ( n b . * w s b ) ; 
r b = r s b . * N a b . / w s b ;
% S o l v e  f o t  c a l i b r a t e d  T a = T F P  i n  A g r i c u l t u r e
q,'o
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;  
p s i t r i a l = 0 . 5 ;
T F P 0 = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) . * p s i t r i a l ) ;
T a = f s o l v e ( ’ T F P C a l ' , T F P 0 , o p t i o n s )
T F P 0 = T a ;
p s i = ( m s b . A ( 1 - r h o ) ) . / ( T a . Ar h o . * n b . A ( r h o . / s i g m a x - r h o ) )
% p a u s e
T a v e c ( i ) = T a ;  
p s i v e c ( i ) = p s i ;
N a b v e c { i ) = N a b ;
X a b v e c ( i ) = X a b ; 
r b v e c ( i ) = r b ;
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%CH EC K B A S E L I N E  C A L I B R A T I O N
'G
  , . _ _.___________________ _ _
% S o l v e  m o d e l  f o r  x = [ w ,  r , X a ,  N a ]  u s i n g  b a s e l i n e  s o l u t i o n  x O = [ l , l , X a b ,  
N a b ]  a s  i n i t i a l  r o o t
g‘o
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = 1  e  -  6 ;
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;
x O = [ l ,  r b ,  X a b ,  N a b ,  n b ]
x = f s o l v e ( 1 f r e e e n t e r e n d o g n ! , x O , o p t i o n s )
w F E = x ( l ) ;
r F E = x ( 2 ) ;
X a F E = x ( 3 ) ;
N a F E = x ( 4 )  ; 
n F E = x ( 5 ) ;
N x F E = ( 1 - N a F E ) . / n F E ;
q. _ _______"o  — ~  —  —  —  —  —  — —   —  — —    ~ ---  — -------------
% o t h e r  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s  
% a l t e r n a t i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  P & P  v a l u e )
go
p i 0 = l . / 9 ;
p i l = l . / 3 ;
"6
o,_________________________________________________________________________________,____________________________________ ______________________________
g'O
%C A L I B R A T E  p h i  s o  t h a t  N x ( M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s ) = 0 . 7 * N x ( F r e e  E n t e r p r i s e ) .
%
9- _"o _ -------------     — -------------------------------------------------------■ — — —
N x h a t = 0 . 7 . * N x F E ;
N x = N x h a t ;
z 0 =  [ x  ( 1 )  , x  ( 2 )  , x  ( 3 )  , x  ( 5 )  ] ;
p m i n = l ;
p m a x = 2 ;
p e = f m i n ( 1p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ’ , p m i n ,  p m a x )  
m a x p r o f i t = - p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ( p e )  
p e
% p a u s e
q.
'o
% c a l i b r a t e  p h ig
w a . / p i 2  
p e
p h i = m a x p r o f i t . / w a
% I n i t i a l  v a l u e  f o r  M o n o p o l y r i g h t s  m o d e l
y 0 = [ N x h a t ] ;
z z 0 =  [ x  ( 1 )  , x  ( 2 )  , x  ( 3 )  , x  ( 5 )  , x  ( 1 )  ] ;
g*d
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% S o l v e  f o r  n e w  N x  i n  M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s  M o d e l
o,
o
o p t i o n s ( 1 )  = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;
z = f s o l v e ( ' e n t r y d e t N x ' , y O , o p t i o n s )
N x = z  ; 
y O = N x ;
p e = f m i n ( ' p o s t e n t r y p r o f i t ' ,  1 ,  2 ) ;
% M o n o p o l y  R i g h t s  M o d e l  g i v e n  N x
q
o
o p t i o n s ( 1 ) = 1 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 2 ) = l e - 6 ;  
o p t i o n s ( 3 ) = l e - 6 ; 
o p t i o n s ( 1 4 ) = 5 0 0 ;
z = f s o l v e ( ' m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 ' , z z O ; o p t i o n s )  
z  z  0 =  z  ;
f = m o n o p o l y r i g h t 4 ( z ) ;
N x v e c ( i ) = N x ;  
w a M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 1 ) ;  
r M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 2 ) ;
X a M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 3 ) ;  
n M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 4 ) ;  
w x M R v e c ( i ) = z ( 5 ) ;
w r e l v e c ( i ) = w x M R v e c ( i ) . / w a M R v e c ( i ) ;  
N x t o t a l v e c ( i ) = n M R v e c ( i ) . * N x ;  
p i x v e c ( i ) = p i x ;  
p e v e c ( i ) = p e ;
% s t o p  t h e  l o o p
e n d
% e n d  t h e  l o o p  
%P l o t s
f i g u r e
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 1 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , p e v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ' )
y l a b e l ( ' l i m i t  p r i c e  ( p Ae ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 2 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , r M R v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ' )  
y l a b e l ( ' R E N T  1 )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 3 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , X a M R v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l  ( ' r i _ b ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n p u t ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 4 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , w x M R v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ’ )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t u r i n g  W a g e  ( w _ x ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 5 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , w a M R v e c ) ;
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x l a b e l { ' n _ b ' )
y l a b e l ( ' A g r i c u l t u r a l  W a g e  ( w _ a ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 6 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , p i x v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ' )  
y l a b e l ( ' \ p i _ x ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 7 )
p l o t ( n b v e c , N x t o t a l v e c ) ;
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ' )
y l a b e l ( ' T o t a l  C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( n N x ) ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 8 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , N x v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b 1 )
y l a b e l ( 1 C o a l i t i o n  S i z e  ( N x )  ' )
s u b p l o t ( 3 , 3 , 9 )  
p l o t ( n b v e c , n M R v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ' )
y l a b e l ( ' N U M B E R  O F  F I R M S  ( n ) 1 ) 
p a u s e
D v e c = ( n M R v e c . * N x v e c ) . * p i x v e c ;
D v e c
p a u s e
f i g u r e
p l o t ( n b v e c , D v e c ) ; 
x l a b e l ( ' n _ b ' )
y l a b e l ( ' M a n u f a c t e r i n g  O u t p u t 1 )
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C h a p t e r  7
C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a r k s
The East Asian economic growth miracle during the late 1980s to the 1990s 
followed by a sharp recession which started in 1997 led us to question the sustainability 
of such growth. In answering the question, many studies such as Mankiw et a l (1992), 
Young (1993, 1995, 1998), Krugman (1994), Collins & Bosworth (1996), Sarel (1996), 
Fox & Diewert (1997), Hall & Jones (1998, 1999), Hsieh (1997, 1998), Hulten & 
Srinivasan (1999), and Naradi & Son (1999) have produced different answers to the 
‘East Asian economic growth controversies’ . With differences in techniques used and 
differences in data sets, some of the studies concluded that the East Asian economic 
growth phenomenon was input accumulation rather than productivity driven. Therefore, 
the growth was not sustainable. This coincided with the recent recession in the late 
1990s. However, there are also some studies that suggest an alternative view that the 
recession can be considered as just a short-run economic shock.
Moreover, Abramovitz (1986) hypothesised that the productivity growth rates of 
the technologically backward countries (such East Asian countries) tend to be a higher 
rate than that of the advanced countries (e.g. the US). However this idea is based on the 
assumption that the technologically backward countries must have sufficiently developed 
social capabilities (e.g. education, politics, commercial, industrial, and financial 
institutions) in order to allow them to fully exploit the best technology available. If this 
hypothesis is applicable for the East Asian economic growth, we should be able to 
observe the following three vital facts:
1) The productivity growth rates (TFPG) of the East Asian countries tend to be a 
higher rate than that of the advanced country (i.e. the US).
2) If the first is true, then the convergence of productivity levels between the East 
Asian and that of the US must be observed.
3) The speed of convergence process depends on the supporting institutions 
within the country itself.
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Our thesis was inspired by such controversies and aims to assess whether the East 
Asian economic growth miracle during the last three decades can be explained by the 
productivity convergence hypothesis or not. If this is true, then the three listed facts 
above must be observed. Therefore, we started to conduct a detailed research re­
investigating the cause of the East Asian economic growth. Primal and Dual growth 
accounting techniques were employed. At the beginning of our work, in Chapter 2, we 
tried to identify the problems causing the discrepancies of the growth accounting results 
from the two techniques as found in the arguments between Young (1995, 1998) and 
Hsieh (2000). Theoretically, the two techniques must yield an identical result. However, 
our explanation is; with the presence of the informal sector in the labour market, 
collective bargaining, and the possibility of capital market imperfection, the assumptions 
behind the equality of the two techniques (i.e. the perfect competition conditions) may be 
violated and thus cause these discrepancies.
To rectify the problem related with the labour market, assuming the equality of 
real wage and marginal products of labour, we tried to estimate the true share of labour 
in the GDP at factor cost by utilising the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
database on self-employed labours in estimating the real size of the total employed 
workers. With this information, we would then be able to estimate a correct real wage 
paid to labour. Assuming free labour mobility between the formal and the informal 
sectors results in the equality of the real wage between two sectors. Then we estimated 
the size of the total real wage paid in the informal sector and thus the true share of labour 
in the GDP. Without doing this, the estimated share of labour is underestimated as 
suggested by Sarel (1996) and Gollin (2002). Moreover, to deal with the increase in 
labour quality over a period of study, we utilised schooling data from Barro & Lee 
(2000) and a technique used by Hall & Jones (1998, 1999) to estimate the human capital- 
augmented labour data series and used it in our growth accounting exercise instead of 
using the pure labour data. By doing this, we arrived at the conclusion that the average 
share of human capital-augmented labour for the considered countries was around 2/3. 
This left the other 1/3 to physical capital stock. This conclusion was in line with recent 
literatures e.g. Mankiw et a l (1992).
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For the capital market, since it is suggested that the capital market in the 
developing countries may not be efficient enough to reflect the real cost of capital, it is 
then useful to assume the constant returns to scale condition and to recover the real rate 
of return of capital from the condition. This process is suggested by Hulten (2000) and 
the calculated real rate of return of capital is named as the ex post rate of return of 
capital. The reliability of this procedure depends on how precise of the estimated share of 
labour (as mentioned above) is and the accuracy of the estimated physical capital stock. 
Regarding the estimation of the physical capital stock, we followed Young (1995) by 
assuming that the growth rate of the aggregate capital stock is the function of a 
Tomqvist’s weighted average growth rate of its components (i.e. the underlying 
aggregate capital stock function is assumed to be a translog function).
With all these adjustments, Chapter 3 confirmed that our primal and dual growth 
accounting results were literally identical. We concluded that during the last three 
decades, 1971-2000, the estimated TFPGs of the four East Asian countries considered 
were higher than that of the US. In the case of Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand the estimated 
TFPG showed a significant contribution to GDP growth. Moreover, as suggested by 
Hulten (2000) we also estimated the TFPG under Harrodian’s technical growth 
assumption. This revealed a substantial increase in the estimated TFPG for all considered 
countries by roughly 1.5 times.
Additionally, we tried to decompose the source of TFPG by utilising the dual 
growth accounting technique. It can be concluded that the marginal products of the 
physical capital of the East Asian economies have been decreasing. This is reflected by 
the downward trends of the ex po s t rate of return of physical capital, especially in case of 
South Korea. However, labour productivity showed a trend in the opposite direction 
since an increasing real wage was found. Therefore, we arrived at a conclusion that the 
increase in labour productivity, rather than the increase in marginal products of capital 
can explain the TFPG of East Asian countries.
However, the findings from Chapter 3 still cannot quantify how wide the gaps of 
the TFP levels among the considered countries are, and the extent to which the gaps have 
narrowed. Therefore, in Chapter 4, to test the productivity convergence hypothesis, we
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estimated the relative TFP levels of the selected East Asian countries and the US by 
following Arrow et a l (1961) and Cave et a l (1982) procedures. Both parametric and 
non-parametric estimations showed that the relative TFP level of the US is still the 
highest level of all considered countries. However, it is clear that the rate of change of 
the US’s TFP level was still lower than the catching-up East Asian countries, especially 
Japan. That is these results also show the evidence supporting the productivity 
convergence hypothesis and confirm the results of the growth accounting study presented 
in Chapter 3. By far, apart from the case of South Korea, our two empirical chapters have 
confirmed that the cause of growth of the selected East Asian countries was productivity 
driven rather than input accumulation.
Furthermore, in Chapter 5, we extended our scope of the study by trying to 
explain the reasons behind the differences in TFP levels among the countries by 
considering the institutional conditions given for each country. Our main focuses were 
on government policy, degree of market competition, and industrial relations. This study 
showed that the strength of the labour union for each country depends on its history, 
market condition, and government policy. A country with strong ties between 
government and the entrepreneurs and a low degree of monopolisation tends to have a 
relatively weak and disorganised labour union such as the case of Thailand and Taiwan. 
In contrast, South Korea has relatively strong and organised labour unions in the country 
due to the bias in government policy towards the union (especially after the 
democratisation process in the late 1980’s) and a high degree of monopoly power of its 
conglomerate -  <'cheboV in the market.
Prior literature such as Nickell (1999) and Parente & Prescott (2000) (P&P) 
illustrated that there is a possibility of rent sharing between labours and the monopoly 
firms through the collective bargaining process. Furthermore a high degree of monopoly 
power in the final product market coupled with the strong labour union may be 
considered as a barrier to adopt a more superior technology. This fits our findings from 
the two empirical chapters. We showed that South Korea, the country with a high 
monopoly power in the market coupled with the strong and well-organised labour 
unions, was the country with a relatively low TFPG and the only country that showed a 
negative slope of the relative TFP level. With the newly democratised government’s
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support, the South Korean’s labour unions seem to be the strongest union in the selected 
East Asian countries. Our explanation is that the labour unions in South Korea are too 
strong. With this strength the unions can refuse to adopt the best work practice that 
would better suit the available physical capital stocks. Therefore, linking back to the 
evidence found in Chapter 3, the downward trend of the ex post rate of return of physical 
capital of the South Korean economy demonstrated that there were considerable amounts 
of physical capital stocks invested in the period. With the resistance from the union, the 
country failed to utilise it fully.
On the other hand, in Thailand and Taiwan, the two countries had a high 
proportion of small and family businesses in its economy with relatively disorganised 
labour unions. Our study in Chapter 4 showed that even though the relative TFP levels of 
the two countries were lower than that of South Korea, there was evidence of distinctive 
positive trends yielding the high TFPG rates which coincided with the findings in 
Chapter 3. Considering the case o f Japan, well managed industrial relations yielded a 
positive effect on TFP. Indeed, like South Korea, Japan has a considerably high degree 
of monopoly power considering the size of its conglomerates -  ‘ keiretsu ’ . However, with 
well managed industrial relations by the government and a special employment prospect 
in Japan -  ‘lifetime employment’ , labour unions in the country caused the lowest number 
of days lost from strikes and walkouts during the last three decades, as compared with 
the other selected countries. Without the disruptions caused by the unions, the TFP level 
of Japan showed an impressive positive trend, even during the economic slowdown of 
the 1990s.
In Chapter 6, we presented a theoretical model based on the relationship between 
monopoly power, labour union, and productivity of the firm. Our model is a three-sector 
(i.e. household, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors) model in a closed economy 
enviromnent as in P&P. The main modification in our model is that the number of firms 
was treated as an endogenous variable. We also added exercises showing the choice of 
technology selected by the union in response to the change in the elasticity parameters in 
the model. The model suggested that with the presence of monopoly rights in the market, 
productivity level of a firm would be reduced by approximately 2/3, with almost double 
the price for the industrial output. Furthermore, as long as the labour union still has total
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control in monopolised industry, introducing more firms in that particular industry would 
create a more competitive environment but may cause a negative effect on the 
productivity level of the firms. As it is expected that each firm will have a lower market 
share and thus a lower amount of output produced, the coalition will then fry to minimise 
the number of job losses in each firm by adopting a lower productivity work practice. 
The lower the productivity level the lower the real wage and thus the lower the effective 
demand which causes the lower output produced and sold in the market simultaneously, 
given a market clearing condition.
Alternatively, we proposed that, to tackle the resistance to adopt a more efficient 
work practice from the coalition of the insiders in a particular industry, an efficient 
policy is to introduce a competition from the substitute products in order to provide a 
wider choice to the consumers (aiming to increase the elasticity of substitution of the 
consumer’s demand). Without the power to dictate the choice of work practice in the 
substitute industry, the union no longer has the ability to resist the change in work 
practice within the incumbent firms. To allow the incumbent firm to be a more 
competitive firm and to survive competition from the new substitute product, the 
coalition must adopt a more productive work practice in order to prevent the total job 
losses within the incumbent firms.
In summary, drawn from the research results, there are some policy implications 
suggested. Since it is clear that the source of growth of the selected East Asian countries 
was mainly due to an increase in labour productivity while the productivity of the 
physical capital stock was decreasing during the period of study, then to endure this 
economic growth a policy maker may need to pay more attention to aim for increasing 
the productivity of the available physical capital stock. In order to be able to utilise the 
capital stock at its full potential, more education and/or training programme for workers 
may be required. Moreover, to introduce a work practice maximising the full potential of 
capital stock, the resistance from insiders needs be diminished. This may be done by 
introducing more competition in the market. A wider range of products offered in the 
market will limit the possibility that the coalition may resist the adoption of a new work 
practice, since not doing so the coalition will risk total job loss after the incumbent firms 
are replaced by the new entrants. With the sufficient backward linkage from the
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international firm to the domestic industry, an opened economy will benefit greatly from 
the competition imposed by the foreign firms. Therefore, a policy enhancing 
international trade and investment is also essential.
Although we put our best effort in conducting this research, inevitably it is still 
subject to some constraints. Firstly, without a limitation of the comparable international 
data, our primal TFPG estimations in Chapter 3 should be based on the working hours 
rather than the number of employed workers. It is implicitly assumed that the rate of 
change of working hours in one period (e.g. one year) equals the rate of change of 
number of employed workers. In other words, we assumed that the number of working 
hours per worker is constant. In our view this assumption may not be suitable for a short- 
run study, since the fluctuation in the number of working hours per head may change due 
to the short-run business cycle. However, in the long-run, the number should be 
reasonably stable. Since our study is based on the 30-year database, then the effect from 
the short-run cycle should be minimised. Secondly, we used the estimate of the number 
of informal employed workers from ILO which may show only a rough estimation of the 
informal economy for each country. Nevertheless, we had to use the employment data 
from ILO since we believe that this is the most reliable source for the international 
comparison purpose.
In Chapter 4, there would be a great benefit for international comparisons if the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate for Taiwan were available. Nonetheless, 
the results (i.e. the estimated relative TFP levels) from both exchange rates used (the 
official and the PPP exchange rates) for the other countries showed insignificant changes 
in its relative levels. This perhaps could be explained by the fact that the ratios between 
PPP and the official exchange rates were approximately constant during the period of the 
study. Therefore, our results for the official exchange rate should be able to serve for 
international comparison purposes. Besides, without the results for Taiwan, the results 
for the relative TFP levels for the rest of the countries still led us to the same 
conclusions.
In Chapter 5, we studied Japan, South Korea, and Thailand in great detail. With 
the differences in labour statistics, we could not compare the days lost from strikes and 
walkouts for Taiwan with other countries directly. However, the statistics shown in
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Appendix 5.2, should be a good proxy for data on days lost. Moreover, it also reveals the 
average number of workers involved in each dispute, which allows us to understand the 
scale of the dispute. As mentioned in the chapter, with the data provided, we could reach 
a conclusion that the labour unions in Taiwan are relatively disorganised compared with 
the case of South Korea.
For Chapter 6, we assumed pure labour-augmented technology in the 
manufacturing sector. Consequently, the production function in the sector was simply a 
one input (i.e. labour) model based on a certain given value of the productivity 
parameter. Thus, it would be an interesting case to study a.model with two substitutable 
inputs -  e.g. capital and labour such as the CES or the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. However, our model was designed to serve our pmpose to investigate the 
interactions between the choices of productivity selected by the coalition of insiders and 
the change in elasticity parameters. Thus it was necessary to assume that the other 
production variables (e.g. capital or the utilisation of the available physical capital stock) 
depend solely on the choice of the coalition that reflects changes in the productivity 
parameter ( n x ). Moreover, it would be a great interest to study the opened economy 
case.
From the limitations stated above, there will be some areas that one would 
consider as further challenging research tasks. Firstly, as this thesis is based on only 5 
countries, there would be a great long-run international comparison project if one would 
consider estimating the relative TFP level on a bigger scale. The comprehensive works 
of Hall & Jones (1998, 1999) were based of parametric estimation on labour and capital 
shares. Consequently, the works have a very strong assumption that all the nations have 
the same constant capital and labour share over the period of the study. By conducting a 
large scale research on a non-parametric relative productivity level, we may find more 
interesting results. In addition, research on more disaggregate levels (such as firm, 
industry, province, or state level) may yield a good benchmark in comparing productivity 
at that particular level as well. Secondly, international trade and investment are known to 
be one of the engines that drive the international technology diffusion. It would be a 
challenging task to modify our model in Chapter 6 to be an open economy model. This 
would enable us to investigate some more interesting scenarios including the effects of
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openness on home productivity level and other interested variables e.g. employment, 
output, and prices.
In summary, our research proves that the cause of economic growth miracles of 
the selected East Asian countries during the last three decades was due to productivity 
growth rather than input accumulation. The study also shows the evidence supporting the 
productivity convergence hypothesis between the East Asian countries and the US. We 
also show the important role of the institutional factors especially market competition, 
industrial relations, related laws and government policies in supporting the productivity 
advancement o f the economy. Finally we suggest that, the supporting laws and 
government policies, the higher degree of market competition coupled with the well 
managed industrial relations are the keys to achieve a higher productivity level and to 
sustain economic growth of the country.
Lastly, not only economists but also our research colleagues in other fields have 
been trying to search for the answers to make this world a better world using their 
expertise. There must be millions of development plans that can be drawn from their 
work! The ultimate aim of this thesis is try to unravel just a small part of the problem; to 
search for the answers that may help in narrowing the income gaps between the rich and 
the poor. For sure, the research will continue.
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